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Abstract 
 
The increase in online social network (OSN) usage has led to personal details 
known as attributes being readily displayed in OSN profiles. This can lead to the 
profile owners being vulnerable to privacy and social engineering attacks which 
include identity theft, stalking and re identification by linking.  
Due to a need to address privacy in OSNs, this thesis presents a framework to 
quantify the vulnerability of a user’s OSN profile. Vulnerability is defined as the 
likelihood that the personal details displayed on an OSN profile will spread due 
to the actions of the profile owner and their friends in regards to information 
disclosure.  
The vulnerability measure consists of three components. The individual 
vulnerability is calculated by allocating weights to profile attribute values 
disclosed and neighbourhood features which may contribute towards the 
personal vulnerability of the profile user. The relative vulnerability is the 
collective vulnerability of the profiles’ friends. The absolute vulnerability is the 
overall profile vulnerability which considers the individual and relative 
vulnerabilities. 
The first part of the framework details a data retrieval approach to extract 
MySpace profile data to test the vulnerability algorithm using real cases. The 
profile structure presented significant extraction problems because of the 
dynamic nature of the OSN. Issues of the usability of a standard dataset 
including ethical concerns are discussed. Application of the vulnerability 
measure on extracted data emphasised how so called ‘private profiles’ are not 
immune to vulnerability issues. This is because some profile details can still be 
displayed on private profiles. 
The second part of the framework presents the normalisation of the measure, in 
the context of a formal approach which includes the development of axioms and 
validation of the measure but with a larger dataset of profiles. The axioms 
highlight that changes in the presented list of profile attributes, and the 
attributes’ weights in making the profile vulnerable, affect the individual 
vulnerability of a profile.  
 
 
iii 
Validation of the measure showed that vulnerability involving OSN profiles does 
occur and this provides a good basis for other researchers to build on the 
measure further. The novelty of this vulnerability measure is that it takes into 
account not just the attributes presented on each individual profile but features 
of the profiles’ neighbourhood.     
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1-Research Background  
The World Wide Web (WWW) has played a part in the communication of 
humans for a number of years. Around 10-13 years ago though, internet usage 
was very different in terms of the activities carried out by the user. This is 
illustrated by a survey done by the U.S. Department of Commerce, into the 
access of technology tools in the years 1998 and 2000 (U.S Department of 
Commerce. 2000).  
Their results indicated that there were many activities carried out online. Some 
of the most popular included searching for news and information, but the most 
popular activity was checking emails. Life before the online social networking 
revolution had very different characteristics (e.g. more face to face 
conversations between users and children were playing outside more rather 
than staying in and playing on the computer). Also people were not as open 
about themselves online (Kalamdani 2009). The introduction of online social 
networks (OSNs) and Web 2.0 changed those characteristics.  
One of fastest growing phenomena has been the availability of social network 
sites on the WWW. Nielsen (2009) emphasised this by highlighting the fact that 
OSN sites have been overtaking email usage.  A survey carried out in 2009 by 
Nielsen (2009) showed that 65.1% of web users used email but 66.8% were 
using OSN sites. Also in 2010 Nielsen (2010b) carried out a survey which found 
that Americans spent 22.7% of their time using OSNs in contrast to 8.3% of 
their time checking emails. This highlights that OSN usage for some users is 
becoming part of their daily life.  
OSNs have been adopted by users of all different ages, varying from young 
children to older adults. They encourage vast amounts of different types of 
Chapter 1-Introduction 
2 
information to flow around the WWW everyday and this is the area in which 
concern is starting to grow. With the freedom and innovation of OSNs comes 
the price of privacy. Unlike the past, people are more open with each other 
online and this encourages personal details to be shared. The disclosure of 
personal details on OSN profiles can cause problems for users of information 
systems which require personal details to authenticate the user. If a stranger 
gets hold of your personal details they can impersonate you and commit identity 
fraud.  
Facebook, the most popular OSN, which in 2010 reached 500 million active 
users (Facebook 2010), has quite an interesting and controversial history 
regarding privacy.  
For example, a significant event, which highlighted privacy breaches for 
Facebook users in November 2007, was the use of Beacon (the advertising 
system that monitored Facebook users), when users went shopping online, 
Facebook shared the data of what they bought with the users’ friends and other 
businesses (BBC News 2007).  This event is similar to a company called Phorm 
who in 2008 wished to target online advertisements based on users’ online 
browsing behavior which in some peoples’ eyes breached customer privacy 
(BBC News 2008b).  
In July 2010, the security consultant Rob Bowes highlighted publically available 
profiles on Facebook by extracting personal details from them and publishing 
the data online. The extraction occurred from 100 million profiles that were open 
and publically available. Bowe’s motivation for this action was to highlight the 
privacy issues associated with Facebook (Emery 2010). In 2011, two doctoral 
students at Indiana University had discovered a security vulnerability in 
Facebook, which allowed malicious websites to access the real name and the 
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private profile data of the visitor. Also the malicious websites could post bogus 
messages on the visitor’s wall (Indiana University 2011).  
Other OSNs besides Facebook have had issues regarding privacy. In 2010 it 
was found that in addition to Facebook, MySpace, LiveJournal, Twitter, Hi5, 
Xanga and Digg had been sending data to advertising companies. The data can 
be used to find out the personal details and names of users. This happened 
despite privacy policies of the OSNs claiming that they do not share user data 
without getting consent.  When a user clicked on an advertisement, the user 
names and ID numbers of the personal profiles that were being viewed by the 
user were sent to the advertising companies. The companies can use the user 
names and ID numbers to go to find the profiles and view the public data 
available on there. Depending on the OSN site, the public data can include age, 
full real name of the user, occupation and hometown (Steel and Vascellaro 
2010).    
These events have highlighted the issue of privacy in OSNs and how personal 
details can spread into the wrong hands. This can make users vulnerable to 
privacy and social engineering attacks.  An example of a privacy attack is 
reidentification by linking (Sweeney 1997) which would enable people to extract 
some personal details from an OSN profile and use external sources to 
investigate that person’s identity. Social engineering attacks can also occur. 
One example is phishing where fraudsters get users to give their personal 
details to them via scams. Then they use the given details to look for profiles of 
that user on the WWW.  
1.2-Motivation  
The motivation for this research emerges from the need to address privacy in 
OSNs by establishing a measure which quantifies how vulnerable an OSN user 
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is to social engineering attacks and the spreading of personal details, because 
of the users own personal information disclosure and that of their friends 
network. OSN networks can be represented by graphs and the use of graphs 
will aid the calculation of vulnerability. At present in the social networks analysis 
field there is a lack of vulnerability measures based on graph theory which 
quantifies vulnerability and takes the information disclosure of the OSN user 
and its friends into account. In graph theory, an OSN graph consists of a node 
which represents an OSN profile which is used to by the OSN user to present 
their personal details and an edge which represents a friendship connection 
between two OSN profiles.  
1.3-Aims and Objectives   
The aim of this research is to design and implement an approach to measure 
how vulnerable an OSN profile is to privacy and social engineering attacks and 
the spreading of personal details through relationships represented using graph 
theory in this work.  
The objectives of the research are:  
1. Analysis of various OSN profiles and connections in order to define the 
concept of vulnerability.  
2. Apply probability algorithms in order to establish a vulnerability measure 
which will enable the identification of vulnerable nodes.  
3. Design and implement a data extraction approach for OSN profiles which 
will provide real life case studies for the vulnerability measure to be 
applied to. This will be part of the experimental work in order to analyse 
the effects of the vulnerability measure on different cases.  
4. Investigate structural factors based in the OSN representation which can 
affect the vulnerability value of a profile. 
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1.4-Methodology 
The methodology is a combination of several aspects of the research. Firstly a 
data retrieval approach is developed with graph algorithms in order to extract 
real life cases from an OSN in order to test the vulnerability algorithm on real 
data. The extracted data is subsequently placed into a repository and forms the 
basis for an OSN graph to be generated and the vulnerability algorithm for the 
vulnerability measure to be applied. The vulnerability measure uses the OSN 
graph in the calculations.  
The vulnerability measure involves a mathematical operator between the 
vulnerability of a profile and the vulnerability of the profile’s friends. A 
mathematical operator is defined by a mathematical function and various 
mathematical functions can be studied to investigate the properties and how 
they influence the vulnerability value of a profile.  
There are two versions of the vulnerability measure which includes the 
unnormalised and normalised. The unnormalised version is covered in chapter 
3 and used in the experimental work which is detailed in chapters 4 and 5. The 
normalised version of the vulnerability measure which was developed as a 
consequence of experimental findings is used in chapters 6-8.  
The axioms and propositions which are presented in chapter 7 form the formal 
approach for the measure. They were formed after substantial experimental 
work which involved investigating how the vulnerability measure works and 
normalising the measure to a value between 0 and 1. The validation of the 
vulnerability measure with regard to variety of situations is detailed in chapter 8.  
1.5-Scope 
In terms of assumptions, the vulnerability measure assumes that only 
immediate friends of a profile can make it vulnerable. The friends of a friend or 
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external users are not taken into account. Also the strength of relationship 
between a profile and its friend is not incorporated in the measure. The strength 
of relationship between two profiles can be defined by the level of interaction 
which includes the writing of profile comments and the tagging of photos. If the 
two profiles do not interact as much then the personal details may or may not 
be leaked. The effect of presenting vulnerable attributes on OSN profiles is the 
same regardless of the type profile owner.  
1.6-Thesis Structure 
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows:  
Following this introduction, chapter 2 surveys relevant literature in the OSN field 
by exploring the history of OSNs, as well as detailing several aspects that the 
concept of vulnerability is built upon. These aspects include privacy risks, graph 
theory as applied to OSNs and social network analysis measures.  
Chapter 3 details the proposed vulnerability measure in its unormalised form, 
based on the vulnerability concept alongside the algorithm and the issues 
associated with the algorithm.  
Chapter 4 details our proposed OSN profile data extraction approach based on 
a top friends network and the processing of the OSN graph which is derived 
from the extraction. Also the findings associated with the extraction and the 
ethical issues associated with extracting OSN profiles are presented.  
Chapter 5 extends the work done in chapter 4 by focusing on the graph findings 
and the validation of the vulnerability case studies based on extracting all 
friends from an OSN profile. Also an additional experiment is presented which 
examines the concept of levels in an OSN and how this can affect the 
vulnerability of a profile.  
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Chapter 6 explores the modeling of the individual vulnerability of a profile based 
on the privacy attitudes of the profile owner and how this affects the overall 
vulnerability of the profile.  
Chapter 7 presents the axioms and propositions which forms the formal 
approach of the vulnerability measure.  
Chapter 8 details the experiments to validate the vulnerability measure on a 
larger scale and show that the vulnerability concept is a valid one.  
Chapter 9 presents the overall conclusions to the thesis, ideas for future 
research as well as detailing our contribution to the field of social network 
analysis.                  
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of background work as well as 
related work in other fields associated with vulnerability. Section 2.1 introduces 
the concept of offline social networks which leads on to a look into the features 
which make up an OSN and what sort of OSNs will be used in this thesis. 
Section 2.2 covers the history of OSNs. Section 2.3 explores current research 
developments in the OSN field which relate to the field of vulnerability.  
Section 2.4 investigates the six degrees of separation which forms the basis for 
the experimental work on the concept for OSN levels which is detailed in 
section 5.4. Sections 2.5-2.6 present privacy attacks which can occur with 
information disclosure of personal details. This contributes towards the 
motivation for proposing a vulnerability measure. Also detailed are the various 
attitudes of different types of OSN users towards information disclosure.  
Section 2.7 introduces important concepts of graph theory which can be applied 
to OSN graphs and are used in social network analysis measures to analyse an 
OSN. The graph will aid the calculation of the vulnerability of a profile. Section 
2.8 centers on the current social network analysis measures and why there 
needs to be more measures associated with privacy and especially 
vulnerability. Section 2.8.2 investigates the various vulnerability definitions in 
regards to graph theory and this work provides more motivation for the 
proposed vulnerability measure. Section 2.9 concludes for this chapter.       
2.1-Offline Social Networks 
In general offline social network definitions cover the same concept in different 
ways. Downes (2005) describes an offline social network as a collection of 
individuals that are linked together by a set of relations. This definition illustrates 
that a variety of relations can link two individuals together e.g. sexual 
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relationships, transactions and common interests but the most popular type of 
relation which is going to be used in this thesis is friendship. Van Tilburg’s 
(1995) definition is similar to Downes (2005) but unlike Downes, emphasises 
that the relationships between individuals are interdependent which shows that 
there is a dependency upon each other and implies that the relationship is 
bidirectional.  
2.1.1-What Constitutes an Online Social Network 
Online social networks (OSNs) in comparison to offline social networks are web 
based sites e.g. Facebook1 and MySpace2. In this thesis, we consider web 
based OSNs but not email based OSNs. Email based OSNs are social 
networks based on email communications between users (Juszczyszyn and 
Musial 2009).  
Boyd and Ellison (2008) describe the three ingredients of OSNs which include: 
 Allowing a user to make a public or semi public profile inside a system 
which is bounded.  
 Bringing together a list of other users in which they share a connection 
with and allowing the user to view.  
 Travelling along their set of connections and the connections made by 
other users within the system.  
This definition is interesting because it compares a user’s online social network 
(OSN) to a bounded system which illustrates that the OSN is a network of 
interdependent user profiles which interact with one another. Like Downes 
(2005) and Van Tilburg (1995), Boyd and Ellison (2008) do state that what 
constitutes a relationship between two individuals can vary between different 
                                                     
1
 http://www.facebook.com/ 
2
 http://www.myspace.com/ 
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OSNs. All the authors though, fail to mention relationships that can happen 
between two individuals which are not interdependent.  
An example of a non-interdependent relationship is the concept of top friends 
where the user can class the friends which they have a strong relationship with 
as a top friend. An example being node A may class node B as a top friend but 
node B may not class node A as a top friend. This implies that the relationship 
is not bidirectional. In saying that, some OSN sites (e.g. Facebook) require both 
individuals to agree to a bidirectional relationship by the accepting of a friend’s 
request.  
Boyd and Ellison (2008) highlight the use of public or semi public profiles by 
users. An OSN profile contains personal details, any interactions between a 
user and other users they are connected to and a list of these other users. 
These other users may be friends, acquaintances or even strangers. Having a 
public profile implies that that the contents of that profile is not hidden from the 
other users therefore they can see everything. At present some OSNs (e.g. 
MySpace) even allow external users to view the contents of public profiles. An 
external user in the case of MySpace is a user which does not have a MySpace 
account or a connection to profiles of MySpace users. In comparison a semi 
public profile implies that some of the profile contents are hidden from other 
users even if an online connection exists between the profile owner and other 
users.  
2.2-History of Online Social Networks 
Between the years 1997, when the first OSN (SixDegrees.com) was 
recognised, to the present day, there have been a variety of different OSNs 
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which have catered to various users. SixDegrees.com 3 was the first OSN site 
to combine features that were already present on dating sites and 
Classmates.com (a site that allowed users to connect to their school friends). 
These features highlighted by (Nickson 2009) were the following:  
 Create user profiles which contain personal details about the user (e.g. 
name, age etc).  
 Have the ability to view other users’ profiles.  
 Invite friends, list friends and have the ability to surf the lists of the 
friends.  
The name of the first OSN was based upon ‘6 degrees of separation’ theory 
made famous by Milgram (1967) , where one person is separated by no more 
than six degrees (steps) from another. Each step is linked by a friend of a friend 
relationship. This theory is explained and debated in more detail in section 2.4.  
Unfortunately due to the lack of stability as a business and the trend of WWW 
users at that time, SixDegrees.com closed in the year 2000 with an estimated 
1,000,000 registered members. Boyd and Ellison (2008) claim the OSN demise 
was due to the lack of activities to do on the site after accepting friends’ 
requests and there were people who did not have a network of friends that were 
online. The features of SixDegrees.com formed the basis for the development 
of other OSNs with additional features (e.g. the classification of top friends as 
illustrated by Facebook and different OSNs presenting different personal 
details).   
As well as SixDegrees.com, around the last few years of the 20th century there 
were other OSN sites including MiGente 4 (targeted at the Hispanic community), 
                                                     
3
 http://www.sixdegrees.com/ 
4
 http://www.migente.com/ 
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AsianAvenue5 (targeted at the Asian American community) and Blackplanet6 
(targeted at the African American community) which started a trend of having 
one directional connection between friends. This is because users could make 
connections with other users without seeking their approval. LiveJournal7 which 
is an online community where users can keep blogs or journals, was 
established around the same time in 1999 and they adopted the one direction 
connection (Boyd and Ellison 2008); (Nickson 2009). The aspect of one 
directional connection is taken into account in the proposed vulnerability 
measure.  
In 2002, Friendster8 was launched and designed to encourage the friendship 
between friends of friends. An example being that if user B is friends with users 
A and C but A and C are not friends. This illustrates the concept of transitivity 
between profiles and what a mutual friend is. If user A wants to find out 
information about user C, then user A can view user B’s profile. Consequently 
the identity of user C could be built up and cause the privacy of user C to be 
compromised. User B is a mutual friend of users A and C.  
As the popularity of Friendster grew, the site began to encounter technical 
issues which caused the site to become problematic. Friendster lost users 
because of their policy towards fake profiles. Fake profiles were profiles which 
represented celebrities, fictional characters who were icons or people who did 
not exist. The background to this policy stemmed from the design of the site not 
allowing users to view profiles that were four or more degrees away from them. 
To get around this problem, users started to become power users who were 
                                                     
5
 http://www.asianave.com/ 
6
 http://www.blackplanet.com/ 
7
 http://www.livejournal.com/ 
8
 http://www.friendster.com/ 
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users that send/accept friends requests with acquaintances or even strangers to 
demonstrate their popularity (Boyd and Ellison 2008).  
The company did not like the use of the fake profiles, so they actively started to 
delete them. This action went down badly with the users and they started to 
leave Friendster because of the technical issues, they did not trust the company 
anymore and most users enjoyed browsing fake profiles (Boyd and Ellison 
2008). Despite this, Friendster at present has over 115 million registered users 
and is a popular OSN site in Southeast Asia (Alexa 2010).  
In 2003, MySpace was launched and started to compete with Friendster. 
MySpace was aimed at adolescents (teenagers) and young adults. The site 
offered an environment which was driven by music and the idea of customizing 
your profile to reflect your identity and stand out from everyone else. It was 
MySpace’s ability to listen to their users and implement the functionalities that 
the users wanted, that made MySpace more popular than Friendster (Boyd and 
Ellison 2008).  
In 2008, MySpace beat another OSN competitor called Facebook to become a 
leading OSN but Facebook managed to get a wider variety of users to join. This 
action led to a decline in the number of registered users of MySpace. Facebook 
beat MySpace because of what the OSN was offering to the user. Facebook 
centers on the connections and interactions between people in a person’s life.  
In comparison MySpace is presented more as a “hangout for teenagers” as 
McWilliams (2009) illustrates, which is not what some users want. As of 2010 
MySpace has more than 100 million users worldwide (MySpace 2010a).  
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The introduction of Facebook encouraged the expansion of niche communities 
(e.g. LinkedIn9 and Ryze10 business networking). This is illustrated because in 
2004, Thefacebook as it was initially called was introduced but only as an OSN 
site for Harvard University. In order to become a Thefacebook member the user 
had to have a Harvard University email address and this is what made the 
network a private OSN. It was not until 2005 that Facebook, which was its new 
name, started to expand to accept members from high schools, other 
universities i.e. Yale and corporate business networks. Eventually Facebook 
membership was open up to everyone but access could not be gained to closed 
networks without approval from the administrator or having a relevant email 
address (Boyd and Ellison 2008). Closed network are networks that require 
authentication from its members in order to view the contents of the network.   
What made Facebook different back in 2005 was that a user could not make 
their profile public to all users of Facebook. This is no longer the case because 
users’ profiles that are fully public can be searched for via the WWW or the user 
profile search function in Facebook. This can lead to an increased risk of the 
personal details of a user spreading throughout the OSN and beyond.  
Also what made Facebook different to other OSNs in 2005, was that developers 
had the ability to build applications that users could install in order to add 
personality and gaming to their profiles. Applications,  if added to a users’ profile 
can allow third parties access to the users’ personal details and this also causes 
spreading of personal information. Section 3.3.4 discusses the privacy issues 
regarding applications in more detail.  
                                                     
9
 http://www.linkedin.com/ 
10
 http://www.ryze.com/ 
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Facebook has grown to become the leader in OSNs as of 2011 by expanding its 
functionality to include various services (e.g. Facebook chat 11 which allows 
users to chat with one another and Facebook places 12 which allow a user to 
share their location at a given time with their friends, using a mobile). In 2010 
Facebook had more than 500 million active users (Facebook 2010).  
The number of users for both Facebook and MySpace have illustrated that 
OSNs are still popular. The increase in the functionalities of both OSNs will 
provide more opportunities for personal details of users to spread.  
Looking at the future of OSNs, Twitter has become a rival to MySpace and 
Facebook when it comes to OSN sites used on mobile phones. Twitter 13which 
is a micro blogging site grew 500% in 2010 in the USA alone (Nielsen 2010a).  
A micro blogging site is a web service which allows users to use blogs to write 
small message to other users. The future of OSN sites poses privacy issues 
especially with OSN data being accessible not just by the WWW but by various 
other means (e.g. mobile networks, different WWW browsers and applications).  
2.3-Developments in Social Networking Field 
In the past, the research field of offline and online social networks has covered 
topics ranging from data mining by the use of information retrieval as illustrated 
in Bird et al. (2006) and Chau and Xu (2006) right through to exploring privacy 
concerns amongst the student population. This is also illustrated in studies 
described in Gross and Acquistli (2005) and Gibson (2007).  
In the last few years, offline and online social networking research has focused 
on privacy concerns and information disclosure due to the introduction and 
popularity of OSNs as illustrated in section 2.2.  
                                                     
11
 http://www.facebook.com/sitetour/chat.php 
12
 http://www.facebook.com/places/ 
13
 http://twitter.com/ 
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In recent studies involving examining personal details known as attributes on 
OSN profiles, Strater and Richter (2007), Gibson (2007), Hinduja and Patchin 
(2008) and Nosko et al. (2010) mainly looked at the data from the viewpoint of 
trends rather than devising a quantitive measure for privacy aspects. There has 
been research carried out in to various aspects of privacy. One of which has 
been inference.   
2.3.1-Inference 
The inference of personal details from OSN profiles via has become an 
interesting topic in regards to privacy but the thesis work into vulnerability and 
quantifying vulnerability does not head into the area of inference.  
Lindamood and Kantarcioglu (2008) have looked at inferring private information 
using OSNs. Their approach talked about the use of machine learning 
algorithms to predict undisclosed information that was private. The area of 
machine learning concentrates on studying the design of computer programs in 
order to derive patterns and rules from past experiences. The computer 
program which acts as a learner, processes the data which represents past 
experiences and develops “an appropriate response to future data, or describe 
in some meaningful way the data seen” (Vucetic 2007). However Lindamood 
and Kantarcioglu (2008) did not look at the disclosure of personal details in 
terms of the vulnerability of profiles.  
In contrast, Becker and Chen (2009) analysed privacy risks through the 
development of a tool to measure privacy risks and to advise users how to 
reduce the privacy risks. The aim of the tool was to investigate whether the 
personal details of a user could be inferred from their friends. This methodology 
used a threat model approach and the concept of frequency to try and infer the 
attribute values. In their experiment 93 participants installed the tool and the tool 
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had a 60 % accuracy rate. This is due to 1673 attributes being inferred, 918 
being verifiable inferences and 546 attributes being correctly inferred. This 
experiment focuses more on deriving the value of the attribute based on the 
attribute values stated by the friends rather than the spread of an attribute value 
in an OSN via the interactions made by a profile with its friends and friends of 
friends.  
The spreading of attribute values is important for this research because it allows 
an investigation into whether an OSN profile displaying attributes that contribute 
towards privacy and social engineering attacks readily and publically, results in  
friends of the profile spreading the attribute values through the OSN network, 
via profile comments written to their friends.   
2.3.2-Information Disclosure Measures 
Quantifiable measures for information disclosure and vulnerability have started 
being proposed. This is illustrated by research done by Gundecha et al. (2011) 
and Schrammel et al. (2009). Gundecha et al. (2011) work focuses on the 
identification of vulnerable friends and how they impact on the user. A 
vulnerable friend in regards to a user is defined as a friend whose privacy and 
security settings will not protect the user or the user’s network of friends.  A 
combination of measures is proposed to help identify vulnerable friends. 
Schrammel et al. (2009) is mainly qualitative and involves investigating the 
accessibility of personal detail on OSNs to different levels of users (friends and 
unknown people) by the use of a questionnaire.  
Two information disclosure measures were proposed, based on the 
questionnaire responses to measure for each questionnaire participant, the 
participants’ information disclosure to its friends and information disclosure to 
unknown strangers.    
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2.3.3-Social Network Analysis 
Graphs can be used to represent and analyse OSNs as illustrated by Wilson 
and Nicholas (2008). The study of OSN graphs which is introduced in section 
2.7 can help to emphasise and understand how privacy is breached in an OSN, 
through information disclosure using the attributes inside the node rather than 
just the edges and nodes alone. The personal details on a profile are known as 
attributes and the node represents a profile in an OSN. Social network analysis 
measures can also be applied to graphs to explore the behavior of nodes in a 
social network.  
Most of the work on social network analysis measures was undertaken in a pre 
Web 2.0 era by authors including Freeman (1979) and Wasserman and Faust 
(1994). In 2008 privacy became a main issue due to the increase of various 
types of spam attacks that can happen in OSNs (e.g. context aware spam as 
illustrated by Brown et al (2008)).  
Since privacy issues have become more prevalent to end users especially, 
there is room for measures to consider privacy. Current social network analysis 
measures which are detailed in section 2.8 can be applied to an OSN graph but 
concentrate on the node environment (profile network of the OSN user) and fail 
to take the node contents (what is displayed on the OSN user’s profile) into 
consideration as well. The vulnerability measure detailed in this thesis, takes 
both the node contents and the node environment into account.  
2.3.4-Media Stories  
Interesting issues in OSN research even became media stories. One of these 
issues was the maximum number of friends a human can handle on an OSN 
profile which is based on Dunbar’s number (Dunbar 1992). This concept is 
illustrated in research done by an anthropologist called Robin Dunbar.  
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The number of friends a person has can influence their vulnerability. The 
concept of power users emphasises the competition to have as many friends as 
possible (Bialik 2007; BBC News 2009). The issue with this is that the person 
may add strangers to their friend’s list. Letting people you do not know view 
your personal details is risky and increases your chance of identity fraud and 
stalking. This in turn can increase your vulnerability.  
In regards to privacy, work in the social networking field has been done into the 
analysis of user interactions on an OSN by Yun et al. (2010); Wilson et al. 
(2009); Viswanath et al. (2009) who look into the various types of user 
interaction. Interactions between two users, presented on a public profile can 
cause the loss of personal details and indicate the strength of relationship 
between the two users. The issue regarding about the strength of relationship 
between two profiles are presented in section 3.5.3.  
Overall, the field of social network analysis measures is where the proposed 
vulnerability measure (detailed in chapter 3) which focuses on the spread of 
personal details would be beneficial.  
2.4-Six Degrees of Separation 
The concept of the six degrees of separation was made famous by Stanley 
Milgram in 1967. The concept revolves around the idea that one person is 
separated by no more than six degrees (steps) from another. Each step is 
linked by a friend of a friend relationship.  
The aim of Milgram’s experiment in OSN graph terms was to measure the 
average path length (average number of steps) between two nodes which were 
randomly chosen. The two selected nodes may or may not have known each 
other. If the two nodes did know each other in OSN graph terms there would be 
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an edge directly connecting the two nodes together. The experiment (Milgram 
1967) involved the following procedure:  
1. Information packets were randomly sent by Milgram to people in 
Nebraska and Kansas in the USA. The information packets contain 
letters which gave details about the study and about the target person in 
Boston. Also included were business reply cards that were addressed to 
Harvard and a roster in which they could write their own name. This was 
so the researchers at Harvard could track the progress of the experiment 
and deal with any arising problems.  Boston was chosen as the target 
destination because of the large geographical distance between it and 
Nebraska and Kansas.  
2. If the person agreed to participate, the person was asked if they 
personally knew (on first name terms) the target person in Boston. If they 
did, then the person had to forward the letter directly to the target person. 
If the person did not know the target person, then they had to think of a 
relative or friend who is more likely to know the target person. If this was 
the case then the person had to sign the relative or friends name on the 
roster and forward the information packet to that person. A postcard was 
also sent to Harvard so they could track the packet’s progression 
towards its target destination.  
3. When the information packet did arrive at Boston, the roster was 
analysed to see how many people the packet had been forwarded to. 
Also the researchers at Harvard could use the postcards to investigate 
the packets which did not reach their target destination.  
The results from the experiment (Travers and Milgram 1969) stated that out of 
the 296 information packets sent out, 64 (29%) of the packets actually reached 
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their target destination. The average path length of these chains was 5.5 which 
was rounded up to 6 and consequently Travers and Milgram (1969) concluded 
that people in the USA are separated by an average of six people.  
There have been several criticisms regarding the methodology and findings 
from the experiment. Kleinfield (2002) in particular questioned the reason why 
there was a low completion rate in regards to the information packets reaching 
their target destination. Another issue was the fact that Milgram had stated that 
the information packets had been sent to random people. What Kleinfield (2002) 
discovered was that there was an advertisement for recruiting for this study but 
the advertisement was written in such a way to attract social people. Social 
people probably had bigger circles of friends and would be able to get over 
class barriers.  
James (2006) like Kleinfield (2002) highlights that the failure to participate in the 
experiment was a major factor towards the low success rate. Milgrams’s study 
showed that for whatever reasons, the participants failed to pass the information 
packets on to people they knew and so social connections were not completed. 
Therefore the results showed a failure in the small world theory. More research 
needed to be done into why the participants failed to pass the information 
packets even though they agreed to take part in the experiment. The 
participants could have been at any stage of establishing a chain.  
In 2001, Duncan Watts repeated Milgram’s experiment but used an email 
message rather than an information packet, as the package that needed to be 
delivered. There were 48,000 senders and 19 targets in 157 countries. The 
analysis of the results showed that the average path length was around 6 
(Watts et al. 2002).  Volunteers who took part in this experiment were given an 
individual’s identity and were asked to email a message to someone who they 
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thought would know the target individual. This process was repeated until the 
message reached the target individuals inbox. Like Milgram (1967) experiment, 
the completion rate was very small. Only 3% of the email chains reached the 
inboxes of the target individuals.  
Leskove and Horvitz (2007) study involved analysing 30 billion MSN Messenger 
conversations amongst 240 million people.  A communication graph was 
produced from the data gathered which contained 180 million nodes and 1.3 
billion undirected edges. The structural features of the communication graph, 
(e.g. clustering, diameter of the graph and average path length) were analysed 
and it was found that the average path length of the graph was 6.6. The 
structural features are explained in section 2.7.  
The two studies by Watts and Leskovec and Horvitz have helped to validate 
that the concept of the six degrees of separation does exist in modern times but 
is subject to changes in the future. This will come with more work done into 
OSNs and the degrees of separation.  
2.4.1-Small World Effect  
The theory of the small world effect was devised by Duncan Watts and Steven 
Strogatz in 1998 and centers around the concept of the six degrees of 
separation (Milgram 1967), which states that one person can be linked to 
another person in no more than six steps. The six degrees concept is important 
when investigating a profiles’ vulnerability in regards to levels in an OSN. An 
OSN consists of levels of friends which help to build up your network. For a 
given profile, the levels of friends are as follows:  
1. The first level consists of the friends of the profile. These friends have a 
direct friendship link to the profile.  
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2. The second level of friends is the friends of friends of the profile. The 
friends of friends are friends of the profile’s friends. The friends of friends 
do not have a direct friendship link to the profile but they may know about 
the existence of the profile by searching the friends list from the OSN 
profile of the profile’s friends.  
An OSN consists of dynamic components which are linked together. The use of 
shortcuts between a small number of the components in the network can turn 
the network into a small world network and bring users in an OSN closer 
together.  
Small world networks can be identified by the following three characteristics 
which correspond to the OSN graph G of the network. More details about the 
characteristics are discussed is section 2.7.1 :  
High Average Clustering Coefficient value of OSN graph G :  
The clustering coefficient of a node (Watts and Strogatz 1998) reflects how well 
connected the node’s friends are to each other. The coefficient value is between 
0 and 1. A value of 0 means that the friend are not connected to each other and 
therefore do not know each other. A value of 1 indicates that the friends all 
know each other and therefore are connected to each other in graph G. This is 
commonly known as a clique. The average clustering coefficient of graph G is 
the average of all the clustering coefficients of the nodes in graph G.  
A small world network is classed as having a high average clustering coefficient 
value because of the increase in the number of cliques in the network. This 
means that some of the nodes have highly connected neighbourhoods which 
will have a high individual clustering coefficient value.  
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Small average shortest path length for graph G 
In graph G, a path length between two nodes is the number of edges between 
the two nodes. The shortest path length known as the geodesic distance is the 
minimum number of edges between two nodes. The average shortest path 
length for graph G is the average of all the shortest path lengths for each pair of 
nodes.  
A small average path length indicates that a pair of nodes in graph G will have a 
short distance between them. This is where the small world effect concept is 
derived from. In this case, it is about bringing people closer together via the use 
of OSNs.  
Degree distribution of graph G fits power law distribution  
The degree is the total number of edges that are connected to a node. For a 
directed graph, the indegree and the outdegree distributions are analysed 
separately (Barabási and Oltvai 2004). The indegree of a node is the number of 
edges heading towards the node and the outdegree is the number of edges 
heading away from the node.  
A power law distribution is a probability distribution which focuses on the 
frequency of the degree values for all of the nodes. Most of the nodes will have 
a low degree value and fewer nodes have a high degree value. The tail of the 
distribution will be long.  
In a small world network, there are an increased number of nodes that have a 
high degree value (known as hubs). This forms the basis for the shorter path 
lengths between the nodes.  
The indegree and outdegree distributions are important for analysis because 
they allow outliers to be identified which could prove significant when accessing 
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the vulnerability of a profile. A neighbour of a node with a high outdegree could 
contribute towards spreading of the node’s personal details deep into the OSN.  
2.5-Privacy Attacks associated with Personal Details 
Personal details presented and available online, raise social engineering issues 
as they can be used for identity fraud as emphasised by Narayanan and 
Shamatikov (2010). Personal details (e.g. first name and date of birth) are 
considered as ‘personal identifiable information’ which can be used to identify 
ones individual data (Krishnamurthy and Wills 2009).  
Since many web systems use personal details to authenticate users (e.g. online 
banking and payment), an individual is making themselves vulnerable to various 
privacy and social engineering attacks by being open about their lives online. 
This is a change from the past where people had more face to face 
conversations and did not disclose their personal details so readily. Some 
privacy risks involving personal details are illustrated in Table 1.  
Table 1-Privacy Risks Associated with Personal Details 
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The details of the example cases in Table 1 are described below 
1. The Sarah Palin case: David Kernell used Mrs Palin‘s postcode, date of 
birth and other details to reset the password of her Yahoo email account. 
Mrs Palin’s personal details were found on Wikipedia.  
2. MySpace phishing: in late 2006 a phishing attack targeted MySpace users, 
tricking them into submitting personal details to a web page that looked like 
MySpace. These personal details were then sent to a hacker.  
3. MySpace messaging phishing: is similar to the phishing attack detailed 
above but involves instant messaging. The user is sent a link to view some 
photos on MySpace. The link was sent via the instant messaging program 
from someone in their contact list. The user clicks the link which actually 
leads to a MySpace like login page. The login page looks very similar but 
actually is a fraudulent version of the login page. Once the authentication 
details are entered, the user is logged into the web pages of the real 
MySpace. The hacker can use the authentication details recorded in this 
way to extract the personal details from that account (Kirk 2006).  
4. Bryan Rutberg’s case: involved stealing his identity via his Facebook login 
details. The hackers then changed the Facebook pages to make it appear 
that Bryan was in trouble and sent emails asking for financial help.  
5. Hospital discharge records: which included patient details were used to 
identify humans by linking their common demographic attributes to a 
database of details of public voters from Massachusetts in the USA. This 
can happen with OSN data due to attributes (e.g. date or birth, gender and 
location) being presented (Sweeney 1997).  
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These cases illustrate how careful people have to be when submitting details 
online. The Bryan Rutberg identity fraud case highlighted the importance of 
knowing your friends thoroughly. The hackers in this case played with peoples’ 
emotions regarding friendship. If a friend seems to be in trouble the first thing 
you want to do is help but it also is useful to know how your friend reacts in a 
real case.  
There are also some other privacy risks that can occur especially if the OSN is 
careless about keeping some attributes (e.g. email address) private. These are 
illustrated by Balduzzi et al. (2010) and Jagatic et al. (2007).  
If the email addresses of users were made public then spammers can crawl the 
OSNs and collect email addresses and who they belong to from user profiles. 
Then this information could be used to construct phishing emails or targeted 
spam by using personal details which could include real names and names of 
friends. This act is known as social phishing (Jagatic et al. 2007).  
By allowing users, including outside users, to search through OSNs for profiles 
by name or email address, this can play into the hands of the spammers. 
Spammers can use the profile search (querying the OSN) to validate if the 
emails collected through their crawl belong to profiles in which the profile 
owners are real people as opposed to fake profiles of fake people. Also the 
spammers can track the amount of personal detail that is displayed on a profile 
because some users display their personal details in a very public way to the 
extent that outside users can view the details.  
The technique of querying the OSN can be carried out by the spammer to also 
explore a company in terms of its employees and any details about the 
company especially if the company has an OSN profile page.  
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Namestnikov (2010) highlights the popularity of OSNs to spammers because of 
the networks’ ability to exchange information. One case that is presented is the 
Brazilian bank case, where emails were used to spread Trojan horse viruses 
which targeted online banking services but now OSNs are predominately being 
used to spread the viruses. One of the main reasons for this is the speed in 
which the attack can take hold (e.g. over 2000 users followed a link sent by 
spammers on Twitter within one hour).  
The privacy risks mentioned in this section have highlighted how important it is 
to keep personal details hidden under control and the consequences of 
spreading personal details. This forms the motivation for wanting to construct a 
vulnerability measure which quantifies the likelihood than an OSN profile is 
subject to the spreading of the personal details which may lead to social 
engineering attacks. The next section explores how users of different ages react 
to the issue of privacy. The findings in this section will be important when 
modeling the vulnerability of different user types.  
2.6-Privacy Attitudes and Age 
The types of users who have profiles on OSN sites vary in age from children to 
older adults. A couple of years ago there was a common misconception that the 
only types of users that used OSNs were students. This was due to a increase 
in significant notable studies including Gross and Acquisti (2005), Gibson 
(2007), Hinduja and Patchin (2008), Govani and Pashley (2005) and Dwyer et 
al. (2007) who all concentrated on surveying students and their attitudes 
towards privacy. Since then, there have been social networking studies done 
which explore the attitudes to privacy of children and teenagers (De Souza and 
Dick 2009), adults (Lenhart et al. 2010) and older adults (Lehtinen et al. 2009).  
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Different age categories display different behaviours when it comes to 
disclosing personal details on OSNs and this affects their attitudes towards 
privacy. One issue that has resulted from previous research is that there is no 
clear group of age bands. Different studies define age bands in different ways 
so the age bands are very roughly defined when discussing age bands and 
privacy below. An example is in the De Souza and Dick (2009) study where 
high school children are used to analyse the details they present on MySpace 
profiles. The age range of the children is between 12 to 18 years old. In 
comparison Hinduja and Patchin’s (2008) study is concerned with adolescent 
(teenager) personal information disclosure on MySpace, classifies adolescents 
as 17 years old or younger. This study was carried out in 2006 and a user had 
to be 14 years old or over to have a MySpace profile so adolescent 
classification is technically between 14-17 years old. At present in 2011, the 
minimum age for MySpace users is 13 (MySpace 2011).  
Underage users are a problem for OSNs because there is no system to validate 
a users’ age. Lenhart et al. (2010) research found that nearly half of 12 year old 
in the United States use OSNs and this is despite the minimum age for 
Facebook as well as MySpace being 13 (Facebook 2011a).  
In the sections below, various age bands and their attitude towards privacy are 
presented and discussed.  
2.6.1-Children 
For children, disclosing personal details on an OSN can lead to bullying, 
stalking and meeting with up strangers which could result in more serious 
consequences. This is illustrated by the Ashleigh Hall case. A 33 year old man 
called Peter Chapman who was known to the police as a sex offender, used 
Facebook in order to set up a profile where he posed as an adolescent boy. He 
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befriended an adolescent girl called Ashleigh Hall who was 17 years old. They 
organised to meet one another, Chapman suffocated her and dumped her body 
in a field (BBC News 2010b).This case highlighted how important it was not to 
add people you do not know as your OSN profile friends because the details of 
OSN profiles can hide the truth in regards to identity.  
Unlike older users, children have less awareness about the ramifications of their 
actions.  De Souza and Dick (2009) highlighted several factors that influenced 
the disclosure of personal details by children and adolescents which included 
peer pressure, website interface design and signaling.  
Peer pressure is when a child sees that their friends disclose personal details 
using their OSN profile and decide that in order to fit in, they have to do the 
same. The child does not want to feel left out of conversations that their friends 
may be having. The ability to have independent thinking has not quite 
developed yet. In childhood, children go through phases of wanting the latest 
items (e.g. certain toys or gadgets). Social networking is no different and this is 
emphasised by Boyd (2006) who discusses the concept of adolescents 
migrating to MySpace because their friends were there and the pressure to 
stand out through the personalisation of profiles.  
Website interface design of OSNs is another factor in influencing information 
disclosure. MySpace and Facebook require members to register to get an OSN 
profile, which causes the disclosure of personal details. The fields on the 
registration forms normally have attribute fields (e.g. name, date of birth and 
location) which have to be filled in. This is forcing children to disclose their 
personal details at the earliest stage. These details ultimately appear on the 
profile by default until the child changes the privacy settings (De Souza and 
Dick 2009).  
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Signaling is the art of presenting yourself in a positive light or to been seen in a 
certain way by providing information (Donath and Boyd 2004). This concept 
causes concerns for privacy, because to make people see you in a certain way, 
a lot of personal details have to be disclosed (e.g. gender, age, profile picture, 
likes and hobbies).   
De Souza and Dick (2009) research study involved developing and distributing 
a privacy questionnaire to high school children to uncover what personal details 
they disclosed on their MySpace profiles. Their analysis and findings indicated 
that children who were very private in the offline world applied the same theory 
in the online world and this resulted in them being less likely to disclose as 
many personal details on their profile. The worrying finding was that the 
younger children i.e. those under 15 years old were showing signs of disclosing 
more personal details therefore highlighting that peer pressure could be a major 
driver in information disclosure especially for younger children.  
This finding has been justified in Livingstone et al (2011) research which 
involved an online survey of 9-16 year old WWW users in 25 European Union 
countries. The research findings highlighted that younger children are more 
likely to have public profiles than older children. Also the address and phone 
number is displayed twice as often by children with public profiles as it is for 
children with private profiles.  
Public concern over the safety of children using OSNs has led to pressure to 
educate children about OSN profiles and the disclosure of personal details. An 
example response is the ‘Click Clever Click Safe’ campaign by the UK Council 
for Child Internet Safety (2010).  
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2.6.2-Adolescents 
Besides work done by De Souza and Dick (2009) on children, there have been 
various other studies (Boyd 2006, Pierce 2007, Lenhart et al 2010 and Patchin 
and Hinduja 2010) that have focused on adolescents and the characteristics of 
the way they use their social networking profiles. Lenhart and Madden (2007) 
and Patchin and Hinduja (2010) studies in particular, have provided significant 
findings on adolescent personal detail disclosure and privacy issues.  
Lenhart and Madden (2007) study involved telephone interviews in 2006 with 
935 adolescents who were aged between 12 to 17 and their parents. The 
findings showed that the issue of privacy is starting to become an issue that 
adolescents think about. This is in contrast to younger children who are more 
likely to disclosure personal details without thinking about the issues about 
privacy, therefore affecting their levels of vulnerability. In this study 66% of the 
teenagers limit access to their profiles so that the profile is not visible to all 
WWW users. This is important as some OSN profiles, if left absolutely public 
can be searched for through the WWW. Some profiles are very public and so 
can, by the use of a search engine, but also there are profiles that are public to 
the OSN but can’t be searched for via a search engine. This issue has be 
implemented in the Facebook privacy controls. Facebook has a privacy option 
which allows everyone including external users access to view your profile.   
This finding is justified by Patchin and Hinduja (2010) who analysed 1403 
MySpace profiles in 2009 and found that 58.3% of the adolescents who used 
their profiles, often had made them private. The study carried out in 2009 is a 
continuation of a study carried out in 2006 (Hinduja and Patchin 2008) in which 
2423 profiles were analysed and only 38.6% were private profiles.  
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Regarding personal details disclosed in the Lenhart and Madden (2007) and 
Patchin and Hinduja (2010) study, first and full names seems to be disclosed 
readily. The name accompanied with other details can help to establish the 
identity of someone.  This is stated by Patchin and Hinduja (2010) who claim 
that having several details of the adolescent (e.g. name, current city, profile 
picture and school) is all that is needed to locate the individual. Based on the 
age of the person, different items of personal details are required to extract the 
person’s identity. To investigate an adults’ identity, details about their workplace 
and current location may be required alongside the more common details which 
include name, profile picture and date of birth.  
The major issue regarding private profiles which is not highlighted by Patchin 
and Hinduja (2010) is that making a profile private in MySpace does not make 
your OSN profile totally private. Personal details (e.g. name, profile picture and 
age) can still be presented on a private profile. A private profile in MySpace 
does not show the list of friends or interactions between the profile user and 
their friends. If a user with a private profile has friends who have public profiles 
then the friendship between the user and the friend can be inferred. Also if the 
public profile has their interactions displayed, then personal details of the user 
could be leaked in those interactions.  
The most important personal detail that will distinguish an adolescent from an 
adult is the name of the school. In Lenhart and Madden (2007) study, 49% of 
the adolescents displayed the school name and educational details. Unlike De 
Souza and Dick (2009) comment, that younger children disclose more 
information than older children, ironically older adolescents (15-17 years old) 
too, share their photos and school name on their OSN profiles.  
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2.6.3-Young Adults and Adults 
OSN sites are just as popular with young adults as they are with adolescents or 
older adults. This is justified by Lenhart et al (2010) who did a survey of 2253 
young adults, 18 or over, in 2009 and found that 72% of the young adults (18-29 
years old) used OSN sites. Significantly more young adults use OSN sites than 
older adults (30+ years old) which are stated at 40% (Lenhart et al 2010). This 
may be the case because for young adults, they are part of a technology 
generation.  
Gross and Acquisti (2005) is the most cited study into the disclosure of personal 
details by younger adults. Gross and Acquisti (2005) survey of 4000 university 
students who used Facebook found that  90.8% of the students surveyed 
disclose a profile picture online , 50.8% display their current home address, 
87.8% display their birthday and 39.9 % display their phone number on their 
profile. These personal details along with their full name can be used to extract 
someone’s identity. From these statistics, the trend of information disclosure 
does not change in terms of comparing adolescents to young adults. Young 
adults seem to disclose their personal details readily but you would think that as 
you grow up in the technology age you become more aware of privacy issues.  
Tuunainen et al (2009) justifies Gross and Acquisti (2005) findings because of 
his investigation, where 210 people responded to a web questionnaire about 
their Facebook usage in terms of their privacy and information disclosure. 88% 
of the people were aged between 18-30 years old and the results indicated that 
there was a severe amount of information disclosure and a lack of knowledge 
about the visibility of their profiles and the content of the Facebook privacy 
policy.  
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The Facebook privacy policy concentrates on certain key areas. The first area 
details what Facebook do with the information that is submitted to their site. 
Examples of what Facebook do with the information include to maintain a 
service, contact you, to serve social ads and to help you find friends. Also 
detailed is the information that is collected when you interact with Facebook. 
Some of the information collected includes site activity information and cookie 
information.  
The second area details how the information that is presented on profiles can 
be shared and public to other users but only if you set your privacy settings to 
do so. Also detailed is information that is shared with third parties if you add 
(e.g. an application). The third area focuses on how Facebook keeps the 
information from users secure (Facebook 2011b).  
In regards to the information disclosure of the subjects on Facebook regarding 
Tuunainen et al (2009) study, 99% displayed real name, 98% displayed profile 
picture, 89% displayed birthday, 89% displayed hometown, 83% displayed 
email address and 80% displayed education information. These results alone 
illustrate the readiness of personal detail disclosure even if the sample size is 
very small.  
In comparison to Tuunainen et al (2009) and Gross and Acquisti (2005) studies, 
Lampe et al (2007) analysed the information disclosure of a larger group of 
profiles on Facebook. In total 38,407 profiles were analsyed and the results 
were quite similar in that 83.8% of the subjects display their birthday, 83.3% 
displayed their hometown, 45.1% displayed their current address, 92.3% 
displayed their email address  and 93.8% displayed their gender.  
A reason for the readiness to disclose personal details was emphasied by 
Govani and Pashley (2005) who pointed out that students in particular seem to 
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.be aware about the privacy issues associated with OSNs but despite this, still 
feel comfortable with displaying the personal details. There is a false feeling of 
trust because they think that Facebook will protect their details when in fact their 
details being displayed on profiles are their responsibility. Govani and Pashley 
(2005) study involved conducting a pilot survey with 50 students from Carnegie 
Mellor University in the USA. The survey investigated the students’ awareness 
of privacy concerns and available privacy protection supplied by Facebook.  
Their survey results showed that real name, profile picture, birthday, home 
town, email address and education information were the top six attributes 
disclosed on profiles which correspond to the top six attributes displayed in the 
Tuunainen et al. (2009) study.    
In terms of adult usage of OSNs, even though there has been a lack of studies 
carried out on what personal details adults disclose, there has been some work 
carried out into their trends regarding social media. Lenhart et al (2010) study 
uncovered some interesting trends on adults and OSN profiles. In general 
adults like to have multiple profiles. This brings up the question about how much 
an adult takes privacy issues into consideration if they are willing to spread their 
personal details across multiple profiles. Adults may choose to have multiple 
profiles because they sometimes want to keep their work and family life 
separate.  
2.6.4-Older Adults 
Of all the age bands, the older adults seem to be the most reluctance to use 
OSN sites. Despite this, there is a specfic market for OSNs for older adults 
which include Eons14 and Saga Zone15.  There are several reasons why older 
                                                     
14
 http://www.eons.com/homepage 
15
 http://www.sagazone.co.uk/ 
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adults do not share the same enthusiasm as younger adults and teenagers do 
towards social networking technology.  
One reason emphasised by Lehtinen et al. (2009) is that older adults are 
conscious that they will show too much of their identity if they display their 
personal details. They like to keep themselves private and there is a hesitation 
to post items such as media or photos on OSN profiles.  
Gibson et al. (2010) highlighted a major reason why older adults may be 
reluctant to present personal details online which is a feeling of vulnerability. 
This is largely down to the media highlighting stories about identity theft that 
happens online. On a positive note, this proves that the use of the media can be 
used to highlight the dangers of disclosing personal details on OSN profiles.   
Overall in analysing different age groups and their perceptions of privacy, there 
needs to be more done to emphasise privacy to children, adolescents and 
young adults because of their increased desire to display their personal details 
on OSN profiles. As you grow older, you would expect the user to understand 
the repercussions of displaying their personal details on an OSN profile. This 
trend is not always the case when it comes to younger adults. More research 
needs to be done also into what adults disclose online.  
In 2009 the case of Sir John Sawers highlighted how even adults need to be 
more careful in regards to the privacy of OSN profiles. The wife of Sir John 
Sawers who was the next head of MI6, displayed personal family details on a 
Facebook profile. The profile was open and very public to 200 million users in 
an open access London network. The personal details included the location of 
the couple’s flat and the location of their three children (Evans 2009).  
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There are some signs that privacy issues have been taken into account but with 
the increase in OSNs coming up with applications to use the personal data 
stored in their systems, controlling personal data usage will be harder than ever.  
2.7-Introduction into Graph Theory associated with an Online 
Social Network  
An OSN graph is a representation of an OSN at a specific time. The 
representation consists of nodes which represent the profiles of the users in the 
OSN and edges which in this case are the friendship relationships between two 
profiles. The edges can represent various types of relationships. A formal way 
of describing the representation of an OSN graph G is G= (V, E) where V is the 
set of nodes and E is the set of edges that connect the nodes together. Each 
edge e    consists of two nodes (e.g. e1= {a, b}). 
In terms of the edges between the nodes, there are two representations. An 
undirected graph indicates that the edge between two nodes is symmetric and 
therefore has no direction (unordered pair). An example being that in a graph G, 
edges {a, b} = {b, a}. This indicates that the edge linking nodes a to b is the 
same as the edge linking nodes b to a.  
In comparison, a directed graph indicates that the edge consists of an ordered 
pair of nodes (e.g. edge e= {a, b} is not the same as edge e= {b, a} unless a=b) 
which can imply a self loop where a node is connected to itself. The edges are 
known as directed edges and edge e= {b, a} shows that there is a directed edge 
from node b to node a where node b is the tail and node a is the head.   
A directed graph is ideal to model an OSN because it allows the flow of 
information to be seen. To analyse the edges between two nodes in more 
detail, a directed multigraph is more appropriate. A directed weighted 
multigraph which is illustrated in Figure 1 and denoted as G= (V, E) allows 
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parallel edges between the nodes where V is a set of vertices and E is a set of 
edges that is represented by the function: },:},{{: vuVvuvuEf     
The parallel edges between the nodes, allows a more in depth analysis of the 
relationships and allows relationships from OSNs to be accurately depicted. For 
modeling OSNs in this thesis, there are no self loops in a directed weighted 
multigraph so a node cannot be friends with itself. The weights between the 
edges can represent the level of interaction (e.g. number of emails exchanged 
between two nodes). Figure 1 illustrates a directed weighted multigraph as 
explained above.  
  
Figure 1-A Directed Weighted Multigraph 
A formal representation of the OSN which is represented by the directed 
weighted multigraph G in Figure 1 is as follows:  
Using Naji et al. (2011) notation, graph G can be denoted by G= (V,E,W) where 
V is the set of nodes which represent actors in the network, E is the set of 
edges which connect the nodes together to signify friendship and W is a matrix 
of |V|*|V| which consist of values which represent the edge weights between the 
|V| nodes. In the case of graph G, the edge weights represent the number of 
emails exchange between one node and another. Set E ⊆ (V × V ) and each ei
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E where i is the |E| in graph G, is an ordered pair so edge ei= {a, b}    edge 
ej= {b, a}. This means that the edge weight for the edge ei may not be the same 
as the edge for ej.   
Figure 1 illustrates that Carly is the most connected node with connections to 
three other nodes. In terms of the amount of emails, Carly receives more emails 
(12 emails) then she sends out (9 emails).  
The indegree of node n is the number of directed edges that have node n as the 
head of the edge. The indegree of a node which is explained in more detail in 
section 4.5 signifies how popular a node is within a network. This is important in 
terms of information flow because the indegree can indicate how many friends 
trust the node and as a result leak personal details to the node. The outdegree 
of node n is the number of directed edges that have node n as the tail of the 
edge.  In terms of information flow, the outdegree of a node can represents the 
spreading of personal details from the node to its friends.  
A subgraph of G = (V, E) is another graph H = (A, B) where A ⊆V and B⊆E. A 
subgraph of a node can give information about the node’s connection to other 
nodes. The other nodes are known as the neighbours of a node. In an OSN the 
neighbours would be the friends of the profile owner.  
Using Figure 1, the subgraph of the node named Bill would just include the 
node named Carly because none of the other nodes are connected to Bill. Carly 
is the neighbour of Bill. If a node contains neighbours in which all the 
neighbours are connected to each other then this is known as a clique. In terms 
of information flow, information may spreads more quickly around a clique due 
to the nature of the nodes knowing each other. A clique can signify a strong 
friendship group.  
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The clustering coefficient value (Watts and Strogatz 1998) of a node illustrates 
how well connected the neighbours are and is a value between 0 and 1 .The 
higher the clustering coefficient value, the more connectivity there is between 
the neighbours. More details of the calculation of the clustering coefficient value 
for a node is detailed in section 2.71.  
Two nodes that are connected by an edge can be commonly known as adjacent 
nodes. A path is a sequence of nodes such that each node is adjacent to the 
next. In a path, each edge can be only traveled along once. The length of the 
path is the number of edges in that path. The same principle of paths applies to 
directed graph as well as undirected graphs but the difference is that the path 
for directed graphs must go in the direction of the arrows. An example of a path 
using a directed graph is illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2-A Directed Graph to Illustrate The Concept Of Paths 
Using Figure 2, an example of a path is from node A to node D which has a 
path length of 3 (ABCD). The geodesic distance (shortest path) between 
two nodes is the minimum path length (e.g. the geodesic distance between 
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nodes A and D is 2 (AED)).  The geodesic distances between all pairs of 
nodes in the graph can be used to help calculate the diameter of the graph 
which is the longest geodesic distance between any two nodes in the graph.   
In the case of Figure 2, the diameter of the graph is 2 which is a small value for 
a graph diameter. If each of the nodes in Figure 2 represents an OSN profile, 
then the small diameter indicates a very compact network. A node is no more 
than 2 steps away from any other node (Hannerman and Riddle 2005).  
The geodesic distance between two nodes is used to work out the average 
shortest path distance of a network using an OSN graph. This measure is 
detailed in section 2.7.1.    
Overall this section has introduced the components of what makes an OSN 
graph and some concepts of graph theory which will be used to help explain the 
vulnerability concept in section 2.72 and 3.1. Also the small world effect in 
section 2.4.1.  
There are various types of networks that a graph can represent (e.g. road 
networks, flight networks and electrical networks). An OSN is an example of a 
complex network and there are various types of complex networks which 
include small world (Watts and Strogatz 1998), scale free (Barabási and Albert 
1999) and random (Erdös and Rényi 1960). The small world model is the most 
relevant to the OSNs because of its characteristics which are stated and 
discussed in section 2.4.1.   
2.7.1-Characteristic Measures for Complex Network Classification 
Wilson and Nicholas (2008) highlighted that there are three particular 
characteristics of a network that are used in classifying the type of network. The 
three characteristics are clustering coefficient of each node, average path 
length across the network and degree distribution of the nodes.    
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The clustering coefficient of a node defines how well connected the neighbours 
are to each other. Since directed graphs are used in this thesis, the clustering 
coefficient of node n using Watts and Strogatz’s (1998) equation will be:  
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where ei is the number of edges that exist between the neighbours of node i 
and ki is the number of neighbours of node i. If the value of the clustering 
coefficient  which is denoted as Ci is heading towards 1, then most of the 
neighbours of a node are connected to each other. On the other hand, if the 
coefficient value is near 0 then the neighbours are not connected to each other 
at all.  
Examining the average clustering coefficient for all the nodes in the OSN graph 
G, calculated using Watts and Strogatz (1998) metric in equation 2, can define 
how well connected or not the nodes in the graph are to each other: 
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where n is the number of nodes and Ci is the clustering coefficient for each 
node in OSN graph G.  
The average path length of graph G which represents an OSN network is the 
average number of edges along the shortest path (geodesic distance) between 
two nodes for all pairs of nodes in graph G.  
Let graph G have a set of nodes V. The notation for the shortest (geodesic) 
distance between two nodes is d (v1 ,v2) where v1 and v2 V. The equation for 
the average path length of graph G would be: 
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where n is the number of nodes in the OSN graph G and d(va,vb) is the shortest 
distance between two nodes. The higher the average shortest path length, the 
harder it is for information to flow across a network. Milgram’s (1967) 
experiments which involved the 6 degrees of separation and the analysis of the 
average path length made the concept of the small world famous.  
With the degree distribution of a network, the analysis of the distributions can be 
divided into indegree distribution and outdegree distribution. The indegree 
distribution involves studying how many edges are heading towards the node 
for every node in graph G, and then plotting the distribution. The outdegree 
distribution involves studying how many edges are heading away from the node 
for every node in graph G, and then plotting the distribution.  
2.8-Social Network Analysis Measures   
Social network analysis measures are more specifically used to analyse and 
evaluate an OSN through the use of a graph. This section will explain some of 
the more commonly used measures in social network analysis.  
2.8.1-Centrality Measures   
The most popular set of measures are the centrality measures by Freeman 
(1979) which concentrate on the structure (edges) around the node. The 
measures include degree centrality, betweeness centrality and closeness 
centrality.  
Degree Centrality of a node is the number of edges attached to the node. This 
concept utilises the concept of degree in graph theory which has been 
Chapter 2-Background And Related Work 
45 
explained in section 2.4.The normalised degree centrality for an undirected 
graph G = (V, E) containing node v is shown in equation 4: 
1
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where deg(v) is the number of edges attached to node v and n is the number of 
nodes based in the graph. For a directed graph, the degree centrality is the 
outdegree of the node. The outdegree is the number of edges going away from 
the node.  
The concepts for the other centrality measures i.e betweeness centrality and 
closeness centrality will be explained using a commonly used example which is 
a kite network from Krackhardt (1990) that is shown in Figure 3. The kite 
network is an undirected graph which consists of 10 nodes and 18 edges.  
 
Figure 3-Kite Network from Krackhardt (1990) 
Betweeness centrality pinpoints the node that has the highest control when it 
comes to the information flow in the network. A node with a high betweeness 
centrality indicates that they have more control over the information flow of the 
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network. They act like brokers to control the passage of information. This gives 
the node a sense of power over the other nodes. The betweeness centrality of 
node p is calculated using Equation 5:  
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where geoab  is the number of shortest paths between nodes a to b and geoab(p) 
is the number of shortest paths that pass through node p. Equation 5 can be 
used for a directed graph but the value has to be normalized by dividing by the 
number of pairs of nodes that do not include p as demonstrated in equation 6 
where n is the number of nodes in the network. 
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Analysing the kite network in Figure 3, node H has the highest betweeness 
centrality value. Even though node H is only related to 3 other nodes, the node 
acts as a bridge which connects nodes I and J (indirectly) to the rest of the 
network. This indicates that node H is important in the network because if node 
H was removed then nodes I and J would not be able to communicate with the 
rest of the network therefore node H is vital for information flow. In comparison 
nodes E, C and J have the lowest betweeness centrality values because if they 
are removed from the network, everyone in the network is still connected 
together and there would be no change in the information flow (Hansen et al. 
2009)  
Closeness centrality measures the average shortest distance (geodesic 
distance) from one node to every other node. The closeness centrality of node a 
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based on an undirected graph G= (V, E) is the inverse of the sum of shortest 
paths to all the other nodes of node a. This is indicated in equation 7: 
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),(  represents the sum of all the  shortest distances between node 
a and all the other nodes in the network which are represented by b. The 
notation N represents the number of nodes in the network. A low closeness 
centrality value indicates that the node plays a central role in the network i.e. 
these nodes would be able to spread information to all the other nodes in the 
network because of their short path lengths. Equation 7 can still be used for a 
directed graph but the direction of the edges has to be taken into account.  
Using the kite network in Figure 3, nodes F and G have the lowest closeness 
centrality values so they play a more central role in the network and act as 
efficient information disseminators (Hansen et al 2009). The next section 
describes some other measures in the social network analysis field.  
2.8.2-Other Measures  
Density describes how well the nodes are connected to each other. The density 
for an undirected graph G which is calculated using equation 8 is the ratio of 
edges present against the maximum number of potential edges. The density 
value is a number between 0 and 1 and the higher the number the denser the 
graph is.  
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where |E| is the number of edges and n is the number of nodes present in graph 
G. Using the kite network in Figure 3, the density of the kite network would 
equal . 4.0
45
18
)2/)110(10(
18


 , which shows that the network is not dense. To 
increase the density of the graph, there would have to be more edges between 
the nodes. In comparison, for a directed graph the density is calculated as  
|E|/(n(n-1)).  
Degree prestige (Knoke and Burt 1983) concentrates on the indegree of the 
node. The context of a network can dictate what an indegree edge actually 
represents. The most prestigious node in a network would be seen as the most 
popular person in the network. The degree prestige of (e.g. node Z) is 
calculated using equation 9:  
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where )(Zd In  is the indegree of node Z and n is the number of nodes in the 
network.  
Proximity prestige (Knoke and Burt 1983) improves on degree prestige by 
using the concept of reachability. Reachability is where one node can reach 
another via a sequence of nodes which are linked together (adjacent nodes). A 
reachability matrix can be produced where if a node is reachable from another 
then a number 1 is placed in the matrix, otherwise if the node is not reachable 
from another than a number 0 is placed.  
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Figure 4-Reachability Matrix Example from (Tan 2007) 
Figure 4 illustrates that even though (e.g. node A is not directly linked to node 
D), there is a path of adjacent nodes from (ABD) and that is why there is a 
1 in row A column D in the reachability matrix. The proximity prestige of node vi 
is calculated using equation 10.  
|)(Re|/),(
)1/(|)(Re(|
)(
iij
i
ip
vachvvd
nvach
vP


  (10) 
where |Reach(vi)| is the number of nodes that can reach node vi, n is the 
number of nodes in the network,  ),( ij vvd is the average distance between 
the nodes that can reach vi and node vi.  
The advantage of having a directed graph is that it allows you to analyse 
prestige as well as centrality. Both prestige and centrality measure the 
importance of a node but the centrality of a node in a directed graph focuses on 
the outdegree of the node whereas degree prestige of a node focuses on the 
indegree of the node.  
Sections 2.8.1 and 2.8.2 have explained a variety of common measures that are 
used in social network analysis. With the introduction of OSNs and the 
increased use of the WWW, there needs to be more social network analysis 
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measures for privacy. As demonstrated by the measures explained above, 
many of them involve the analysis of edges but fail to take the contents of the 
node into account. This is important for a privacy measure because the 
contents of a node (in this case an OSN profile) can dictate what the privacy 
attitude of the user is and therefore influence their disclosure of personal 
details. This forms part of the motivation in wanting to contribute a privacy 
measure for the social network analysis field that takes the node and its 
structure into account.    
Section 2.8.3 explores the concept of vulnerability which forms the basis for the 
proposed vulnerability measure which is detailed in chapter 3 and the 
contribution to the area of privacy measures in the field of social network 
analysis measures.  
2.8.3-Vulnerability Definitions  
In different fields the term vulnerability can imply different concepts. For 
example, in computer networks, attack vulnerability (Holme et al. 2002) is linked 
to the reduction of network performance, due to the loss of network nodes and 
connections. This definition highlights the use of graph theory but provides 
limited information about the node contents.  
This is further justified by some common definitions for vulnerability in the area 
of graph theory which can applied to OSN graphs as well. The definitions 
include:  
1. Cutpoint: is the weakest node or nodes of the OSN graph. If the node 
was removed then the OSN graph would be divided into clusters that 
were unconnected. This would make the OSN graph vulnerable because 
it exploits the weak points of the graph. In doing this the attacker will 
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know that if they attack the node which is the cutpoint they can stop the 
network from functioning properly (Hannerman and Riddle 2005).  
2. Vulnerable Bridges: (Lambda sets and Bridges) Lambda sets involve 
ranking the relationships in terms of how much flow there is between 
each edge that links the nodes together. Lambda sets then identify sets 
of relationships which, if disconnected, would greatly disrupt the flow 
among all of the nodes (Hannerman and Riddle 2005).  
3. Outer Nodes only connected to one other node: The outer nodes 
which are only connected to the main node (node with the highest 
number of relationships with the nodes) in the OSN are vulnerable 
because if the main node disappears they are no longer part of the social 
network therefore they are connected to no one. You could argue that 
the rest of the network is vulnerable because these outer nodes as long 
as they are attached to the main node could be watching how the 
network grows and changes. The outer nodes could be the possible 
network attackers.  
4. Clustering Coefficient: The nodes which have a high clustering 
coefficient will have a neighbourhood where most or all of the neighbours 
are connected to each other. In terms of privacy the neighbours would 
make the main node vulnerable because of the good flow of information 
between them. The relationship between the nodes would be so 
information rich that if a new node joined a highly clustered community 
they would learn a lot about the community. This could be what an 
attacker may do if you want to learn more about a network. A high 
clustering coefficient of a node can lead to information spreading 
throughout the OSN if the node’s neighbours display their profiles so 
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publically. The information can also leak into other sub networks based in 
the OSN.  
2.9-Conclusions 
With the increase in OSN usage and the disclosure of personal details via OSN 
profiles, the field of social networking and privacy has bought up some major 
issues. Displaying personal details so publicly using OSN profiles can make 
OSN users vulnerable to privacy and social engineering attacks. OSN usage 
attracts a lot of different age groups and each age group has their own attitudes 
towards the disclosure of personal details on OSN profiles. The older adults 
seem to be more wary of disclosing personal details online where as children, 
adolescents and young adults have peer pressure to contend with as well as a 
willingness to trust the OSN with their details. More needs to be done to 
educate these age groups about the dangers of displaying personal details so 
publicly.  
The representation of an OSN by a graph can help to investigate and analyse 
how privacy attacks can affect users.The analysis of OSN graph through the 
use of graph theory concepts and social network analysis measures can help to 
identify where personal details can flow more freely. In terms of the concept of 
vulnerability, the common definitions associated with graph theory talk about the 
structure surrounding the node and fail to acknowledge the contents of the 
node. This observation forms the basis for our proposed vulnerability definition.  
With the social network analysis measures, there needs to be more measures 
associated with privacy and our proposed vulnerability measure, which is 
explained in section 3, will fit in to this area.  
 
Chapter 3-Vulnerability Measure 
53 
CHAPTER 3: VULNERABILITY MEASURE 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the vulnerability concept as well as detail 
the three components (individual vulnerability, relative vulnerability and absolute 
vulnerability) which make up the vulnerability measure. The measure explained 
in this chapter is in its unnormalised form. Chapter 6 will explain how the 
measure is normalized. The individual vulnerability calculates the vulnerability of 
an individual node which represents an OSN profile. The relative vulnerability 
calculates the overall vulnerability of the neighbourhood which contains the 
neighbours of the node and the absolute vulnerability of the node is a result of a 
mathematical operation between the individual and relative vulnerability values 
of the node. Also highlighted in this chapter are the issues which are associated 
with the algorithm developed for measuring vulnerability.  
3.1-Initial Vulnerability Concept 
With the observation that there needed to be, vulnerability definitions that took 
both the structure around the node and the node contents into consideration as 
illustrated in section 2.8.2, a vulnerability definition was proposed to take into 
consideration the structure around the nodes in an OSN graph, as well as the 
node contents(AbdulRahman et al. 2010).  
A directed multigraph was used to model the OSN because the direction of 
relationship would allow investigation, to see from which node the flow of 
personal details were coming from. A multigraph represents an accurate 
representation of an OSN used for this research because the edge connecting 
node A and node B is not the same as the edge connecting node B to node A. 
This allows a more detailed analysis of the strength of relationship between two 
nodes based on the online social interaction. The strength of relationship can be 
different depending on the actions of the node (e.g. Node A may interact more 
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with Node B by writing profile comments on Node B’s OSN profile, but node B 
may be more reserved and not write anything on Node A’s OSN profile).  
Our initial definition (AbdulRahman et al. 2010) for a vulnerable node in an OSN 
is stated below:  
Definition: the vulnerable node in a social network graph is the node that 
contains attributes to breach privacy and provide grounds for a social 
engineering attack. For such a node a highly connected neighbourhood in which 
the neighbours display the attributes readily will increase the risk of 
vulnerability, as detailed below.  
An OSN profile consists of personal details, a list of friends of the user and 
interaction elements (e.g. a wall where the user and their friends can exchange 
comments with each other). The friends of the user, who owns the profile, form 
the node's neighbourhood which can be analysed using an OSN graph.  
If you have a public profile and friends who are highly connected and who also 
have very public profiles where they display a lot of personal details, then your 
personal details may spread easier and this may increase your chances of 
being vulnerable to social engineering attacks.  
Also vulnerability is about the loss of control of personal details. The more 
public you make yourself then the less likely you are to have total control of your 
personal details. A very public profile which can be accessed via web searches 
allows personal details to be gained by social engineering attackers, sexual 
predators, hackers, etc. The aim is to make your profile and personal details 
less accessible to unknown users. This can be done by using privacy settings, 
being careful what personal details are displayed or by displaying false data.  
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A concept of vulnerability was proposed by Gundecha et al. (2011) but this 
concept unlike ours focuses a lot more on the privacy and security settings of 
the friends of the OSN user and the identification of vulnerable friends. A user 
will have a vulnerable friend if the friend’s privacy and security settings do not 
protect the user or the user’s network of friends.  
In comparison, our research concentrates more on the propagation of the 
personal details of the user through the OSN network because of the behavior 
of the user and its friends in terms of information disclosure. Also our 
vulnerability measure emphasises the potential for the user to be vulnerable to 
social engineering attacks. 
3.2-Vulnerability Formalism and Explanation 
Given an OSN si             
    where    is a set of OSNs, each social 
network si consists of a set of profiles        
  where i represents the OSN 
(e.g. 3) for example Facebook and j represents the profile number (e.g. 2). Each 
profile has a different username and is associated with a individual email 
address (making it uniquely identifiable).There are two types of users: external 
users and members where a member has a profile pj    . An external user 
denoted as         
   where the set of all types of users for social network 
si     . An external user can view some if not all the information of many pj     
which is the set of profiles for social network Ssi   ,as long as the profile is 
publicly available via a search engine.  
A member denoted as ijm     owns a profile pj     which corresponds to a 
specific username, email address and social network. In a social network si      
, member ijm  can have many profiles pj      though based on different email 
addresses. Members can have many profiles pj      with the same or different 
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usernames which spread over many online social networks si     . Each profile 
is defined by a tuple of attributes                    . The attributes can be 
personal details or social network attributes (e.g. news feeds).  
For each profile 
jjjj nij
aaaaP ,..,,..,, 21 . For each attribute ai      in 
profile pj a vulnerability score was allocated. If an attribute ai    is classed as 
vulnerable then the attribute ai is allocated a weight wi  . For each profile pj  

jjjj nij
wwwwVP ,..,,..,, 21  where jVP  represents the individual vulnerability of 
profile jP .Each wi value is between [0, 1]. The combination of these weights is 
used in the calculation of the individual vulnerability of the profile pj. One 
attribute of a profile pj  is the list of friends which act as neighbours  ni   
whereas the other attributes are atomic (e.g. name). Each neighbour ni   is 
also a profile pj    .  
In each social network iiji NjPs ,..1,   where Ni is the total number of users in si 
,  nijkijijijij aaaaP ,..,,..,, 21  where  n is the number of attributes defining each 
profile in si. For each profile ijP  its individual vulnerability ]1,0[ijIV , relative 
vulnerability ]1,0[
ijR
V  and absolute vulnerability which is an operation between 
VI and VR and denoted by ]1,0[ijAV  are calculated.  
Even though an external user      does not own a profile pj      external 
user      can make members ijm     vulnerable by spreading the 
members’ personal details on other webpages. The vulnerability measure at 
present does not take this into account.  
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The vulnerability measure proposed to quantify vulnerability is based on an 
OSN graph G=(V, E) which is a directed multigraph. Each node (       
  ) where N is a set of nodes, represents an OSN profile and the edge defines 
the connection between two profiles. A vulnerability value is associated with 
each node and the vulnerability value is defined by three components which 
include the individual vulnerability, relative vulnerability and absolute 
vulnerability.  
3.2.1-Vulnerability Measure Assumptions 
There are some assumptions made by us before the vulnerability measure is 
implemented. One of the main assumptions is that the profile data is correct. If 
the resources were available, the profile data could be analysed against 
external resources to double check the details matched. With the vulnerability 
measure the assumption is that only the immediate friends contribute towards 
the vulnerability of a node. The measure does not take into consideration that a 
friend of a friend or an external user could pose a threat. The idea has been 
explored but the technical concept has not been implemented. Also the 
measure at this stage has not taken into account the interaction of the node 
(e.g. how many comments are displayed on a profile wall and does the content 
contain any personal information about other users). In regards to the weights, 
the assumption made is that the presence of attributes that lead to vulnerability, 
cause the same effect for all the users.  
3.2.2-Individual Vulnerability 
The individual vulnerability (VI) is the vulnerability created by the self disclosure 
of personal details. It is calculated based on examining each profile for the 
presence of attributes that contribute towards vulnerability to social engineering 
attack.  
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An initial set of attributes contributing to possible vulnerability included:  
1. Full Name 
2. Gender 
3. Age 
4. Profile Photo 
5. Current Location 
6. Zodiac Sign 
The attributes above were selected because research highlighted their 
significance in breaching privacy and leading to social engineering attacks, 
which can cause loss of identity. The research is explained below. 
Krishnamurthy and Wills (2009) and McCallister et al. (2009) emphasised that 
some of the attributes that were selected (e.g. full name, current address, and 
date of birth) were “Personally identifiable information” which can be used to 
“distinguish or trace an individual’s identity”. If friends of a profile user were to 
help to leak personal information by being talkative on an OSN then this could 
compromise the identity of the person in the offline and online world.  
The attribute selection is also acknowledged by other works: Irani et al. (2011) 
emphasies that the attributes which include name, location, gender, hometown 
and birthdate can be used in a password recovery attack to recover passwords 
to accounts such as email accounts. These attributes can be answers to secret 
questions which are asked to ascertain the identity of the user and makes sure 
it matches the identity of the account user.  An example of this attack is the 
Sarah Palin case which is described in section 2.5.  
In Social Media University Global (2008) the authors state that you should not 
display family information (e.g. the maiden name of your mother or the name of 
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your pet). These attributes are common security questions, as stated by Furnell 
(2010), when the user has forgotten to reset their passwords. Banks also use 
these questions as illustrated by Kelly (2008). Federal Trade Commission 
(2006) and Social Media University Global (2008) highlighted that displaying 
personal details (e.g. full name, date of birth and contact number) can help 
attackers steal your identity.  
Nosko et al. (2010) justified this further by stating that displaying too many 
personal details (e.g. full name, phone number, address and date of birth) can 
increase identity theft concerns. These details can also be extracted by using 
the reverse telephone directory in combination with some of the personal details 
displayed on a profile. A reverse telephone directory allows users to search by 
telephone number in order to find the details of the person or service they 
require.  
Date of birth is a commonly used attribute when associated with identity (e.g. in 
the National Health Service) in the UK and in the USA where 87 % of 
Americans can be uniquely identified from a combination of the date of birth, 
gender and the five digit zip code (Miceli and Kim 2010). Irani et al (2011) 
extends this further by highlighting that OSNs use the attribute location more 
widely than zip code.  
This shows the importance of not disclosing personal details anywhere. If the 
date of birth is not present on the profile then the age and zodiac sign can be 
used in an attempt to infer the date. Also profile comments mentioning the 
words happy birthday may help to validate the inferred date of birth.  
With the introduction of Foursquare which is a opt in social networking tool that 
transmits your location , keeping parts of your current address a secret may 
have just got harder and also there is an increased possibility of being stalked 
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as demonstrated by (Hickman 2010). The disclosure of current address or 
hometown can lead to real world stalking where users’ movements are tracked. 
(Schrammel et al. 2009).  
Even photos on OSN profiles can cause information disclosure and loss of 
identity through the art of photo tagging. Photos can be used to validate a 
person's age or who members of their family and friends are. This is validated 
by Gross and Acquisti (2005) who found in their study that 61% of the profile 
pictures that were disclosed were suitable for identification purposes.   
Digital cameras which are used to take photos, store extra data for each image 
in an EXIF (exchangeable image file format) that is embedded in each file. The 
extra data can come in useful if a photo is cropped because the original photo 
can sometimes remain in the digital file itself. Mobile devices that are used to 
take photos, can store a wider variety of data because the image file 
incorporates GPS (Global Positioning System) data. The data can include the 
date and the time in which the photo was taken and also the exact position of 
the photographer (Vamosi 2011).  
Future work for the vulnerability measure involves research being done to 
highlight other attributes which can contribute towards vulnerability. The type of 
user that the attributes belong to will be a contributing factor to the attributes 
chosen and their respective weights.  
The conditions of individual vulnerability (VI) are that 
},..,1],1,0[|,...,,{ 21 niVVVVV iIInIII   
where n is the number of nodes in 
the network. Each node represents a profile. The VI value is based upon 
allocated weights to some of the attributes mentioned previously. The list of the 
attributes includes name, profile picture, gender, age, current location and 
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zodiac. The weights were based on the relative frequency of the attributes in the 
dataset which was constructed using our extraction approach which is detailed 
in chapter 4. The relative frequency approach means that the total of the 
weights has to equal 1 and there is no need for normalisation to be applied.  
If the contents of the node have any of these attributes then an attribute weight 
is allocated to the node. The total of the weights for the node is the VI value. 
The calculation for the VI value is illustrated using Lam et al. (2008) metric in 
equation 11. For simplicity 
iI
V  denotes the individual vulnerability of node i 
where i =1,.., n and n is the number of nodes in the network. For each of the 
nodes: 



m
j
jjI WFV i
1
*
 
(11) 
where m is the number of attributes, Fj is a binary value to show whether an 
attribute j has been displayed in the profile and Wj is the weight that has been 
allocated to the attribute if it is vulnerable. In this case the weights are the 
relative frequency of the attributes. The higher the VI value, the increased 
chance that the node will become vulnerable to social engineering attacks.  
3.2.3-Relative Vulnerability 
The relative vulnerability value is the summation of the individual vulnerabilities 
of the neighbours of node i as illustrated in equation 12: 
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where n is the number of the neighbour and VI is the individual vulnerability of 
the neighbour j. The reason that j is not equal to i is because a node cannot be 
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neighbours with itself. Any niVVVV
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  where n is the 
number of nodes in the network. Equation 12 also illustrates that the relative 
vulnerability is calculated recursively. If node i has no neighbours then the 
relative vulnerability is 0.  
The relative vulnerability of a node is important because it summaries the 
neighbourhood of the main node (node being analysed for vulnerability) i.e. if 
the relative vulnerability is high then it shows that the neighbours are willing to 
post their personal details online readily. This can cause the main node to be 
vulnerable because of the attitude towards privacy from the neighbours and the 
potential for personal details of the main node to be leaked via public interaction 
(e.g. profile comments). The attributes that are accessed for vulnerability are 
personal details which could lead to social engineering attack and the loss of 
control of personal information. If the personal details of a node are leaked 
because a neighbour who likes to talk mentions them in their own profile 
comments then this causes problems for the node if (e.g. a hacker views the 
neighbour’s profile and extracts the personal details). The personal details can 
also leak through the network because of the neighbour’s willingness to be 
open.  
Peer pressure is one of the major factors which drives information disclosure on 
OSNs (De Souza and Dick 2009; Govani and Pashley 2005; Gross and Acquisti 
2005; Cachia 2008; Boyd 2006). This is true especially with the younger age 
groups (e.g. children, adolescents and young adults) where they can be 
influenced by trends in technology.This is illustrated by the Digital Youth Project 
which found that for American teenagers, there was a strong peer pressure to 
join OSNs and this added to their anxiety of feeling left out if they did not join a 
network (Boyd and Buckingham 2008).  
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This issue is what makes the concept of the relative vulnerability of a node 
important especially in networks which consist of young people. If a node is 
highly influenced (due to peer pressure) by its talkative friends, who presents 
vulnerable attributes readily on OSN profiles, then the node has an increased 
chance of self disclosing their own vulnerable attributes and this results in an 
increase of the individual vulnerability of the node. Consequently the absolute 
vulnerability of the node will rise due to the behaviour of the friends and the 
increased self disclosure of the node.  
3.2.4-Absolute Vulnerability 
The absolute vulnerability VA which is calculated in equation 13, takes the 
individual vulnerability VI and the relative vulnerability VR  into account. To these 
values, a mathematical operator is applied. This gives an absolute vulnerability 
value for each node. 
iii RIA
VVV   (13) 
where i=1,..,n, n is the number of nodes and   represents the MAX operator in 
this case which is the maximum value between the VI and the VR value. An 
example of the application of absolute vulnerability is presented below:  
Node Z has a VI value of 0.9 and has 2 neighbours which are B and C. B has a 
VI value of 0.5 and C has a VI value of 0.9. The VR value is therefore 1.4 and 
shows that node C displayed their vulnerable attributes so readily and therefore 
contributed towards the vulnerability of node Z. This is because node C has 
shown signs that because they are public with the vulnerable attributes, they 
may leak the personal details of their neighbours via interactions which are 
displayed on node C’s profile. If the profile of node C is publically available to 
external users then the personal details of the neighbours can leak even into 
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unknown networks. The operator in the equation 13 is MAX so the VA value is 
1.4. Further research is done into operators and vulnerability and this is 
presented in chapter 6 and chapter 8.  
3.3-Vulnerability Measure Algorithm  
Figure 5 explains the algorithm for the unnormalised vulnerability measure 
which is used to calculate the individual, relative and absolute vulnerability 
values for each node Nn which is the set of nodes in the network. At the 
beginning of the algorithm, before the first for loop, the important components 
are defined which includes the list of vulnerable attributes and their respective 
weights. The values for the individual, relative and absolute vulnerability are set 
to 0 initially because no nodes have been analysed yet.  
 
Figure 5-Unnormalised Vulnerability Measure Algorithm 
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Once all the variables are initialised, then counter i is incremented by 1 so this 
means that the OSN profile for node 1 is to be examined first. All the profile 
attributes of node 1 are stored in set B and are ready to be analysed. If any of 
the attributes presented on the profile match any of the vulnerable attributes 
from set F, then the vulnerable attribute weight for that particular attribute from 
set W is taken and added to the running weight total of node 1 (WT). This 
means that every time a new weight is added, the total weight of the node is 
updated. Once there are no more vulnerable attributes, the running weight total 
becomes the individual vulnerability (I) value of the node which is then stored in 
the repository. The counter i is then incremented by 1 and the individual 
vulnerability is calculated for node 2. This process happens until the counter 
reaches the end of the node list which is represented by Y.  
The next stage involves calculating the relative vulnerability of each node. This 
stage begins with node 1 again. For node 1, the list of neighbours is derived 
and their corresponding individual vulnerability values are extracted from the 
repository, one neighbour at a time. Once there are no more neighbours for 
node 1, the individual vulnerability values for the neighbours are added together 
and the total becomes the relative vulnerability (R) value for node 1 which is 
stored in the repository. The relative vulnerability is then calculated for the rest 
of the nodes in the node list and placed into the repository.  
After the relative vulnerability has been calculated for all the nodes in the node 
list, the final stage of the algorithm involves calculating the absolute vulnerability 
for each node. This stage begins at node 1 and the individual and relative 
vulnerability values for node 1 are extracted from the repository. A mathematical 
operator (e.g. product or MAX) is applied to the values and this result in the 
absolute vulnerability (A) value for node 1. The value is stored in the repository 
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and then the absolute vulnerability values are calculated for the rest of the 
nodes in the node list and once the end of the node list has been reached the 
algorithm will terminate.  
3.4-Vulnerability Measure Application  
Figure 6 highlights how the vulnerability measure can be applied by using the 
OSN graph in conjunction with the vulnerability algorithm. This shows how the 
graph is used especially in the relative vulnerability calculation when the 
neighbours of the node have to be identified. In the following example which is 
illustrated in Figure 6, the attributes and their weights are just for the sake of the 
example.  
Using Figure 6, let’s consider an OSN graph consisting of MySpace profiles 
linked together by top friends relationship. The edges with dashed lines in 
Figure 6 show that there is no relationship between two nodes. An example is 
that node B is in node C’s top friends list but node C is not in node B’s top 
friends list. The OSN graph in Figure.6.highlights the fact that in some OSNs, 
(e.g. MySpace), the relationship between two people may be bidirectional, 
although not necessarily always.  
Chapter 3-Vulnerability Measure 
67 
 
Figure 6-Unnormalised Vulnerability Measure Application 
In the case illustrated in Figure 6 which uses the algorithm presented in Figure 
5 , node B has the highest VI and therefore contributes towards node A’s 
vulnerability value The VR value of node A is lowered because of the low VI of 
node C.  
3.5-Vulnerability Algorithm Issues 
The algorithm has highlighted various aspects of the vulnerability measure 
which are detailed below, that can be altered or added, in order to accurately 
reflect a dynamic OSN network.    
3.5.1-Attribute Weights  
The weights of the attributes form a major part of the vulnerability measure. 
Even though for the weights the relative frequency of the attributes in the 
dataset can be taken, this approach does not indicate the importance of an 
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attribute. As far as we know, there is a lack of research done into the 
importance of attributes (e.g. Does displaying a name on an OSN profile impact 
more than displaying your age on an OSN profile?) When hackers gain access 
to details, are they paid more for extracting certain user attributes? There is no 
established hierarchy of importance in regards to attributes. Stated below are 
two different approaches that can be used to investigate the importance of 
attributes  
Information Theory Approach 
The field of information theory is based around the concept of uncertainty and 
how to measure uncertainty.  The more information there is available, the less 
uncertainty there is. This theory formed the basis for entropy (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949) which was a used as a measure for uncertainty. The equation to 
measure the entropy of a random variable X is 

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2 )(log)()(  (14) 
where n is the number of events and P(Xi) is the probability of event I occurring. 
Entropy is measured in bits of information. The entropy measure can be used to 
measure the uncertainty of an OSN profile. In theory, the more personal details 
that are presented on the profile, the lower the amount of uncertainty and 
therefore a lower entropy value. Entropy can be a measure of surprise. The 
lower the probability of the event occurring, the more surprising it is.  
Using equation 14, the events would be represented by the attributes of the 
profile and the probability of displaying the name is the number of nodes that 
display the name / total number of profiles in the network. There are some 
axioms which are associated with equation 14 i.e. the entropy is a non negative 
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quantity and that if the probability of an event is 1 then there is no uncertainty. 
The function between probability and entropy should be continuous and 
monotonic. This means that small changes in the probability of an event should 
only result in small changes in the entropy value. In terms of vulnerability, the 
lower the vulnerability the higher the entropy.  
Statistical Approach 
Another type of approach which can produce attribute weights is using the 
results of a questionnaire to develop a statistical approach to derive the 
weights. To investigate the variety of weights that this approach would produce, 
we developed an online questionnaire.  
Questionnaire Design 
The specific aim of the questionnaire was to develop an approach for 
generating attribute weights based on peoples’ responses to the questionnaire 
in terms of rank attributes according to importance in disclosing the identity of a 
person.  
The questionnaire which is presented in Appendix I is comprised of two parts. 
The first part collected the gender and the age of the participants but this 
information was only used for statistical purposes.  
The IP address and the name of the participant were not collected in the 
questionnaire, and no other particular information to identify the participant is 
used in the questionnaire.  
The second part of the questionnaire required the participant to classify a list of 
19 items of personal details known as attributes in terms of importance when it 
came to disclosing a persons’ identity. The 19 items of personal details were 
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selected because they were attributes that were available for users to fill in, on 
various OSN profiles.  
The scale of importance in this questionnaire was a category scale which was 
ordinal because the orders of the categories are placed in terms of their 
magnitude. A category scale is a rating scale for closed ended questions where 
the response options (categories) are specific verbal descriptions (Zikmund et al 
2010). 
For the scale, the categories were not important, important and very important. 
Not important means that the participant feels there is no importance in the 
attribute contributing towards disclosing the identity of a person. Important 
indicates that the participant feels there is some importance that the attribute 
will contribute towards disclosing a person’s identity. Very important means that 
when trying to disclose a person’s identity, the participant feels this attribute has 
a significant contribution towards disclosure.  
For the magnitude of the scale, very important has more magnitude than 
important which has more magnitude than not important. The magnitude of the 
categories contributes towards the statistical approach which is detailed in the 
section entitled questionnaire results.    
The category scale only consists of three categories because the main aim of 
the questionnaire was to help generate attribute weights and having this scale 
would remove uncertainty when classifying attributes. Having a larger category 
scale which consists of the categories: not at all important, not important, 
neutral, important and very Important, would impose some uncertainty. This is 
because the category neutral implies that the participant has no opinion on the 
question asked. Also the category not at all important sounds too similar to not 
important.    
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The questionnaire was initially designed using SurveyMonkey16 which is a free 
online survey software and questionnaire tool which allows you to collect 
responses as well as analyse the results. It is a subscription based service 
where if you chose the ‘basic’ service you would pay nothing but only be able to 
collect and analyse the responses for 100 participants. This issue meant that 
the same questionnaire was also created using Survey Methods 17 where the 
number of responses you can collect and analyse for free is 500.   
Questionnaire Sampling 
The objective of the questionnaire was to determine what people thought about 
a variety of attributes in terms of importance in contributing towards disclosing a 
persons’ identity.  
Before distributing the questionnaire to participants, the target population had to 
be defined.  Burns (2000) defines a population as “an entire group of people or 
objects or events which have at least one characteristic in common, and must 
be defined specifically and umambiguously”.       
The issue of privacy affects a variety of people in various age ranges. For the 
questionnaire, in order to take this issue into account, the target population was 
defined as a population of people who study or work at higher education 
establishments in the U.K and abroad. Also the population included friends and 
family of the thesis author and some of her research colleagues.  
Respondents to the questionnaire included staff from the institution where the 
thesis author was based, students from the department which the thesis author 
was based, staff and students from Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, UK, 
Malaysia and US higher education institutions. Also respondents included 
                                                     
16
 http://www.surveymonkey.com/ 
17
 http://www.surveymethods.com/ 
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college students taking part in an open day associated with the department 
where the thesis author was based, friends and family of the thesis author and 
her research colleagues. The students from the higher education institutions 
include undergraduate and postgraduate.  
The questionnaire participants did not necessarily have to posse an OSN 
profile. Non OSN users still have opinions on what attributes can contribute 
towards the disclosing of a person’s identity.  
Sampling Methods 
A mixture of snowball sampling and convenience sampling were used to select 
the sample from the population. These sampling methods are non-probability 
sampling methods because the sample is selected based on the researcher’s 
judgment rather than a random selection which is a probabilistic approach to 
sampling.  Non probability sampling methods are also suitable for exploratory 
research which is the case for this research.    
Exploratory research is when there is limited information or no information about 
earlier studies regarding the research problem. Consequently the research is 
more centered on building a theory (Palgrave 2008; Jupp 2006).  The research 
in this thesis is about building a theory involving the vulnerability of OSN profiles 
and there has not been any previous studies based on the measurement of 
vulnerability of OSN profiles.   
In terms of sampling methods, snowball sampling is when initial respondents 
are selected and then additional respondents are acquired by information that is 
passed on from the initial respondents (Zikmund et al 2010). The ways in which 
snowball sampling was used in regards to the distribution of the questionnaire 
are listed below:  
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The thesis author emailed the questionnaire to known lectures in universities 
based in the U.K and aboard and asked them to pass on the questionnaire to 
people they know including colleagues, students and friends. The lecturers 
were known to the thesis author because of either being taught by them or 
being research contacts.  
 The thesis author also emailed the questionnaire details and link to her 
friends to fill out the questionnaire and asked that the friends passed on 
the questionnaire details and link to their friends and family.     .  
 In order for the questionnaire to be distributed to staff and students at 
universities abroad, the thesis author asked research colleagues who 
were lecturers in their home countries, to email the details of the 
questionnaire including the questionnaire link to acquaintances as well 
as colleagues, students and family members back at their home 
countries.  
The reasons why snowball sampling was used because it allowed a possibility 
to reach populations that are normally difficult to sample. In the case of this 
questionnaire, participants who were not known to the thesis author directly 
were reachable indirectly.   
Another sampling method used to gather a sample was convenience sampling. 
Convenience sampling is defined as obtaining participants who are readily 
available to take part in the questionnaire and also who are accessible 
(Zikmund et al 2010).  
The ways in which convenience sampling was used in regards to the 
distribution of the questionnaire are listed below:  
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 Staff from University of Bradford: details and link to the questionnaire 
submitted to ‘Staff Briefing’ which is a weekly newsletter which is 
delivered to staff at the University of Bradford via email.  
 Students from University of Bradford computing department: for research 
students known to the thesis author, an email was sent out explaining 
and providing a link to the questionnaire. For undergraduate and 
postgraduate students, the head of the computing department distributed 
an email containing the details of the questionnaire and a link to the 
questionnaire to the relevant mailing lists.  
 An open day took place at Bradford University with college students and 
the thesis author took part in a presentation of the vulnerability research. 
In the presentation, the questionnaire details and link to the 
questionnaire were mentioned to the college students.  
Convenience sampling was used because it is a method which allows a 
researcher to use a less expensive approach in order to gain an approximation 
of the truth. Also Zikmund et al (2010) highlights that “convenience samples are 
best used for exploratory research when additional research will subsequently 
be conducted with a probability sample”. The research in this thesis is 
exploratory but in the future probability sampling methods can be used to gain a 
very large sample of participants who use OSNs or the WWW.  
Questionnaire Results 
The questionnaire was created in January 2010 and was available for 
participants to fill in from January 2010 to May 2010.  
There were 275 people who responded to the questionnaire. In the respondents 
to the questionnaire, 51.2% were male, 48.3% were female and 0.36% chose 
not to specify their gender. The age ranges of the respondents varied. 3.2% 
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were under 18, 41.4% were 18-24 years old, 44.7 % were 25-34 years old, 
5.8% were 35-44 and 4.72% were 45 or over. Figure 7 illustrates how the 
attributes were classed in terms of importance when it comes to disclosing a 
persons’ identity. There was a small percentage of respondents who filled out 
the first part of the questionnaire but then did not classify the attributes and that 
is why the percentages may not add up to 100.  
 
Figure 7-Attribute Importance Classification 
From the online questionnaire results in Figure 7, the attributes were then 
placed into the class with the highest percentage of respondents. The attributes 
that were classed as the very important when it comes to identifying a person 
included full name, gender, profile picture, date of birth, email address, current 
address and contact number. These results justify our choice of some of the 
attributes for the vulnerability measure. Some of the attributes which were 
classed as important (e.g. places and levels of education) maybe classed as 
very important if the attributes are being used to identify children.  
A statistical approach can be established from the results of the questionnaire. 
To allocate more significance to attributes that were considered as very 
important, they were given twice the weight then attributes that were classed as 
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importance. This was because if the very important classed attributes were 
display on an OSN profile, those attributes would contribute more towards 
increasing the profile owner’s chances of their identity being disclosed 
according to the results from questionnaires and the literature in the field.   
Attributes classed as very important were given twice the weight. This factor of 
2 was an initial setting and more research in the future into attribute importance 
involving OSN profiles, will provide a more accurate factor value.  
A scenario which is illustrated below shows how the weights are derived.  
An OSN user profile pj     is defined by a tuple of 
attributes                    . The attributes can be personal details or social 
network attributes (e.g. news feeds). In the case of the OSN profile in Figure 6, 
the profile has displayed 6 attributes that have been classed as attributes that 
contribute towards a profile being vulnerable. One of these attributes (Age) is 
classed as important and four of the attributes (Full name, gender, profile 
picture and current address) are classed as being very importance. The 
attribute zodiac sign is classed as not important. The sum of the attribute 
weights has to be equal to 1 i.e. jSSS
Ak
jj
Ak
j kk


,*2
'''  
where Ai is the set of 
attributes that contribute towards profile i being vulnerable; Sj is the total weight 
of the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability and 
kj
S  is the weight of the 
vulnerable attributes which are classed as important.  The notation A’  is the set 
of attributes that are classed as important and A’’ is the set of attributes that are 
classed as very important. 
Applying the approach detailed above to derive the weights, four attributes were 
classed as very important and one attribute was classed as important. This 
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meant that the weight 1/9=0.111 for important attributes and 2/9=0.222 for very 
important attributes. 
Overall the two approaches (entropy and statistical) are different in that entropy 
is based on the attributes presence in the profiles in the network whereas the 
statistical approach is based around a questionnaire which would produce 
subjective weights. The entropy approach which is factually based, focuses on 
the actual actions of the user. This gives a more accurate picture in comparison 
to the statistical approach which is subjective. The subjective approach is more 
associated with users’ thoughts. There is also the issue of whether users’ 
thoughts will translate in to actions carried out by the user.     
3.5.2-Choice of Attributes 
The attributes stated in section 3.11 that are used in the vulnerability measure, 
are not the definitive set of attributes. The types of attributes presented and the 
impact they have on vulnerability depends on the context of the OSN and the 
type of user. Different OSNs like to display different attributes of the user (e.g. 
Facebook) displays the date of birth where as with MySpace the age is 
displayed.       
3.5.3-Relationship Strength 
The one factor which needs to be incorporated into the vulnerability measure in 
the future is the strength of the relationship between two nodes. A node which 
has a poor relationship with another node will not interact as much with the 
node and therefore there is a reduced chance of leaking personal details via 
profile interactions. The concept of friendship in OSNs is a very interesting 
issue.  
The notion of ‘friendship’ has a variety of meanings . Boyd (2006) describes the 
relationship of a friend as one that requires a degree of admiration and mutual 
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love. This definition is on a basic level and can be applied to a offline friendship  
i.e. communication without the use of computers (e.g. writing letters, talking to 
each other on the phone, a face to face conversation).  
With the rise in social media usage, online friendship has become very popular 
and has led to a trend in using OSNs to track the activities and news of their 
family members rather than having a face to face conversation with them. This 
is illustrated in a survey carried out on 3000 British people by the company Flip 
Video at Cisco. 1 in 5 of the people surveyed admitted that they use OSNs to 
keep track of what their family members are doing rather than talking to them or 
phoning them (Cisco 2010). Having a friendship on an OSN (e.g. Facebook) 
can be different to having a friendship offline in regards to the number of friends 
you have. People can have 100 online friends on their profile but how many of 
those friends are real friends and how many are acquaintances or even 
strangers (Zinoviev and Duong 2009)?  
Thelwall (2008) attempts to answer this question by presenting a friend 
mechanism for MySpace. The friend mechanism analyses the total number of 
friends that the person has on their profile and applies the following 
classification:  
 Having 0 or 1 friends is classed as having no friends because Tom is 
automatically a friend when you create a profile on MySpace. This 
category is for people who have just joined MySpace and therefore have 
no friends yet.  
 Between 2 to 9 friends is classed as close friends. These friends may be 
your offline friends who can be persuaded into joining the OSN or you 
have just a small close set of friends. This situation indicates that maybe 
this person is privacy conscious.  
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 Between 10-90 friends is classed as acquaintances who are people you 
know but do not class them as friends. This category may include (e.g. 
work colleagues or old class friends).  
 90 or above friends indicates that there is a possibility that strangers 
have been added as friends. This can increase the vulnerability of the 
person and can lead to (e.g.  cases of harassment, risk of pedophilia or 
identity fraud).  
There are several reasons why people have many friends in their profiles. Boyd 
(2006) mentions the issue of popularity where there is a trend to see who can 
get as many friends as possible. If the owner of the profile is a child or a 
teenager then this sort of behaviour can lead to trouble. Lenhart and Madden 
(2007) carried out a telephone interview with 935 teenagers aged 12-17 and 
their parents in the United States. Their survey found that 31% of the teenagers 
that use OSNs have friends in their profiles that they have never met. A major 
disadvantage of having online friends is that if you do not know them then they 
can pretend to be someone totally different in terms of identity. This can lead to 
cases of harassment, stalking and bullying. Meeting a friend face to face takes 
some of the mystery out of their identity and what they present on their social 
networking profiles.  
Another reason why people may have many friends is because the OSNs 
encourage them to do so. Wilkinson and Thelwall (2010) emphasises the fact 
that MySpace, like Facebook has ways to invite more friends to join the 
network. MySpace has the MySpace automated friend finder. The friend finder 
can work in different ways. It can search through your email accounts and flag 
contacts who have registered on the same social network as you, but neither of 
you have friended each other yet. The Facebook friend finder will also 
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recommend people who you may know based on your friends’ friends and 
similar attributes you may share i.e. being in the same year group at the same 
school. The use of the friend finder has highlighted that there needs to be more 
awareness on OSNs about online friends and the dangers in adding strangers.  
A significant reason that is not mentioned by Wilkinson and Thelwall (2010) is 
very often associated with the simplicity and convenience of forming online 
friendships on OSNs. With making friends online, all it takes is one mouse click 
on the ‘add as a friend button’ and a confirmation of the friendship with the 
friend you want to add. In the offline world, more work is needed to make and 
maintain a friendship via engaging in conversation and finding out about the 
person’s personality, identity, likes and dislikes. Unlike the online world where 
the identity of the person is not always presented correctly, a face to face 
conversation allows validation of some of the features of the person’s identity.  
In terms of the likelihood of a friendship occurring, two people are more likely to 
establish an online friendship connection on an OSN if there are attributes that 
they both share in common (e.g. the same hobbies, going to the same school or 
having the same group of friends). Also their backgrounds may be similar. 
These attributes could be faked in order to establish a relationship with a user. 
With OSN profiles, validating a users’ identity is difficult and because you can’t 
see the users’ face. Therefore, attributes such as age can’t be validated.  
This concept of friending people who are similar to you is known as homophily. 
In graph theory the concept of triadic closure can be applied to this model, 
where if two people share a common friend then there is an increased 
possibility that they will become friends themselves at some point (Simmel and 
Wolff 1950).  
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Homophilly can be called into question because of Granovetter’s (1973) theory 
that if you want to find a job it is better to speak to someone outside your circle 
of friends. You may not have any attributes in common with the people outside 
your circle of friends but you may learn valuable job information. Granovetter’s 
(1973) theory centers on the concept of strong and weak ties. Strong ties are 
people that you have strong bonds with (e.g. friends and family) whereas weak 
ties are people that you do not share a strong bond with (e.g friend of a friend or 
an acquaintance). However with weak ties, they provide the chance to acquire 
new ideas or information. Also the weak ties are effective at spreading ideas 
because acquaintances and friend of a friend will have their own set of friends.  
One element which has a significant effect on friendship in OSNs is the strength 
of the relationship between two people. This is known as ‘tie strength’. If the two 
people are presented by nodes in an OSN graph then the ‘tie’ is the edge which 
connects the two nodes together. In the field of OSN analysis, tie strength plays 
an important part when proposing measures which involve the analysis of 
relationships between two people. Tie strength was first characterised by 
Granovetter (1973). Granovetter’s concept was that tie strength could be 
characterised by a “combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, 
intimacy and reciprocal services”.  
At present, in some OSNs (e.g. LiveJournal) the idea of tie strength being 
characterised by reciprocal services cannot always be applied. This is because 
the friendship between two people is not always bidirectional due to the fact that 
in the case of LiveJournal, permission does not have to be granted to add 
someone as a friend. This is in contrast to Facebook where to become a friend 
with a user they have to accept the friend request.  Another example is the 
concept of top friends which are defined as close friends. Alice is in John’s top 
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friends list but John is not in Alice’s top friends list. Research done after 
Granovetter (1973) by other authors has increased the list of factors of tie 
strength including Structural Factors and network topology (Burt 1995), 
Emotional support (Wellman and Wortley 1990) and Social Distance (Lin et al. 
1981).  
Structural Factors and network topology focuses on the network that two users 
that are friends have in common. The factors include the number of mutual 
friends, groups in common and the number of overlapping networks. Emotional 
support, analyses profile wall comments and inbox messages between the two 
users for the presence of positive and negative emotion words. Positive emotion 
words include sweetheart, congrats and birthday.  Negative emotion words 
include hate, dump and useless.  The social distance between two users can 
measure the age differences (in days) between two users, differences between 
the educations of the two users (degrees),  number of occupations differences 
between the two users and the political differences of the two users Gilbert and 
Karahalios (2009).  
As the world of social media has grown so has the list of factors that contribute 
towards tie strength. Gilbert and Karahalios (2009) heighted this by explaining 
that in reality, tie strength has seven dimensions and many alternatives. The 
factors which have become more prevalent in recent years have revolved 
around the frequency of communication and interaction between the users. 
Singla and Richardson (2008), Yun et al. (2010) and Xiang et al. (2009) 
analysed how user interaction played a part in calculating the tie strength of two 
users.  
There are various types of user interactions on OSNs that take place between 
two people including the viewing of each other’s profiles, establishing a 
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connection via the acceptance of the friend’s request and the tagging of pictures 
(Xiang et al. 2009). Two users have a strong relationship on an OSN when 
there is regular user interaction between both parties. Singla and Richardson 
(2008) demonstrated this by emphasising that people who spend a lot of time 
talking via instant messaging are more likely to share their personal attributes 
and interests. This makes the relationship stronger but is it bad news for privacy 
issues and vulnerability especially if both the people display their profiles in a 
very public way.  
The various types of user interactions can be classed into public and private. 
Public interaction such as writing comments on the person’s profile or photo 
tagging whereas a private interaction is sending a private message to the 
person. Yun et al. (2010) makes an interesting point that private interactions 
should be given more weight when calculating the tie strength between two 
people. Their investigation involved analysing the user interactions of Twitter 
and me2DAY which is a Korean website similar to Twitter. They found that 
private interactions were rare online. Private interactions in the case of Yun et 
al. (2010) research study were direct messages, short messages by phone and 
sharing gifts.  
Private interactions are harder to quantify inside a network in comparison to 
public interactions inside a network.  Inside an OSN, say Facebook, users have 
access only to their own private interactions but Facbook can crawl and mine 
the private interactions for all the Facebook users.  
Overall, tie strength is a multidimensional area which encompasses computer 
science, sociology and psychology in order to investigate the strength of 
relationship between two people. The fact that there has been emphasis on 
user interactions reflects the modern day use of OSN sites.  
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3.5.4-Analysing different parts of the profile 
In OSN profiles there are various ways in which a user can leak their personal 
details (e.g. comment walls or tagging photos), but there are some OSN users 
who use blogs to interact with their friends. Blogs can be used to keep a reader 
up to date on a certain topic or as a personal diary containing (e.g. the inner 
most thoughts and emotions of a person). Blogs can contain music or video 
clips.  
Another aspect which can leak personal details in a more obvious way is 
quizzes. Browner (2010) work emphasies how a relative harmless quiz can lead 
to big consequences for the user in terms of their identity. A multiple choice quiz 
that was an application that could be added to a Facebook profile asked 
questions like how long is your password? and is your password your name 
with some other numbers or somebody in the family?  The answers given to 
these types of questions can lead to identity fraud, especially if the hacker 
manages to guess your password from the answers given in this quiz. Also 
because this quiz was a Facebook application, once the user agrees to run the 
application then the application has access to the user’s Facebook profile and 
its contents. Personality quizzes can leak personal information( e.g. gender, 
age, date of birth, email) as well as likes and dislikes  The details that should 
never be given in quizzes includes personal identifiable information , password 
details, banking details and mother’s maiden name.  
3.6-Conclusions 
The increase in use of OSN profiles to display personal details on profiles had 
provided a need for a vulnerability measure. The vulnerability measure is 
concerned with how the displaying of personal details can make you vulnerable 
to privacy or social engineering attacks. The vulnerability measure consists of 
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three components which include the individual vulnerability which focuses on 
the vulnerability of a profile, relative vulnerability which highlights the collective 
vulnerability of the profile’s neighbours and the absolute vulnerability which 
takes into consideration the individual and relative vulnerabilities. The algorithm 
which is stated in this chapter does present some significant issues which can 
form the basis for future work (e.g. the weights and the choice of the attributes). 
The vulnerability measure forms the foundations for the other work presented in 
this thesis 
.
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CHAPTER 4: ONLINE SOCIAL NETWORK DATA 
EXTRACTION AND GRAPH PROCESSING 
The aim of this chapter is to present our data extraction approach for OSN 
profiles which is detailed in the papers: Alim et al. (2009) and Alim et al. 
(2011b).The data extraction allows for personal details and a list of friends to be 
extracted from OSN profiles, in this case MySpace, in order for an OSN graph 
to be generated. This OSN graph is analysed in this chapter for structural 
factors which can affect the vulnerability of a profile.   
4.1-Data Extraction Methodologies in Social Networking  
The field of data extraction in OSNs has come a long way since Gross and 
Acquisti (2005) who used a questionnaire to ask people about their views on 
privacy. Extraction methodologies can be split into two separate types which are 
non automated and automated. Non automated approaches through the use of 
surveys and interviews are used in research done by Gibson (2007), Govani 
and Pashley (2005), Dwyer et al. (2007) and Strater and Richter (2007). On the 
other hand, in the past couple of years there has been more analysis done on 
data produced from automated extraction approaches. Automated approaches 
include web crawlers and some examples of studies which use web crawlers 
include Arjan et al. (2008) and Caverlee and Webb (2008).  
Table 2 illustrates some of the data extraction techniques in more detail which 
are used to extract attributes from OSN profiles. It shows some data extraction 
methods ranging from manual through to automated methods. 
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Table 2- Different Extraction Methods from OSNs 
 
The first two approaches in Table 2 are automated crawlers which allow a vast 
amount of data to be extracted within a short period of time. However any 
changes to the source of extraction (e.g. structure changes to the webpage) 
may require some adjustments to the crawler. On the other hand, the bottom 
two approaches which are not automated, requires a lot of time to collect a 
substantial sample of data.  
4.2-Our Data Extraction Approach  
The overall aim of developing our data extraction approach (Alim et al. 
2009;Alim et al. 2010; AbdulRahman et al. 2010) is to extract OSN profiles from 
MySpace in order to construct an OSN graph which would help us to measure 
the vulnerability of OSN profiles. Also the extracted profiles would provide real 
life cases for the vulnerability measure to be applied to. MySpace was chosen 
as an OSN because it allows a rich source of data to be derived from profiles 
without the need to be a member of MySpace.  
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This chapter will focus on our initial experiment (Alim et al. 2009) which involved 
developing and running our data extraction approach algorithm 500 times and 
extracting attributes and top friends from 298 profiles because the rest of the 
profiles were private, musicians or bands. An OSN graph was produced and 
analysed to identify structural features that could contribute to and affect the 
vulnerability of a profile.  
Chapter 5 will detail the second experiment which involved running the 
algorithm 250 times but instead of top friends, all the friends and relevant 
attributes were extracted from 163 profiles because the rest were musicians or 
band profiles. For the second experiment private profiles were also extracted as 
well because users still display personal details on private profiles. With private 
profiles the list of friends is not displayed on the profile but some personal 
details can be displayed. An OSN graph was constructed from the repository 
and the vulnerability measure was applied to the extracted profiles. Some of 
these profiles formed the basis for case studies which were used for validation 
purposes.  
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Figure 8-Data Extraction Approach for OSN Profiles 
Our general data extraction approach for extracting from OSN profiles is 
comprised of eight stages:  
Step1. Data pre-processing involves analysis of a given profile’s HTML 
structure. The HTML content is parsed and a vector of tokens is 
produced. The extracted tokens help in the design of the tables in the 
repository and to determine the different types of structures of MySpace 
profiles. Different structures mean different tokens. We created our own 
MySpace profiles to help investigate the different possible structures and 
attributes associated with them.  
Step2. Specify the URL address of a profile. All OSN profiles come 
with a unique profile URL address. The algorithm for the extraction of the 
personal details involved developing and expanding the library which 
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was provided by Haines(1999). The Java code was developed to be 
applied to OSN profiles and the URL of the OSN profile was used as a 
parameter. Then Java IO methods would be used to extract the HTML of 
the profile’s webpage and store it as a character array. The parsePage 
method which we defined would remove all the HTML tags from the 
string, split the remaining text in tokens and place the tokens into a 
vector. This method proved the most important when extracting the 
personal details and the list of top friends from the profile because the 
tokens would dictate the structure of the web page. In the case of Figure 
8, the URL address, personal details and list of top friends have been 
blurred out for privacy reasons.  
Step3. Check the stopping criteria. The extraction can be stopped by 
specifying the number of friends to be extracted (e.g., the first 100 
friends) or by the level (e.g., level 1 is just the top friends of the specified 
profile extracted whereas level 2 is the top friends of the top friends of 
the profile extracted).  
Step4. Visit the specified profile webpage after checking that it has not 
been visited before. Breadth First Search has been used for our 
applications to travel the OSN network as explained later.  
Step5. Extract the relevant personal details from the profile and 
insert them into the repository, ready for OSN graph construction and the 
application of vulnerability measure. The repository that we used was 
PostgreSQL 8.1.4. The repository structure has to be designed for the 
Breadth First Search algorithm.  
Step6. Extract list of the profile’s friends and their profile addresses 
then insert them into the repository if they have not been stored in there 
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before. The extracted friends’ lists can consist of the top friends of a 
profile or all friends of a profile. The data in the repository can be used 
for data mining purposes in the future to find patterns.  
Step7. Automatically generates an OSN graph. The graph is generated 
from the extracted list of top friend or all friends of each profile. The 
various structural features of the graph will be analysed to see how they 
contribute towards the vulnerability of a profile (which is represented by a 
node in the graph).  
Step8. Apply vulnerability measure to the OSN graph. The 
vulnerability of a profile which is represented by a node in an OSN graph 
is calculated by investigating the presence of vulnerable attributes on the 
profile and the profile’s neighbours which are the profile’s top friends or 
all friends.  
4.2.1-Breadth First Search 
Breadth First Search was used to travel across the OSN because for the 
vulnerability measure, profiles and their immediate friends were needed for the 
calculation. The scenario illustrating Breadth First Search in Figure 9 shows that 
profiles 2, 3 and 4 are the three top friends of profile 1. Profile 2 also has three 
top friends which are profiles 1, 3 and 5. Profile 3 is the top friend of profiles 1 
and 2 where as profile 4 is the top friend of profiles 1 and 5. Entrance to the 
repository is implemented as a queue system. The arrows that the relationship 
represents are the ‘is a top friend of’ relationship. An example is that profile 3 is 
a top friend of profile 1.  
Chapter 4-Online Social Network Data Extraction and Graph Processing 
92 
 
Figure 9-A Graph to illustrate Breadth First Search 
The bidirectional arrows show that the relationship between the friends applies 
both ways. An example is that profile 2 is a friend of profile 1 and profile 1 is a 
friend of profile 2. Using Breadth First Search in this case follows the following 
steps: 
1. Add profile 1’s attributes and top friends list into the front of the queue 
ready to go into the repository. 
2. Loop: 
a. Look at profile 1’s friends and check to see if they already exist in the 
repository. In the first iteration, the friends are profiles 2, 3 and 4. 
b. If the friends do not exist in the repository, add their attributes and list of 
top friends to the rear of the queue. 
c. Look at the next profile at the front of the queue (in this case profile 2). 
d. Repeat steps a and b. 
4.3-Data Extraction Findings 
From our experimental work (Alim et al. 2009), it allowed us to learn how to 
automatically extract data from an OSN profile using a Breadth First Search 
approach. The structure of MySpace profiles was found to differ depending on 
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the type of profile and the users’ preferences. This proved a challenge when 
implementing the code especially when over time, the developers of MySpace 
have the ability to change the structure of the profile and therefore change the 
HTML structure. We identify this as a problem for data extraction from OSNs.  
Analysis of web structures of various OSN profiles revealed that there was a 
standard format. Even though some of the profiles were private profiles, some 
attributes, (e.g., nickname, gender, age and location could still be extracted).  
Data that is placed in the repository can be mined and analysed offline to 
recognise patterns and trends about the OSN in which the profiles are based. 
The repository is password protected and stored on a university computer for 
added security.   
The profile data can also be used to identify which profile attributes and values 
make the person vulnerable to social engineering attacks. The meaning of 
vulnerability is associated with the disclosure of personal details. The more 
details you disclose the more vulnerable you can potentially make yourself.  
Vulnerability can be inferred by the attributes presented, (e.g. if the age and 
horoscope signs are present on a profile then it is possible to guess when the 
birthday of the profile owner is). If there are comments which have happy 
birthday messages from friends present on the profile as well you may be able 
to tell the exact date of birth.  
Displaying personal details in OSN profiles can make you more vulnerable to 
consequences in society. One example is whether the profile owner declares of 
there are a drinker and/or a smoker. Personal details present on OSN profiles 
can be of particular interest to employers when it comes to hiring employees. 
Profile details that can cause concern includes any mention of alcohol or drug 
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use and information that implies that the person has been linked to criminal 
activity (Havenstein, 2008). 
4.4-Online Social Network Graph Processing 
An OSN graph was then generated from the repository data. The repository 
data included the personal details and the friends’ lists of all the OSN profiles 
that were crawled using the approach outlined in section 4.2. The graph was 
generated so we could analyse the graph for characteristics which could 
influence vulnerability via the spread of personal details in OSN profiles. The 
graph analysis took place using NodeXL18 and is illustrated in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10-OSN Graph for Top Friends Extraction 
The OSN graph G is modelled as a directed multigraph G = (V, E). V is the set 
of nodes that represent the profiles of users on the OSN which has been 
                                                     
18
 http://nodexl.codeplex.com/ 
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extracted from. E is the set of edges which links the profiles together. The 
relationship which is represented by the edges is a top friend relationship. Top 
friends are not bidirectional, (e.g., node 1 can be a top friend of node 2 but node 
2 may not be on node 1’s top friends list but may be a friend of node 1). Graph 
G is a directed multigraph because we want to analyse the flow of information 
so direction is required. Also the multigraph aspect gives an extra dimension to 
the analysis stage especially with the information flow being bidirectional.  
There are many measures that can be applied when studying OSN graphs. 
Many authors including Wilson and Nicholas (2008), Wang and Chen (2003) 
and Xu and Chen (2008) have highlighted that there are three particular 
characteristics of a network graph that are used in classifying the type of 
network (i.e. small world, scale free or random). These characteristics include 
the average clustering coefficient, average path length and degree distributions.  
Graph G in Figure 10 has | V | = 2,197 and | E | = 2,747. Graph G contains 1 
connected component in which the maximum number of nodes in the 
component is 2197 and the maximum number of edges is 2747. The diameter 
of the graph is 10, which indicates that graph G represents a wide OSN network 
where there is a lack of small shortest path lengths between the nodes. An 
explanation for this being that graph G represents top friend relationships 
between nodes and there may be no relationship between a set of (e.g. node 
A’s top friends and node B’s top friends). This is further justified by the average 
geodesic (shortest path length) distance of graph G being 6 which corresponds 
to Milgram’s (1967) 6 degrees of separation theory.  
In terms of degree distribution of the directed graph G, the indegree distribution 
has a strong power law characteristic as illustrated in Figure 11. This indicates 
that most nodes have a low indegree and few nodes have a high indegree. 
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Most nodes will only be classed by a few friends in the network as a top friend 
but there will be a few nodes that will be classed by many friends in the network 
as a top friend.  
 
 
Figure 11-Indegree Distribution for Top Friends Extraction 
The degree distribution graphs in Figure 11 and Figure 12 are plotted on a log 
log scale which means that a power law distribution will be represented by a 
straight line.  
There are many activities in computing which follow a power law distribution 
(e.g. the visiting of websites or the viewing of social media). Power law 
distribution focuses more on the smaller values in the scale rather than the 
large values. The logarithmic scales only accept positive values i.e. 0, therefore 
nodes that had an indegree or outdegree of 0 were not taken into account.  
The graph in Figure 11 uses a log log scale and follows a power law 
distribution. This is proven by the R2 value which is 0.8175. The R2 value 
denotes the reliability of the trend and is a value between 0 and 1. As the value 
heads towards 1 the trend is more reliable. Following a power law distribution in 
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this case means that a lot of nodes will have low indegree values and a few 
nodes will have high indegree values.  
Figure 11 illustrates that there are some nodes that have high indegree values. 
The highest indegree value is 48 and the average indegree value is 1.250. The 
node that has an indegree of 48 is the most popular node in the network 
because 48 other nodes have included this node as a top friend.  
In comparison, the outdegree distribution which is illustrated in Figure 12 
indicates that this distribution does not follow power law and this is shown by 
the R2 value which is 0.1805. This may be because the number of top friends a 
node has is down to personal preference. Some nodes choose to have a low 
number of top friends because they know who their closest friends are. Other 
nodes may not be able to class top friends as easily, so they include a large 
number of top friends on their profile.  
 
Figure 12-Outdegree Distribution for Top Friends Extraction 
The maximum outdegree value is 40 with the average outdegree being 1.250. 
Also our data extraction approach will have influenced the outdegree value of 
some nodes because only the top friends of 250 nodes were extracted.  
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In terms of clustering coefficient, the average clustering coefficient for graph G 
is 0.031 which highlights that this is not a highly clustered network and a low 
proportion of each node’s neighbours are connected to each other. 36 nodes 
have an individual clustering coefficient of 1.000. These nodes contain a 
neighbourhood of 2 or 3 indegree nodes but no outdegree nodes. This means 
that the friends that classed this node as a top friend know each other and are 
connected to each other. This results in a highly connected neighbourhood.  
Using social network analysis measures, the node with the highest betweeness 
centrality value has the highest indegree value of network which is 48 but has 
an outdegree of 0. This node can act like a broker to the information flow 
around the network because of its connections with other nodes. All the nodes 
in graph G have a closeness centrality of 0 because the top friends are not 
connected to each other.  
Another measure that NodeXL includes in its graph analysis is PageRank (Brin 
and Page 1998) PageRank is an algorithm which was developed to help search 
engine Google rank their web pages in terms of importance. The theory of Page 
Rank is that the importance of a webpage can be justified by the number of 
hyperlinks pointing to it from other webpages. The importance of a webpage 
can be calculated using equation 15  
)(/)(...)(/)(()1()( 11 nn TCTPRTCTPRddAPR   (15) 
where PR(A) is the PageRank of a page A,PR(Ti) is the PageRank of page Ti, 
C(T1) is the number of links going out from page T1 and d is a damping factor in 
the range of 0 to 1 but it is normally set to 0.85. The damping factor is based 
around a random web surfer who is given a webpage at random and starts to 
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click the links and then gets bored and goes to find another random page. The 
PageRank is the probability that the random web surfer visits a webpage.  
The PageRank score for a webpage is dependent on the PageRank values for 
each of the webpages p it is linked to, divided by the outgoing links of each p. 
To get a high PageRank value, there have to be many incoming links from other 
pages (e.g. a link from webpage Dwebpage A )would increase the importance 
of webpage A and therefore increase the PageRank value of A. Also if some of 
the incoming webpages have high PageRank values themselves, then this can 
increase the PageRank value of A. Another factor which affects the PageRank 
value of webpage A is the number of outgoing links of the webpages linked to 
A. The more outgoing links a webpage has, the less benefit it will offer webpage 
A and the lower the PageRank value.  
With the concept of PageRank analysing incoming and outgoing edges, 
PageRank can be applied to OSN graphs. In graph G, illustrated in Figure 10, 
the node with the highest PageRank value of 18.527 has 1 indegree edge and 
40 outdegree edges. This node has the highest PageRank score because of the 
value of the links.  What PageRank has illustrated is how the use of indegree 
and outdegree can be used to measure the importance of in this case 
webpages. This helps to justify the modeling of an OSN using a directed 
multigraph and emphasing the importance of edges whether indegree or 
outdegree.  
4.5-Elements of an Online Social Network Graph that can affect 
Vulnerability 
When analysing OSN graphs, there are many graph characteristics that can be 
examined as illustrated in section 4.4. Analysing the node as an individual entity 
in terms of structure is important when discussing vulnerability. This analysis 
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gives us more information about the state of the node and the immediate 
neighbourhood. The three main characteristics (Alim et al. 2011b) to explore in 
the directed multigraph G=(V, E) include the indegree, outdegree and clustering 
coefficient of a node. The indegree of node n which can signify trustworthiness 
is the number of edges coming towards node n. The indegree of node n is 
denoted by in. The outdegree of node n is the number of edges going away from 
node n. The outdegree of node n which can signify sociability is denoted by on. 
Figure 13 shows the subgraph of a node which in this case is denoted as node 
14 and illustrates the indegree and outdegree concept. Node 14 has an 
indegree of 2 and an outdegree of 8.  
 
Figure 13-The Concept of Indegree and Outdegree for a node in an OSN 
An indegree of node n(in) in the case of node 14 specifies that this profile is a 
friend of someone and is in his/her top friends list. The number of indegree 
edges shows how much other people have an interest in that node. If there are 
many indegree edges, the node is highly interesting and trustworthy.  
In terms of personal details, the fact that node n is classed as a top friend 
means that there is a flow of personal details coming towards it. There is the 
ability for node n to act like a broker and spread the personal details via its own 
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top friends. The spreading of the personal details can be dependent on the 
number of top friends that node n has and how public or private the profile of 
node n and the neighbours are. If the profile is public then the interactions 
between node n, its top friends and all node n's other friends could be public to 
all node n's network. Interactions (e.g. photo tagging and writing profile 
comments) can leak personal details about node n's top friends as well.  
An outdegree (on) represents how many friends the node has in his/her top 
friends list. If a node has many outdegree edges this shows that the node has 
many friends on their profile they can pass information onto. Also the node can 
make itself vulnerable to attack from its own friends if its profile is very public.  
A feature that plays an integral part in assessing the vulnerability of a node is its 
clustering coefficient. A node with a high clustering coefficient will have a 
neighbourhood where information will flow easily, due to nodes knowing each 
other. In terms of vulnerability, a node with a clique where all the nodes in the 
neighbourhood know each other will have a greater vulnerability value due to 
the increased possibility that the information can spread further through the 
network.  
Another important factor that can contribute to the vulnerability of the node is 
the number of neighbours the node has and whether the neighbours choose to 
display their profiles publically or privately. With multigraphs allowing parallel 
edges, you have to be careful that the neighbours are not counted twice. This 
had to be taken into consideration when implementing the vulnerability 
measure. 
4.6-Ethical Issues associated with Extraction 
Due to the nature of the personal data presented on OSN profiles, crawling data 
from publically available OSN profiles in (e.g. MySpace) can raise various 
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ethical issues due to the public personal details which can be used to identify a 
human being.  
One view of crawling and extracting data from public OSN profiles that is 
discussed by (Thelwall and Stuart 2006) is that the OSN profile is in the public 
domain and an invasion of privacy occurs if the data from the OSN profile is 
used in certain ways. An example is extracting the email addresses from OSN 
profiles in order to construct a spam list. This type of attack was investigated by 
Balduzzi et al. (2010).  
The other view states that crawling and storing of the OSN profile data breaks a 
number of ethical criteria and the terms of service of the OSN.  Grier et al. 
(2010) presents a scenario where a researcher wants to investigate the use of 
access control restrictions in MySpace and so for publically available profiles, 
the profile data is extracted and stored for research that investigates the 
presence of publically identifiable data.  
In terms of the Common Rule which is a set of medical ethical rules governing 
human research in the United States, the accessing and storing of personal 
data is seen as research which involves human subjects. The interpretation of 
public versus private data, decides whether this research qualifies for an 
exemption. One side of the case is that the researcher is extracting data that is 
clearly personal identifiable data, but the data is publically available to anybody 
and therefore cannot be classed as human subjects research (Grier et al. 
2010).The other side of the case is that the personal identifiable data could 
pose a risk to the profile owner and so consent from the owner may be required. 
There can be double standards between OSNs and reality, because some 
OSNs (e.g. MySpace) don’t allow profile data of other users to be downloaded, 
extracted via automation or scraped, but they do allow public profiles of 
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personal identifiable information to be accessible to even external users. When 
using publically available data, researchers should be careful not to allow the 
identities of the profile owners to be discovered .         
For our research, only public profile data has been extracted and used to 
calculate the vulnerability measure and generate an OSN graph. Unauthorized 
access was never used to gain access to profile data.  
4.7-Conclusions 
Our data extraction approach which is detailed in this chapter has allowed the 
personal details and list of top friends to be extracted from MySpace OSN 
profiles in order to be used for OSN graph generation and in chapter 5 for the 
application of the vulnerability measurement. The challenges involved in the 
extraction of MySpace profiles was that the profiles have a variety of formats 
depending on the type of profile and so decisions had to be made on the types 
of profiles to extract from. In this particular experiment certain profile types i.e. 
band, musician, comedy and private profiles were ignored.  
In terms of vulnerability and the factors that affected it, analysing the indegree, 
outdegree and the clustering coefficient of node using the generated OSN 
graph can give an idea about how personal details can be spread around an 
OSN. A node with a high indegree indicates that this node is popular and there 
is a stream of information flowing towards it. Depending on the number of top 
friends and whether the node is private or public, the node can make the 
profiles that have classed it as a top friend vulnerable. A node with a high 
outdegree can be made vulnerable by its own top friends especially if the node 
itself is public. The data extraction of personal data from OSN profiles can raise 
various ethical issues depending on the interpretation of public available data. 
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Overall this experiment formed a good basis for the vulnerability measure to be 
applied.  
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL WORK ASSOCIATED 
WITH DATA EXTRACTION 
The aim of this chapter is to extend the work presented in the previous chapter 
by detailing and discussing the second experiment which involved the extraction 
of personal details and a list of all friends from a MySpace profile as well the 
application of the vulnerability measure application. The experimental work is 
detailed in the AbdulRahman et al. (2010) paper.  
This is in contrast to the first experiment (Alim et al. 2009) which involved just 
extracting the top friends from a profile. The data extracted is used for an OSN 
graph analysis and forms the basis for a case study based approach into the 
vulnerability of profiles and a brief experiment into validation of the vulnerability 
measure using case studies. Also the ‘degrees of separation issue’ is 
investigated via the use of a case study to see how the vulnerability of a profile 
links in with the concept of levels in an OSN network.  
5.1-Data Extraction Findings 
This experiment involved running our data extraction approach ( explained in 
the chapter 4) 250 times. The data extraction approach was implemented to 
extract all friends from an OSN profile rather than just top friends. Relevant 
attributes were extracted from 163 profiles because the rest were musicians or 
bands. Out of 163 profiles, 96 of them were private so their list of all friends 
could not be extracted.  
For this experiment private profiles were also extracted from as well because 
private profiles can still contribute towards their vulnerability. Apart from 
extraction findings from the first experiment i.e. the various profile structures for 
this experiment, some of the users that have deleted their accounts still have 
their profiles present. This makes extraction harder and technically MySpace 
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should have deleted the profiles. Also in order to view the friends of some 
profiles you have to be a member of MySpace. This is a new technique which 
OSN members are using to protect their privacy. The various profile structures 
in MySpace is a vast contrast to Facebook where there is one standard profile 
structure. The problem with Facebook is that you have to be a Facebook 
account member to extract from profiles whereas with MySpace you can view 
and extract from full profiles that are publically available without being a 
MySpace account member.  
5.2-Online Social Network Graph Findings 
An OSN graph G was generated from the repository data. Graph G is a directed 
multigraph G=(V, E) where |V|=10,196 and |E|=17,223. The graph just consists 
of one connected component in which the maximum number of nodes is 10,196 
and the maximum number of edges is 17,223. The diameter of graph G is 5 
which is smaller than the diameter of the OSN graph generated in the first 
experiment which was 10. A smaller diameter illustrates that the network is 
more connected. The average path length is 3 and that highlights that 
information flows more freely due to the short path lengths between the nodes.  
The average clustering coefficient for graph G is 0.035 which is quite low and 
highlights that most of the neighbourhoods of the nodes are not well connected 
together. Any small sample may or may not be characteristic of the OSN 
overall.  
In a small world network, the clustering coefficient value is normally high. The 
average path length is 3 which is small and shows one of the characteristics of 
a small world network. For the degree distribution, since the graph is a directed 
graph the indegree and outdegree distributions have to be analysed separately. 
The indegree distribution is heading towards a power law characteristic as 
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illustrated in Figure 14. This shows that most nodes have a lower indegree 
value and fewer nodes have a higher indegree value.  
 
Figure 14-Indegree Distribution for All Friends Extraction 
Most nodes are contained in someone’s friend list but the surprising thing is that 
the outdegree distribution does not have a power law characteristic as 
illustrated in Figure 15. Some of the nodes in this network are private and we 
were not able to gain access to their friends’ lists so this is probably a factor 
when calculating degree distribution. In saying that, if a private profile’s friends 
had public profiles then we could extract their friends list and build up the 
friends list of the private profile.  
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Figure 15-Outdegree Distribution for All Friends Extraction 
5.3-Case studies and Validation 
The vulnerability measure which is detailed in chapter 3 is applied using 
equations 11-13 to the repository data in order to help validate the measure. As 
far as we know there is no benchmark data to compare the results of the 
vulnerability measure so a case study based approach was adopted. In Table 3, 
for the validation of the measure, the characteristics of the node (e.g. the 
number of vulnerable attributes displayed) were analysed for three case 
studies. To give an overall picture about the node, the graph structure (e.g. 
indegree and outdegree of the node) was also included in the validation.  
With using a directed multigraph to model the OSN, the indegree and outdegree 
values in Table 3 may have counted the neighbours twice especially if the 
relationship between the node and its neighbours is bidirectional. That is why 
the sum of the number of private and public neighbours will not match the sum 
of the indegree and outdegree.  
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Table 3-Case Studies for Unnormalised Vulnerability Measure 
 
For the absolute vulnerability (VA) calculation the MAX operator was used 
instead of the product operator shown in equation 13. The MAX operator 
selects the maximum value out of the individual vulnerability (VI) and the relative 
vulnerability (VR). The cases in Table 3 highlight that there are various factors 
which can influence the absolute vulnerability (VA) of a node and these are 
detailed below:  
1. The number of neighbours and the neighbours’ profile type: the 
highest absolute vulnerability case highlights how the VR (vulnerability 
value of the neighbours) significantly increases if there are a large 
number of neighbours. The problem with MySpace is that even private 
profiles will still display some personal details even though the friends list 
or interactions can’t be seen. Therefore private profiles can still 
contribute towards the vulnerability of a node. In the highest absolute 
vulnerability case, the main node has a high VA value caused by the 
neighbours displaying all their vulnerable attributes, they are indicating 
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that they may not take privacy as seriously and by displaying these 
attributes they are opening themselves up to social engineering attacks.  
2. Absolute vulnerability operator: The effects of using the MAX operator 
are evident by the lowest absolute vulnerability case in Table 3. Even 
though the main node is private and the neighbour has got the highest 
individual vulnerability (VI) of 1, the absolute vulnerability is 1. The MAX 
operator highlights the highest vulnerability component. In this case the 
neighbour makes the main node (the node being analysed for 
vulnerability) vulnerable and that is why the absolute vulnerability of the 
main node is 1. More research is done in chapter 6 and chapter 8 into 
various operators and how they impact on the vulnerability value.  
In terms of justification, the node with the highest absolute vulnerability has a 
large number of neighbours which contributes towards a high VA value. Also this 
node is contained in quite a few friends’ lists so this spreads the information 
further. The node with a moderate absolute vulnerability has fewer neighbours 
than the node with the highest absolute vulnerability hence the lower absolute 
vulnerability value. The node with the lowest absolute vulnerability has its profile 
not displayed in the neighbour’s friend list so the information cannot flow far in 
the network. Also the node is private so its friends list cannot be viewed by 
browsing the profile. The OSN graph is needed to analyse public profiles which 
may be friends with the node. Public profiles display a list of who they are 
friends with.  
There are several factors which can influence the VA value of the node, which 
are not taken into account but can form the basis for future research. The 
factors are the strength of relationship between two nodes and the amount of 
interaction that takes place between them. If two nodes have a strong online 
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relationship, they may divulge their personal details via their interactions (e.g. 
profile comments). The amount of interaction can tell a lot about the strength of 
relationship. A high amount of interaction between two nodes may indicate a 
close online relationship between them. 
5.4-Levels in Online Social Networks  
Carrying out an experiment investigating levels of friends on a larger dataset, 
would allow us to observe how the factors mentioned in Section 5.3 link in with 
the levels of friends and their vulnerability values. The aim of this experiment is 
to investigate how the vulnerability of a node which represents an OSN profile is 
affected by levels in its social network i.e. a node's neighbours and their sub 
networks (friend of a friend of the node). In reality OSN sites (e.g. Facebook) 
have in built user controls so the user can dictate (e.g. how much of the profile a 
friend of a friend may see) and this concept is explored in chapter 8.  
To briefly explore the levels of friends, one node, its top friends and their sub 
networks were selected as a case from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset. 
Caverlee and Webb (2008) used Breadth First Search algorithm to travel across 
the network and extract the top friends and personal details from the profiles in 
2006.  
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Figure 16-Levels of Friends and Vulnerability in an OSN 
Figure 16 illustrates how the VA (absolute vulnerability) of each of the top 
friends varies with the VA value of the main node which in Figure 16 is node A. 
The VA values in Figure 16 are not normalized between 0 and 1 at this stage but 
the issue of normalization is discussed at the end of the chapter. Node A, which 
is the main node, has 10 top friends that are labelled B to K. Each one of these 
top friends has its own top friends and this produces the levels aspect of the 
OSN. The VA value is the absolute vulnerability of the node which takes into 
account the vulnerability of the node itself and its neighbours. The measure to 
calculate the VA value uses the MAX operator. For example the VA value of 
node B will take into account the VI (individual vulnerability of B) and the VR 
(relative vulnerability of B).  
The results from Figure 16 show that some of node A's top friends have higher 
VA values than node A itself. This is due to the node A having a lower number of 
top friends than some of the other nodes and the willingness or not for the top 
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friends of node A and their top friends to display their personal details especially 
the vulnerable attributes readily.  
This illustrates that the number of neighbours and the amount they disclose is a 
factor in vulnerability. A lower number of top friends may indicate that the 
personal details flow will not cover as much of the network compared to other 
nodes especially where the top friends are all public and self disclose 
vulnerable attributes readily.  
Node A has 8 top friends and so node A's personal details will be seen by these 
top friends. Excluding the top friends who have private profiles, any interactions 
(e.g. photo comments and profile comments made from Node A to any of the 6 
top friends e.g. node B), will be seen by the top friends/friends or even external 
users of node B. This is because the top friends of node B can see B’s profile in 
MySpace. These interactions will be present in the news feed, profile wall or 
photos section. At present, it is now possible in Facebook for top friends friends 
of node A, to see the first line of any profile comments made from Node A to 
any of its top friends/friends. This can increase the vulnerability of node A or its 
top friend/friend if those comments contain any type of personal information 
which can be used in social engineering attacks. In terms of Figure 16, Nodes G 
and H are private so the interactions from their top friends to them can't be seen 
by anyone who is not in node G or H top friends/friends list.  
With an external user, the fact that node A is public and presents the top friends 
list on the profile would make G and H vulnerable because the user would then 
know that (e.g. node A is top friend). Also the external user can look at node A’s 
interactions which include profile comments to build up the identity of nodes G 
and H. For an attacker, what will make it harder is that (e.g. node G does not 
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display their name on the profile) so the neighbourhood of node G will have to 
built up and analysed in order to extract an identity.  
Node I in comparison is a public profile, which has the highest VA values and 
has 23 top friends. This node has the highest VA value because of the potential 
of its neighbours to spread details around the network because they display 
their vulnerable attributes so readily.  
Analysis suggests that node I may be the biggest threat to node A because any 
of node A's personal details that appears on node I's profile via interactions will 
be seen by node I's neighbourhood and therefore increases the possibility of 
spreading the personal details through the neighbourhood. Also top friend 
friendship may lead to frequent public interactions on the profile so this 
increases the chances of personal details being contained in those interactions. 
It is not just interactions that the neighbourhood can see. One of the current 
issues in social networking is what an external user who is based outside a 
node’s immediate network can see. This is illustrated by a scenario below 
involving Facebook profiles.  
In Facebook for example node X is friends with node Y and node Z is friends 
with node Y, but node X and Z are not friends. One day node X is looking 
through node Y’s friends list and clicks on profile link for node Z. The profile link 
consists of the name of node Z and a profile picture. These two details alone 
have already contributed towards the vulnerability of node Z because the details 
can be used in social engineering attacks. Once the profile link is clicked, even 
though node X can’t see the whole profile, node X can find out about node Z in 
terms of gender, employment history, education details, marriage details and list 
of friends through its friendship with node Y. Now, node X is a threat to making 
node Z vulnerable in terms of losing control of its personal details. This scenario 
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highlights that a user has to be careful in what personal information is displayed 
and how the privacy controls of the profile are set. In Facebook there are 
privacy controls that only allow friends of the profile to see the profile contents.   
In terms of the rate at which personal details will spread, factors that can affect 
it include the connections between the neighbours, how the neighbours display 
their personal details and how talkative the neighbours are in terms of 
disclosing personal details.  
A talkative neighbour can be defined as a node which interacts a lot with other 
nodes through the use of profile comments, emails and wall postings on OSNs. 
In terms of graph structure of the interaction network, a talkative neighbour may 
have a high outdegree and indegree.  
A high outdegree indicates that the talkative neighbour has the potential to 
interact with a lot of its friends. Also the interactions that the neighbours of the 
talkative neighbour have with the ‘friend of friend’ of the talkative neighbour may 
help to propagate the personal details of the talkative neighbour. A high 
indegree indicates there is potential for a lot of neighbours to write comments 
on the talkative neighbour’s profile wall.  
A relationship with a high outdegree node will allow for profile details to be 
spread to many people. A high indegree node indicates that there is lots of 
interest in the node. If interactions between the talkative neighbour and its 
friends are all displayed on the profile and the profile is public to outside users 
and accessible, the personal details of the friends will spread quite widely and 
into networks unknown to the profile owner. This will allow more outer levels of 
the social network to potentially view the personal details.  
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Analysing the graphical structure of the network is very important when 
accessing vulnerability especially when the two nodes have the same 
vulnerability value. In Figure 16 this is shown by nodes J and K which have the 
same VA value for a number of reasons. Both nodes have the same number of 
neighbours which is 8 but the structure of the neighborhood is different. Node J 
has an indegree of 7 and an outdegree of 1 where as node K has an indegree 
of 8 and an outdegree of 0. The structure of both nodes indicates that there is a 
lot of interest in both nodes which is shown by the indegree value but these 
nodes are more wary about selecting who their top friends are.  
Both nodes J and K have 63% of their neighbourhoods containing nodes that 
have an individual vulnerability of 1 which shows that these nodes are willing to 
make themselves vulnerable by displaying their personal details.  
In conclusion this brief investigation into the levels of friends and vulnerability 
has highlighted that the node’s neighbours actions i.e. what vulnerable 
attributes they decide to display, impacts on the vulnerability of the node. If the 
neighbours of (e.g. node C) display their profiles very publicly, then other 
profiles which are in other levels (e.g. friend of one of node C neighbours) can 
view the neighbour‟s profile and find about about node C.  
Also if the interactions of the neighbour and node C are displayed on the 
neighbour's profile and personal details of node C are leaked then this will be 
used when building up a profile of node C. If a node's neighbourhood contains 
talkative neighbours then this will increases the changes of allowing the 
personal details to cover more of the network. A talkative neighbour will be a 
node that has many friends who they interact with. Most of this interaction may 
be public and presented using profile comments therefore increasing the 
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vulnerability of a node connected to a talkative neighbour or even the talkative 
neighbour itself.  
5.5-Improvements  
The results from the experiments done in this section highlighted areas of the 
vulnerability measure that need to be improved. Some of the graph structures 
associated with the spreading of the personal details needs to be incorporated 
into the vulnerability measure, ideally the individual vulnerability measurement. 
The graph structures include the clustering coefficient and the number of 
friends. The clustering coefficient of a node will indicate how easily or not the 
personal details will flow. The number of friends a node has will highlight the 
depth and breadth in which the personal details will flow in the OSN. The 
vulnerability measure has to be applied to a larger OSN network with many 
nodes. This will allow for a wider variety of cases to be analysed. One major 
issue in regards to the vulnerability measure is the normalization of the VR and 
VA values.  
Even though Min Max normalization which is illustrated in equation 16 can be 
used for normalisation, the maximum value is never set because an OSN is a 
dynamic object where profile details and list of friends change all the time. As a 
consequence, the vulnerability values for the node will change over time.  
AA
A
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minmax
min'


 (new maxA-new minA)+new minA
 
(16) 
 
where v is the value to be normalised, minA and maxA are the minimum and 
maximum VR values of the dataset of nodes. The new maxA and new minA 
represent the maximum and minimum values of the scale the values are to be 
normalized to. In this case the new maxA =1 and new minA=0.  
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By normalising the VR and VA values it will allow for relative and absolute 
vulnerability values for the nodes to be more comparable as well as emphasise 
that the vulnerability measure is based on a probabilistic approach.  Also an in-
depth validation will allow us to explore whether friends of the profile owner do 
leak personal details about the profile owner throughout the network. 
5.6-Conclusions  
The first experiment highlighted that extracting all friends from MySpace profiles 
can bring difficulties. The main one being the profile structure. Profile structure 
can change instantly depending on what the user wants to present or what the 
developer wants to improve in terms of site functionality.  
The application of the vulnerability measure and the graph have illustrated that 
when both are applied together a lot of information about the node contents and 
the structure can be derived. The vulnerability of a node depends on the node 
contents as well as the environment of the node which can be analysed by the 
use of a graph. Factors that affect vulnerability include the number of 
neighbours, the clustering coefficient of the node as well as the number of 
public and private profiled neighbours and the operator used in the calculation 
of the absolute vulnerability. Private profiles in MySpace still display vulnerable 
attributes and therefore are taken into account when working out vulnerability.  
The second investigation into the levels of friends in an OSN and vulnerability 
highlighted that the node’s neighbours actions i.e. what vulnerable attributes 
they decide to display can have a significant impact. From the interaction on the 
neighbours profiles (e.g. profile comments), the other levels of the OSN (e.g. a 
friend of a neighbour) can infer details about the node by examining the profile 
comments.  
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Overall to improve the vulnerability measure, graph characteristics i.e. the 
number of friends and the clustering coefficient has to be incorporated into the 
measure as well as normalising the VR and VA values. Also an indepth 
validation of the measure and the especially the concept of vulnerability has to 
take place.  
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CHAPTER 6: MODELLING OPERATORS FOR 
INDIVIDUAL VULNERABILITY 
The aim of this chapter is to address the issue of normalisation of the 
vulnerability measure as well as carrying out experimental work, to explore the 
effect of modeling the individual vulnerability of a profile using different 
mathematical operators. The experimental work is tested on an established 
OSN dataset which is Caverlee and Webb (2008). This is in order to model the 
profile owners various attitudes towards privacy. The effect of the different 
mathematical operators to model the individual vulnerability will impact on the 
relative and absolute vulnerability values of the profiles. Normalisation of the 
vulnerability measure will focus on normalising the relative vulnerability, to a 
value between 0 and 1.   
6.1-Improved Individual Vulnerability Calculation and Meaning 
The neighbourhood of a profile (the profile’s friends) plays a big part in the 
theory of vulnerability which is detailed in this thesis. In the theory, a profile with 
a high VR value increases the chances that one or more neighbourhood profiles 
will disclose personal details about the main profile (the profile at the center of 
the neighbourhood) via interactions (e.g. writing profile comments or tagging 
photos). The experimental work which aims to validate the vulnerability theory is 
detailed in chapter 8.  
To reflect the importance of the neighbourhood in spreading the personal 
details of the profile, the neighbourhood features: the total number of friends 
and clustering coefficient of the profile which is illustrated in equation 1 were 
converted into attributes and added to the list of existing attributes to analyse for 
each main profile and its corresponding neighbourhoods.  
Chapter 6- Modeling Operators for Individual Vulnerability 
121 
In terms of the attributes, number of friends and clustering coefficient, a weight 
was allocated if the profiles met certain criteria. The criteria were if the profile 
had 150 or fewer friends or had a clustering coefficient greater than 0.5.  
Having 150 or fewer friends increases the chances of the personal details of the 
profile spreading across the network though interaction between a profile and its 
friends that makes up the neighbourhood. This value originates from Dunbar’s 
(1992) theory: 150 is the maximum number of humans a person can have a 
stable and interactive relationship with.  
A profile which has a clustering coefficient greater than 0.5 is allocated a weight 
because more of the friends which make up the neighbourhood are connected 
to each other and this may increases the spread of personal details. The 
clustering coefficient of a profile does not focus on the number of friends a 
profile has but how well connected the friends are to one another.  
The weights that are allocated for the two features are calculated using the 
relative frequency approach (e.g. the number of profiles that have 150 or less 
friends and the number of profiles that have a clustering coefficient of 0.5 or 
above) in regards to a dataset.  
Gundecha (2011) validates the thinking behind the vulnerability theory by 
highlighting that a profile user can have a breach of privacy and security if the 
user’s friends abuse their trust and have poor privacy and security settings 
themselves.    
An improved definition of a vulnerable node (Alim et al. 2011) which is stated 
below, takes into consideration the issue of the spread of personal details via 
interactions. This is in comparison with the initial definition in section 3.2.    
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An improved definition of a vulnerable node (Alim et al. 2011) is a node that 
contains attributes and neighbourhood features that breach privacy and provide 
grounds for a social engineering attack and the opportunity for the attribute 
values to spread through the network. For such a node a highly connected 
neighbourhood in which the neighbours display the attributes readily may 
increase the risk of vulnerability.  
6.2-Normalisation 
Normalisation is important because it allows for the vulnerability of profiles to be 
compared to one another. An example being that if you wanted to compare the 
relative vulnerability of two profiles, it is easier to see the difference between the 
relative vulnerability values, if the values are in the same scale. In this case the 
scale is [0,1]. Also with values that are between 0 and 1, probabilistic 
approaches can be used.  
Min Max normalization is not an appropriate method to use for normalisation 
because the OSN is dynamic and can change over time. Therefore the 
maximum value for the relative vulnerability can never be attained and 
consequently the vulnerability measure can’t be normalised.   
In order to make the absolute vulnerability a value between 0 and 1, the relative 
vulnerability had to be normalised first to be a value between 0 and 1. To 
achieve this, instead of calculating the relative vulnerability using a summation 
of the individual vulnerabilities of a profile’s neighbours as illustrated in equation 
12, the geometric mean and the arithmetical mean of the profile’s neighbours’ 
individual vulnerability values can be applied instead. Equation 17 shows the 
calculation for the geometric mean of the profile’s neighbours of profile i 
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where n is the number of the profile neighbours and 
jI
V is the individual 
vulnerability of the neighbour  j. For simplicity
iR
V  denotes the relative 
vulnerability of profile i where i =1,.., n and n is the number of profiles in the 
network. The reason that j is not equal to i is because a profile cannot be 
neighbours with itself. The relative vulnerability (VR) has the condition 
]1,0[|,...,,{ 21  RRnRRR VVVVV  where n is the number of nodes in the network 
The arithmetical mean of the profile neighbours of node i which is calculated 
using Equation 18 will also produce a value between 0 and 1 for the relative 
vulnerability 
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where n is the number of the profile neighbours and 
jI
V is the individual 
vulnerability of the neighbour j. For simplicity
iR
V  denotes the relative 
vulnerability of profile i where i =1,.., n and n is the number of nodes in the 
network. Chapter 7 will detail the formal background of the vulnerability 
measure which includes the effect of the geometric and arithmetical mean on 
the relative vulnerability and how this can affect the absolute vulnerability of a 
profile.  
6.3-Modelling Criteria 
Mathematical functions were used in the modeling of the individual vulnerability 
of a profile. The vulnerability measure was based on the total weight of the 
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profile. In the modeling process, this is referred to as the variable x: the total 
weight of the profile is the summation of the weights of the attributes which are 
present in the profile and this is illustrated in equation 11. The aim of this 
experiment was to improve the calculation of individual vulnerability to take into 
consideration the type of network user (e.g. child, adolescent, adult) and what 
sort of network they belong to (e.g. a network consisting of OSN profiles of 
children ). The types of users and their behavior towards privacy are discussed 
in section 2.6.  
Therefore we modeled the individual vulnerability of the profile with a function 
applied to the total weight of the profile which is represented by x. Individual 
vulnerability can be described in terms of information disclosure. A high 
individual vulnerability value indicates a high amount of information disclosure 
which can increase the likelyhood of social engineering attacks especially if the 
profile is very public. When selecting the types of functions to model with, the 
following initial criteria were applied:  
C1. Function f: x→y is a bijective mapping f: [0, 1] → [0, 1], where x is 
the total weight of the profile and y is the individual vulnerability of the 
profile. Function f is bijective because for every profile, the total weight of 
the profile is mapped with exactly one unique individual vulnerability 
value.  Also for every individual vulnerability value of a profile, there is a 
unique total weight of the profile.  
C2. For ∀ x1, x2, x1≤x2⇒f(x1) ≤f(x2). This implies that the function is 
monotonically increasing which states that as the total weight of the 
profile x increases, then the amount of disclosure y=f(x) increases as well 
and therefore makes the profile with weight x1 at least as vulnerable to 
attack as a profile with the weight x2.  
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C3. f(1)≤1: when the total weight of the profile x= 1 then the profile 
disclosure f=f(x) tends towards 1. f(x)=1 is the maximum amount of 
disclosure possible for an individual profile which means that the profile 
owner displays all the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability on 
the profile and has maximum values for the structural factors (e.g. 
clustering coefficient and number of total profile friends).  
C4. f(0)≥0: therefore f(x) may or may not go through the point (0, 0) 
and this can influence the disclosure value when the total weight of the 
profile is 0. A profile with a total weight of 0 will not display any attributes 
that contribute towards vulnerability and also have no friends, which may 
be an ideal case 
C5. Function f is a continuous function. Continuity for (e.g. point a) for 
function f implies that that there is no drastic change between the values 
of function f when it is near a in comparison to the values when it is at a. 
This means that as x approaches a, then the value of f(x) has to be 
approaching f (a) and this can be represented by the notation
)()(lim afxfax  . There are three criteria which have to be satisfied 
in order for function f to be classed as continuous, a has to be in the 
domain of f [0,1]. Also )(lim xfax  has to exist and
]1,0[)()(lim  afxfax . A continuous function fits the theory that as 
a profile displays more attributes or features that contribute towards 
vulnerability, the total weight of the profile increases and the individual 
vulnerability consequently increases.  
C6. Function f(x) has to be non negative therefore f(x)≥0. 
Consequently the domain of function f is [0,1]. The total weight of a 
profile is a non negative number because in the case of this vulnerability 
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measure, displaying attributes on a profile does not reduce the likelihood 
of contributing towards the vulnerability of a profile.   
The domain of function f will enable probabilistic approaches to be used to 
assess the privacy risks of profiles. Also the normalisation of the vulnerability 
values will allow comparisons to be made with profiles in other OSNs.  
6.4-Types of Functions and their Behaviours 
Parameters i.e. network characteristics for example the number of profiles in the 
network who have friends that have public profiles or the collective level of 
interaction, can be incorporated into function f as a β value (e.g. β f(x)). The β 
value can represent a manner of network characteristics (more examples 
include the average number of friends in the network and its surrounding levels, 
the amount of communication between age bands and the age range of the 
network.  
β has to be a value between 0 and 1 so the values have to be normalised. This 
implies that function f in conjunction with β has to be a value between 0 and 1. 
Also the limit of function f with β has to tend towards 1 or hit 1 exactly. At 
present the research is not concerned with the value of β but further research 
will be required to assign values to β based on the statistical analysis of the 
network.  
For the modeling of the individual vulnerability of a profile we selected a limited 
number of function models as illustrated in Figure.17 which met the modelling 
criteria C1-C6, some of the functions having a generalised form by the 
introduction of a parameter.  
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Figure 17-Graph of Mathematical Function Behaviours 
These functions were chosen to see how the functions behaved in accordance 
to the modelling criteria. Some of the functions had β parameter values already 
specified to investigate the effects of the parameter especially when the 
disclosure value hit 1 or was near 1. The cubic polynomial function had a β  
value of 0.3, the exponential function β value was 0.35, the sigmoid had a β 
value of 0.5 and the quadratic polynomial had a β value of 0.9. The β values of 
the functions are different, in order to investigate what β values are required so 
the functions tends to or hits 1.  
All of the functions fitted some of the modelling criteria specified but the 
quadratic polynomial function fitted the modeling criteria strictly. Three functions 
were chosen to apply and validate against the real life cases from the Caverlee 
and Webb (2008) dataset and these functions included: 



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


1
x  
(19) 
)3(^ x  (20) 
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))1(*(tanh x  (21) 
The functions were chosen because they would provide a variety of different 
case results to analyse and they fitted the modelling criteria with the β value 
incorporated into the function. The functions that were not chosen either started 
off too slow and only gained momentum until the very end (e.g. cubed) or 
started off at a high rate of disclosure and did not increase very far (e.g. 
sigmoid). Some of the functions when incorporated with the addition of a 
provisional β parameter gave results that were outside the 0-1 range.  
6.5-Function Case Studies 
Three profiles from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset with varying features 
and neighbourhood environments were selected as case studies in order to 
examine how well the different functions modeled the various cases. Each case 
represents a different type of user (e.g. adolescent, young adult and older adult) 
and so this will allow an investigation into whether the functions can model 
reality.  
Table 4 presents the details of the case studies in regards to vulnerability. The 
number of attributes that contribute towards vulnerability, total number of friends 
and clustering coefficient are analysed for each profile in order to calculate the 
total weight of the profile. Since a directed multigraph was used to model the 
OSN network, the number of immediate neighbours of a profile is the top friends 
of the profile and the friends that specify the profile as a top friend.  The 
clustering coefficient of the case study profiles is low because top friends of a 
profile may not know each other. The neighbours’ behaviour is very important 
when calculating the overall vulnerability of the profile because of the increased 
chance that they may leak the profile’s personal details via interactions which 
can include profile comments or photo tagging. The vulnerability measure in its 
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present form does not directly incorporate the interactions aspect of the OSN in 
the calculation but this will be incorporated into the calculation of the relative 
vulnerability in the future.   
Table 4-Case Study Details for Various Users and their Profile Characteristics  
 
6.6-Results 
Table 5 below presents the results of the application of the functions on the 
case studies. With the functions, x represents the total weight of the profile and 
an initial β value of 0.5 which is a neutral value, was used. 
Table 5-Vulnerability Values for the Case Studies where β is 0.5 
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The individual vulnerability modeling impacts on the relative and absolute 
vulnerability of a profile. The arithmetical mean operator in equation 17 was 
used to calculate the relative vulnerability and the product operator which is 
illustrated in equation 13 was used to calculate the absolute vulnerability. The 

1
x  function and the ))1(*tanh( x  function results in Table 5 shows 
validation between the results and the profile details listed in Table 4. Apart 
from the )3(^ x  function, the absolute vulnerability of the profile decreases 
as the behaviour of the profiles’ neighbours’ decreases.  
A profile with a high absolute vulnerability indicates that there is an increased 
chance of the profile losing control of its personal details due to its own self 
disclosure and/or its neighbours disclosure. This is illustrated because the high 
individual vulnerability profile which is the young adult user mentioned in Table 
5 itself, is very public with its attributes and the number of friends is a factor that 
contributes towards its vulnerability because it has less than 150 friends. This 
profile’s neighbour displays the same behaviour as the profile.  
On the other hand, the function )3(^ x shows some interesting results 
especially with the profiles representing the adult user and the adolescent user. 
This is because the rate of the )3(^ x  function is very slow until the value of 
x reaches 0.6 then there are significant increases in the individual vulnerability 
values of the profiles.  
The reason why the profile representing the adult user has a lower VA  value in 
comparison to the profile representing the adolescent user is because of the 
individual and relative values. The profile representing the adult user has a 
lower individual vulnerability value of 0.2136 in comparison to the profile 
representing the adolescent user which has an individual vulnerability value of 
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0.9939. Another reason is due to the reduction effect of the product operator 
which is used to calculate the absolute vulnerability. If one of the components 
has a high vulnerability and one of them has a low vulnerability then the 
reduction effect occurs (e.g. the adult user and the )3(^ x  function). The 
individual vulnerability is low but the relative vulnerability is high. Theoretically 
the absolute vulnerability should reflect that the profile itself is private in terms of 
self disclosure but there is still the likelyhood for the profile’s personal details to 
spread due to the high relative vulnerability.  
Out of all the function values in Table 5, the behaviour of the ))1(*tanh( x  
function in general makes it harder to highlight which profiles are very 
vulnerable and need further analysis. This is because the function increases 
from the very beginning in terms of individual vulnerability value. Even with a 
small value of x, there is an individual vulnerability which is significantly bigger 
than the other two functions. This function ))1(*tanh( x  which is a convex 
function could model an alarmist approach to vulnerability. An example being if 
a child disclosed a small amount of personal information then there would be a 
lot of concern regarding the disclosure and its contribution towards the privacy 
and welfare of the child. Therefore the child would have a high individual 
vulnerability value.  
The other two functions which are concave, display behaviour where the value 
of x has to be high to produce a significant individual vulnerability value. This 
approach would be used to model an adult or older adult who is more aware 
about the consequences of privacy and its impact on their life. A younger adult 
may have a function which is both concave and convex in order to reflect the 
fact that they may be more privacy aware but have peer pressure to disclose 
their personal details.  
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Overall what Table 5 does show is that the behaviour of the profile alone does 
not dictate the vulnerability of the profile. The profiles that have a high absolute 
vulnerability and low absolute vulnerability both have high individual 
vulnerability values but the profiles’ neighbours act in different ways in terms of 
disclosure. Another stage of the research will involve carrying out an 
investigation into modeling the overall characteristics of the OSN and 
incorporating this into the functions via the β value. 
6.7-Validation of Case Studies 
The aim of the validation is to explore whether a profile with high relative 
vulnerability contains neighbours who leak some of the profile’s personal details 
via interactions (e.g. profile comments). For the three case studies which are 
detailed in Table 4, where each case represents a seed profile, the profile 
comments of the profile’s neighbours immediate friends were examined to see if 
the comments written by any of the profile’s neighbours leaked any personal 
details about the profile.  
With the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset, the neighbours represent the top 
friends of the node and since a multigraph was used to model the OSN, the 
neighbours also included the top friends that class the profile as a top friend. 
Caverlee and Webb (2008) extracted only the first page of profile comments 
from OSN profiles which contains the most up to date comments.  
For the profile representing a young adult user, only three comments disclosing 
the name of the of the profile owner were present in the profile’s neighbours’ 
interactions.  
For the profile representing an adult user, the profile’s neighbours do not 
disclose any personal details about the profile in their interactions. This is 
probably because the profile never really interacted with the neighbours. 
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However the neighbours friends do disclose some of the personal details of the 
neighbours (e.g. surname).   
With the profile representing the adolescent user, two of the neighbours leak the 
current state of education of the profile owner and the relationship status of the 
profile owner in their interactions with their other friends. The neighbourhood 
contains neighbours which are interactive with one another and this is shown by 
the number of comments they exchange with one another.  
From the results in Table 5, it seems that the young adult user has the highest 
possibility of being vulnerable due to the high individual and relative vulnerability 
value, which demonstrate that both the profile and its neighbours display their 
personal details publically. However the validation results highlight that out of 
the three case studies, the profile representing the adolescent user is more 
vulnerable because the neighbours disclose more personal details about the 
profile in their interactions. This increases the chance of the neighbours’ friends 
and other users viewing the personal details of the profile and spreading the 
personal details through the network. What the results do highlight is that other 
personal details can contribute towards vulnerability (e.g. education).  
The analysis of the neighbours’ profile interactions for disclosure of the profile’s 
personal details and whether the profile interacts with the neighbours, can tell 
you information about the relationship strength between a profile and its 
neighbours. These case studies have highlighted various degrees of strength of 
relationships. An example being that a profile has a weak relationship with its 
neighbours because the profile does not interact with the neighbours, but the 
neighbours still disclose personal details about the profile.   
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6.8-Improvements 
The validation of this experiment has highlighted that a profile with a high 
relative vulnerability doesn’t necessarily mean that the profile’s neighbours will 
leak personal details about the profile in their interactions with other friends.  
The vulnerability values have to match the amount of disclosure of the profile by 
the neighbours. The collective amount of disclosure by each neighbour of the 
profiles’s personal details can be converted into a coefficient with a value 
between 0 and 1 and incorporated into relative vulnerability calculation. This will 
help to reflect the behaviour of the profile’s neighbours in terms of privacy as 
well as their contribution in making the profile vulnerable to social engineering 
attacks. A neighbour with a high individual vulnerability increases the effect of 
details spreading especially if the neighbours’ interactions are public.  
Also different operators associated with the absolute vulnerability calculation 
need to be validated to reflect the nature of the OSN profile and its 
neighbourhood in terms of disclosure.  
6.9-Conclusions  
The modeling of the individual vulnerability of profiles via different mathematical 
functions has highlighted how the type of mathematical function used can also 
link to the vulnerability approach adopted because of the users’ attitudes 
towards privacy.  
An example being that with a convex function a small amount of personal detail 
disclosure can lead to a higher individual vulnerability value straight away 
,resulting in an alarmist approach to vulnerability. This approach is more 
suitable to model an OSN profile of a child, adolescent or young adults.  
A concave function on the other hand would require a bigger disclosure to be 
made before vulnerability was significant. This would lead to a conservative 
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approach on vulnerability, which may be applied to adults or older adults OSN 
profiles. The modeling of the individual vulnerability can affect the relative and 
absolute vulnerability values of the profiles.  
The validation of the vulnerability measure in the three case studies showed 
that in this particular set of cases, even if a profile has a very high relative 
vulnerability value, this does not necessarily imply that the amount of disclosure 
of the profile’s personal details by the profiles’ neighbours is high as well. To 
account for this, the amount of personal details that the neighbours disclose 
about the profile has to be incorporated into the relative vulnerability of 
vulnerability measure as a coefficient. 
 
Chapter 7- Axioms, Propositions and Vulnerability Measure Properties 
136 
CHAPTER 7: AXIOMS, PROPOSITIONS AND 
VULNERABILITY MEASURE PROPERTIES 
The aim of this chapter is to present the formal aspects of the vulnerability 
measure. The formal aspects include the properties of the vulnerability 
measure, initial axiom regarding the individual vulnerability of the profiles and 
propositions which concentrate on the relative vulnerability and absolute 
vulnerability. The axioms are detailed in the (Alim et al. 2011a). The 
propositions and experimental work regarding the propositions are detailed in 
(Alim et al. 2011c).  
7.1-Vulnerability Measure Properties  
Our definitions of absolute vulnerability, individual and relative vulnerability for 
an OSN user in the context of the OSN users (friends, friends of friends, general 
users etc) center around the concept that these value are normalized to value 
between 0 and 1. Within this context, the properties of the algebraic structure 
G= )],1,0([  associated with our vulnerability measure are introduced below. In 
this example, the operator   can be represented by the MAX operator.  
The properties of the algebraic structure G= )],1,0([  include:  
1. Closure: ]1,0[],1,0[, 2121  VVVV  this property implies that when applying 
the operator for the vulnerability measure, all the components needed 
are contained in the same domain of [0,1]. This is because the measure 
utilises the concept of probability. If a profile has a high absolute 
vulnerability value, then there is a chance of this profile being vulnerable 
to social engineering attacks due to the behavior of itself and its 
neighbours in regards to privacy.  
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2. Associativity: )()( 321321 VVVVVV  . By saying that the measure is 
associative we are acknowledging that the grouping order of the friends’ 
contribution in the calculation of vulnerability is not important. The value 
of the relative vulnerability of the profile is still the same This is 
emphasized by the permutation mapping illustrated by Calvo and Dercon 
(2005) in their measure to measure vulnerability in regards to poverty 
and assures us that changes in the way the friends of a OSN profile are 
browsed does not affect the value of the vulnerability measured in the 
OSN graph for a particular user profile (OSN graph node).  
3. Identity Element: the element Ve from G defined in the interval [0,1] such 
that for any element Va from G: aaeea VVVVV  . Applying the MAX 
operator into the relationship above implies that such an identity element 
satisfies MAX(Va,Ve)=Va. for any Va. This implies that Ve=0. In reality to 
get registered a profile on an OSN, some at least minimal (vulnerable) 
attributes have to be disclosed (e.g. name, gender, date of birth or age). 
Therefore the vulnerability of the individual profile cannot be 0 in practical 
terms, but of course may have at least a theoretical chance.  
4. Inverse Element: For every Va from G there is an element called Va
-1 
such as Va  Va
-1
 = Ve (identity element) and Va
-1  Va=Ve. This property 
cannot be applied to the vulnerability measure because if you are fully 
vulnerable, then your friend’s good behaviour will not make you less 
vulnerable, in other terms if Va is any non-zero value having the identity 
element null for the MAX operator it is not possible to find an inverse 
element to satisfy this property.  
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5. Commutativity: For every V1 and V2 from G, 1221 VVVV  . By saying that 
our measure is commutative we acknowledge that the order of the 
friends’ contribution in the calculation of vulnerability is not important.  
In conclusion the vulnerability model properties mentioned above relative to the 
MAX operator define an algebraic structure of a commutative monoid 
(commutative because the operator MAX is commutative for any value in the 
interval [0,1]). The measure is a monoid because it meets the requirements of 
being commutative, associative and has an identity element. 
7.2-Axioms  
The proposed axioms (Alim et al. 2011a) which were established after much 
experimental work, are based up on the work done by (Calvo and Dercon 2005) 
into individual vulnerability, but the difference being that their measurement of 
vulnerability is associated with poverty. In comparison, our vulnerability axioms 
are based around the self disclosure of personal details in an OSN profile.  
Definition 1: Let the individual vulnerability for an OSN profile be defined by the 
tuple V=(z,A,P), where z can be used to illustrate a vulnerability threshold that 
indicates the total amount of self disclosure attributes needed for a profile to be 
labeled as highly vulnerable. The set of attribute values for the i-th OSN profile 
is denoted by ai. The probabilities set Pi=(pi1, pi2, .., pij, .., pim) where m 
represents the number of attributes, contains the likelihoods pij, which measure 
if the presence of the j-th attribute will cause the i-th profile to be vulnerable to 
social engineering or privacy attacks. Consequently pij delivers the value for Wj 
in equation 11 in section 3.2.2. The weighted total of the probabilities pij is the 
individual vulnerability of the i-th profile: according to equation 11, 
iI
V  is a 
positive value less or equal to 1, and this meets the closure property of the 
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vulnerability model since our model components (VI, VR, VA) have to be in the 
domain [0,1].  
In this thesis, we are not concerned with the value of z (vulnerability threshold) 
in the tuple V or its use. However this vulnerability threshold will be used in the 
future for highlighting the degree of vulnerability a profile may have. Definition 1 
illustrates that our individual vulnerability measure takes initially into 
consideration attributes that contribute towards vulnerability. There is an issue 
about whether a profile which does not disclose any personal details or has any 
friends is classed as having any sort of vulnerability.  
If a user would like to apply for an OSN profile he or she is encouraged to 
record personal details in the registration process. The only way to not display 
the personal details publically is after getting the profile, change the privacy 
setting to hide the details or give false personal details in the registration 
process. The latter reason seems the more realistic scenario of the two 
because currently, for example for Facebook users, attributes like name can’t 
be removed from an OSN profile; they can only be change. Three axioms were 
proposed for the probability dependent effect of OSN profile attributes, for the 
probability change and for the addition of attributes onto the profile definition:  
Axiom 1 (Probability Dependent Effect of Attributes) Given two OSN profiles 
characterized by the vulnerabilities V=(z,A,P) and V’=(z,A’,P’) respectively, for 
any change d>0 in one attribute value:  
where V is the profile’s individual vulnerability, A is its set of attributes and P is 
its set of probabilities. The change in attribute value is denoted by d.  
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A constraint of Axiom 1 is that the attributes have to be independent of one 
another. This is so the probability of each attribute contributing to vulnerability 
does not depend on the presence of another attribute. An example of an 
independent relationship between attributes is age and zodiac because people 
of different ages can have different zodiac signs. In comparison the relationship 
between the date of birth and age is dependent because the date of birth is 
used to calculate the age.  
Equation 22 describes the case when two OSN profiles have the same profile 
attributes and these attributes have the same probability values. This 
consequently gives the profiles the same individual vulnerability value. For 
example both profiles have the number of friends as an attribute a1 and the 
probability that this leads to the profile being vulnerable is p1.  
Over time (e.g. a few days later) the number of friends has increased from a1 to 
a1+d for both profiles. In equation 22, this change in the number of friends is 
represented by d. The consequent effect on individual vulnerability is that the 
change with the same increment in the same attribute values for both profiles is 
reflected similarly in the vulnerability of both profiles under the circumstances 
that both profiles have the same probability p1=p1’ associated with the 
information disclosure because of the attribute a1.  
On the other side, in equation 23 if the two OSN profiles have the same 
attributes but the probability of the attributes contributing towards the individual 
vulnerability of each profile differs, as illustrated by the probability notations p’ 
and p”, the changes in the individual vulnerability values for both profiles are not 
the same. This situation may arise when, for example, one profile belongs to an 
adolescent and the other one to an adult. The probability of, let’s say, the 
attribute education information causing vulnerability is higher for a child or 
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adolescent than an adult. This is backed by Hinduja and Patchin (2008) who 
claims that having several details of the adolescent (e.g. name, current city, 
profile picture and school) is all that is needed to locate the individual and trace 
their identity.  
Axiom.2: (Probability Change): For every V=(z,A,P), the probability change 
]1,0[e  and pi+e<=1.  
 
Equation 24 presents a scenario where there are two users with OSN profiles. 
Unlike the first profile, the first attribute a1 in the second profile has a higher 
probability value of making the profile vulnerable. This means that the individual 
vulnerability of profile one is the same or smaller than the individual vulnerability 
value of the second profile. In equation 25 represents the same scenario with 
two OSN profiles but this time attribute a1 in the second profile has a lower 
probability value. Consequently, the first profile will have the same or a higher 
individual vulnerability value.  
Axiom.3: (Addition of Attributes): For every V=(z,A,P), V’=(z’,A’,P’),
,...),,,...,,(' 2121  mmm aaaaaA  where ),...,,( 21 maaaA , z’ and P’ are the 
vulnerability threshold and the probability values of the OSN profile with the 
addition of new attributes. This changes the individual vulnerability value 
denoted as V’. The new set including additional independent attributes is 
denoted as A’. However, if additional independent attributes are added to an 
OSN profile, then they may or may not contribute towards an increase in the 
individual vulnerability of a profile. The attributes’ effect on the individual 
vulnerability will depend on the attributes already present in the profile and their 
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probability values. Also the importance of the attribute in social engineering 
attacks will be a significant factor but more work is required in this area.  
7.2.1- A Sample of Axioms Application 
The directed multigraph to model the OSN in Figure 18 can be used alongside 
the table of attributes and neighbourhood features present in the profiles and 
their respective weights, to demonstrate the vulnerability calculation by applying 
the axiom notation previously mentioned. In Figure 18, there are three profiles 
which are represented by nodes A, B and C. The solid lines represent a top 
friend link between two profiles, (e.g. profile C is a top friend of profile A but 
profile A is not a top friend of profile C).  
 
Figure 18-OSN Graph and Table of Weights 
To calculate the absolute vulnerability of node A, the first step is to calculate the 
individual vulnerability VI of node A. Node A’s profile is represented by the tuple 
V(z,(fullname,gender,age,profilephoto,location,zodiac,clustering_coefficent,num
ber_of_friends),(0.2,0.1,0.0,0.1,0.0,0.0,0.1,0.0). According to equation 11 in 
section 3.2.2, VIA = 0.5. The attribute/neighbourhood feature weights represent 
the probability values which state the likelihood that the presence of the 
attribute or neighbourhood feature will contribute towards the vulnerability of the 
profile. In this case the probability values are chosen values between [0,1] 
which add up to 1. The attribute fullname and neighbourhood feature 
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number_of_friends are given higher weights because fullname is a common 
attribute which is used in identity theft. Having lower than 150 friends may 
cause information to spread quickly across a network due to the increased 
chances of having a highly interactive relationship with some of the friends.  
The relative vulnerability VR of node A takes the individual vulnerability of the 
neighbours B and C into consideration. Profile B is represented by the tuple V 
(z,(fullname,gender,age,profilephoto,location,zodiac,clustering_coefficent,numb
er_of_friends),(0.2,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.1,0.0) has a VI value of 0.8. Node C’s 
profile represented by the tuple 
V(z,(fullname,gender,age,profilephoto,location,zodiac,clustering_coefficent,num
ber of friends), (0.2,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.0,0.1,0.2) has a VI value of 0.5. According 
to equation 12 in section 3.3.3, VRA value is 0.65. The VRA value is high because 
of node B readily presenting its personal details as well as having a high 
clustering coefficient and node C only presenting one personal detail but having 
less than 150 friends and so there is an increased chance of having a 
interaction between friends.  
Consequently according to equation 13 in section 3.2.4, the VAA is 0.32 with the 
product operator. The product operator balances the vulnerability of the node 
and the collective vulnerability of the neighbours. The choice of operator used in 
equation 13 can influence the absolute vulnerability value.  
Based on the vulnerability measure, the axioms presented have helped to 
investigate the impact of attribute and probability value change on the individual 
vulnerability of a profile. Axiom 1 highlights the issue of attributes and the 
probability that the attribute change can contribute towards the profile’s 
vulnerability. In our vulnerability measure we make the assumption that an 
attribute’s contribution towards the vulnerability of a profile is independent of the 
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type of user, as illustrated in equations 22 and 23. This assumption helps when 
modeling an OSN because different users have different attitudes towards 
privacy.  
On the other hand, Axiom 2 illustrates the effect that a probability change can 
have on the individual vulnerability value of the profile. An increase in an 
attribute weight will increase the individual vulnerability of the profile. Since the 
weights of the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability have to add up to 
one, an increase in one attribute weight will lower the weights of the other 
attributes.  
7.3-Propositions 
The effect of different operators on the vulnerability model via new consistent 
findings forms the propositions stated below. They provide an insight into how 
changes to the vulnerability model components can impact on the overall 
vulnerability of a profile. The propositions depend on the operators used in 
equations 12 and 13. Propositions 1 and 2 are based on the axioms which are 
stated in section 7.2, whilst propositions 3-6 aim to explore in more detail other 
areas of the vulnerability model (e.g. relative and absolute vulnerability). The list 
of propositions that we have proposed include:  
Proposition 1 states that in the context of using the product operator in 
equation 13, the absolute vulnerability value increases when there is an 
increase in the individual vulnerability value and the absolute vulnerability value 
decreases when there is a decrease in the individual vulnerability value.  
In the context of using the MAX operator in equation 13, proposition 2 
emphasises that the absolute vulnerability value increases when the individual 
vulnerability value increases subject to the value being higher than the relative 
vulnerability value. On the other hand the absolute vulnerability value decreases 
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when the individual vulnerability value decreases subject to the individual 
vulnerability value being higher than the relative vulnerability value.  
Proposition 3 explores the calculation of the relative vulnerability value by 
substituting the geometric mean operator into equation 12. The relative 
vulnerability value the increases when the individual vulnerability value of the 
new neighbour added to the existing neighbourhood is higher or equal to the 
maximum individual vulnerability value of the existing neighbours. Whereas the 
relative vulnerability value calculated using the geometric mean operator can 
decrease when the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour added to 
the existing neighbourhood, is lower than the minimum individual vulnerability 
value of the existing neighbours.  
In proposition 4, the arithmetical mean operator is used to calculate using 
equation 12 the relative vulnerability value. There is an increase in the relative 
vulnerability value when the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour 
added to the existing neighbourhood, is higher than the maximum individual 
vulnerability value of the existing neighbours. The relative vulnerability value 
calculated using the arithmetical mean operator can decrease when the 
individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour added to the existing 
neighbourhood, is lower than or equal to the minimum individual vulnerability 
value of the existing neighbours.  
Proposition 5 focuses on the change to the absolute vulnerability value. The 
absolute vulnerability value which is calculated using equation 13 and the 
product operator, increases when the relative vulnerability which is calculated 
using geometric mean increases due to the addition of a neighbour (with a 
higher individual vulnerability value than the maximum value in the existing 
neighbourhood). The absolute vulnerability value decreases when the relative 
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vulnerability decreases due to the deletion of a neighbour (with a higher 
individual vulnerability value than the maximum value in the existing 
neighbourhood).  
In proposition 6 which centres on the absolute vulnerability value, the absolute 
vulnerability which is calculated using equation 13 and the  product operator, 
increases when the relative vulnerability that is calculated using arithmetical 
mean, increases due to the addition of a neighbour (with a higher individual 
vulnerability value than the maximum value in the existing neighbourhood). The 
absolute vulnerability value decreases when the relative vulnerability decreases 
due to the deletion of a neighbour (with a higher individual vulnerability value 
than the maximum value in the existing neighbourhood).  
The propositions are presented in more detail below:  
Proposition 1: An increase or decrease in the individual vulnerability value 
determines an increase or decrease in the absolute vulnerability value, absolute 
vulnerability is calculated using the product operator, .  
If 
iii RIA
VVV   for profile i and   is product, then a change in the VI value will be 
reflected by a change in the VA value. Proposition 1 is based on Axiom 2 
regarding probability changes.  
Proof  
]1,0[
iii RIA
VVV  where   indicates the product operator. According to Axiom 
2: 
    )26(),...,,(),,...,,(,),...,,(),,...,,(, 21212121 iiie ARmmRmmA VVpppaaazVVppepaaazVV   
where the probability change ]1,0[e  , 1 epi , eAV is the absolute vulnerability 
value of profile i as a result of the increase in probability value of the attributes 
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contributing towards vulnerability. 
iR
V is the relative vulnerability of profile i and 
iA
V  is the absolute vulnerability of profile i without the probability change taken 
into account.  In Equation 26, 
iR
V  is a constant calculated using the arithmetical 
mean. This proposition fits in with the concept that the individual vulnerability 
value of a profile monotonically increases with the absolute vulnerability value of 
a profile.  
We can identify two cases regarding the change in the VI value:  
a) Increase in Individual Vulnerability Value:  
Equation 27 highlights how the absolute vulnerability value increases when the 
individual vulnerability value of a profile increases due to a change in the 
probability of an attribute or what attributes the profile chooses to present.  
iiiiiiii ARIRIAII
VVVVVVVV   (27) 
where 
iI
V  represents the increased  individual vulnerability value and the 
iA
V 
represents the increased absolute vulnerability value.  
An example of this case is that profile A in Figure 18 decides to present the 
location attribute on their profile which has an attribute weight of 0.1. This 
increases the VI value of profile A from 0.5 to 0.6. The change in VI value (∆VI) 
is an increase of 0.1 due to the addition of the attribute weight for location. This 
consequently increases the VA value for profile A from 0.325 to 0.390 with a 
difference of 0.065.This case links in with Axiom 3 which focuses on the 
addition of attributes and Axiom 2.  
b) Decrease in Individual Vulnerability Value:  
Equation 28 highlights the decrease in absolute vulnerability value when the 
individual vulnerability value of profile i decreases, due to a change in the 
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probability of an attribute or a deletion of a profile attribute that contributes 
towards vulnerability.  
iiiiiiii ARIRIAII
VVVVVVVV   (28) 
where 
iI
V  represents the decreased  individual vulnerability value, the 
iA
V 
represents the decreased absolute vulnerability value and 
iR
V is constant and 
calculated using the arithmetical mean.  
An example of this case is that profile B in Figure 18 decides to delete the Full 
name attribute on their profile. This decreases the VI of profile B from 0.8 to 0.6 
with a ∆VI decrease of 0.2. Consequently this decreases the VA value for profile 
B from 0.400 to 0.300. This observation illustrates that with a ∆VI decrease of 
0.2 and a 
iR
V value of 0.5, the VA value decreases by 0.1. This case links in with 
equation 25 in Axiom 2 which focuses on probability change.  
Proposition 2: An increase or decrease in the individual vulnerability value 
reflects an increase or decrease in the absolute vulnerability value, when 
absolute vulnerability is calculated using the MAX operator,  and the individual 
vulnerability value is higher than the relative vulnerability value.  
For profile i     is MAX, then a change in the VI  value will be reflected by a 
change in the VA value if and only if the RI VV  . 
Proof  
IA
RI
RIA
VV
VV
VVMAXV








 ),(
 (29) 
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The proof highlights that in order for the VI change to lead to a VA change, the 
RI VV  . Subject to RI VV     we have identified two cases of change for 
individual vulnerability:  
a) Increase in Individual Vulnerability:  
Equation 30 highlights the increase in absolute vulnerability value when the 
individual vulnerability value of profile i increases, due to a change in the 
probability of an attribute or what attributes the profile presents.  
iiiiiiiiii RIARIRIAII
VVVVVMAXVVMAXVVV  |),(),(  (30) 
where 
iI
V  represents the increased  individual vulnerability value and the 
iA
V 
represents the increased absolute vulnerability value.  
An example of this case is that profile A in Figure 18 decides to present the age 
and location attributes on their profile. This increases the VI  of profile A from 0.5 
to 0.7 with a ∆VI  of 0.2. Consequently the VA for profile A increases because 
the updated VI  of profile A is larger than the VR of profile A which is 0.65. The 
VA value of profile A has increased from 0.65 to 0.70 and this shows that with 
the MAX operator, as long as the updated VI value is lower than or equal to the 
VR value, then the changes to profile A will not be reflected in the overall 
vulnerability. This case links in with equation 24 in Axiom 2 which centres on 
probability change.  
b) Decrease in Individual Vulnerability:  
Equation 31 highlights the decrease in absolute vulnerability value when the 
individual vulnerability of profile i decreases, due to a change in the probability 
of an attribute or a deletion of an attribute that contributes towards the 
vulnerability of a profile.  
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iiiiiiiiii RIARIRIAII
VVVVVMAXVVMAXVVV  |),(),(  (31) 
An example of this case is that profile B in Figure 18 decides to delete the 
attributes Full Name on their profile. This decreases the individual vulnerability 
value of profile B from 0.8 to 0.6 with a ∆VI  of 0.2.  
Consequently the absolute vulnerability value for profile B decreases from 0.8 to 
0.6. The change in absolute vulnerability (∆VA )= ∆VI  because the individual 
vulnerability before and after the attribute change for profile B was higher than 
the relative vulnerability value of profile B which is 0.5. However the decrease 
depends on the comparison between (
ii RI
VV  ) and )(
ii II
VV  .  
In regards to how the absolute vulnerability is affected by the changes to the 
relative vulnerability of a profile, two operators were selected which can help 
calculate the relative vulnerability of a profile. One of these operators is the 
geometric mean, which is illustrated in equation 17.  
Proposition 3: On the change in relative vulnerability value when relative 
vulnerability is calculated using the geometric mean operator.  
Given that 
iii RIA
VVV  and 
n
n
ij
j
IR ji
VV 



1
 
If 
inin
I
n
i
III VVniVV MAX
1
11
)(,..1,



 where MAX an operator which selects 
out the maximum individual vulnerability (
nI
V ) from the neighbours, then 
nn
RR VV 
1
, where 
1n
RV is the relative vulnerability value of neighbourhood with 
addition of new neighbour and 
nR
V is the relative vulnerability of the existing 
neighbourhood.   
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As long as the VI of the new neighbour (
1nI
V ) is equal to or higher than the 
maximum individual vulnerability value from the existing neighbours, then the 
relative vulnerability value will increase with the addition of a new neighbour and 
this is shown in the proof below where 
nR
V  represents the new relative 
vulnerability value of the profile with the addition of the new neighbour into the 
existing neighbourhood. The proof which is explained below is based on the 
following additional calculations:  
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An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 
18.The highest individual vulnerability value of the neighbours in A’s 
neighbourhood is 0.8. If a new neighbour with an individual vulnerability of 0.85 
joins the neighbourhood, then the relative vulnerability of profile A when 
calculated using the geometric mean operator will increase from 0.632 to 0.697 
with a change of 0.065.Additionally, if the new neighbour had an individual 
vulnerability of 0.8, then the relative vulnerability of profile A would still increase 
from 0.632 to 0.683 with a change of 0.051.  
The relative vulnerability value of profile A can decrease when the individual 
vulnerability value of the new neighbour is equal to or lower than the minimum 
individual vulnerability value in the existing neighbourhood, which in this case is 
0.5. A new neighbour with an individual vulnerability value of 0.4 would 
decrease the relative vulnerability value of profile A from 0.632 to 0.542 with a 
change of 0.090.   
Another operator which can be used to calculate the relative vulnerability of a 
profile is the arithmetical mean, which is illustrated in equation 18.  
Proposition 4: On the change in relative vulnerability value when relative 
vulnerability is calculated using the arithmetical mean operator 
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RV is the relative vulnerability value of neighbourhood with 
addition of new neighbour and 
nR
V is the relative vulnerability of the existing 
neighbourhood.   
As long as the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour (
1nI
V ) is 
higher than or equal to the maximum individual vulnerability value from the 
existing neighbours, then the relative vulnerability value will increase with the 
addition of a new neighbour. This is shown in the proof below, where 
nR
V 
signifies the new relative vulnerability value of the profile with the addition of the 
new neighbour into the existing neighbourhood. The proof which is explained 
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The proof illustrates that in order for
nn RR
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1
, the difference between 
1nI
V  and 
iI
V  has to be a positive number which is above 0.  
An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 18. 
The highest individual vulnerability value of the neighbours in A’s 
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neighbourhood is 0.8. If a new neighbour joins the neighbourhood with an 
individual vulnerability value of 0.85, then the relative vulnerability of profile A 
when calculated using the arithmetical mean operator will increase from 0.650 
to 0.716.Even if the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour was 0.8, 
then the relative vulnerability of profile A would increase from 0.650 to 0.700.  
The relative vulnerability value of profile A can decrease if the individual 
vulnerability value of the new neighbour was equal to or lower than the 
minimum individual vulnerability value in the existing neighbourhood, which in 
this case is 0.5. A new neighbour with an individual vulnerability value of 0.4 
would decrease the relative vulnerability value of profile A from 0.650 to 0.566.  
Proposition 5: On the change in absolute vulnerability due to addition or 
deletion of a neighbour when relative vulnerability is calculated using geometric 
mean operator and absolute vulnerability is calculated using the product 
operator, .  
Given that 
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n
i
IR ji
VV 


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where n is the number of neighbours 
and 
jI
V is the individual vulnerability of neighbour j.  if   is product, then a 
change (increase or decrease) in the relative vulnerability value  (
iR
V )  will be 
reflected by a change (increase or decrease)  in the absolute vulnerability (
iA
V ) 
if and only if RR VV n 1  . 1nRV  is the relative vulnerability of profile i with the 
addition of a new neighbour and RV is the relative vulnerability of profile i without 
the addition of a new neighbour.  
Proof  
]1,0[
iii RIA
VVV  for profile i where   indicates a product operator.  
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The proof shows that when the relative vulnerability is calculated using the 
geometric mean operator, the addition of a new neighbour can increase the 
profile’s relative vulnerability value. We have identified two cases regarding the 
increase in relative vulnerability value due to addition and deletion of a 
neighbour in the profile’s neighbourhood:  
a) Increase in Relative Vulnerability through addition of a neighbour 
Equation 32 highlights an increase in the VA when the VR of profile i increases, 
due to the addition of a neighbour into the profile’s neighbourhood.  
ininiinn ARIRIARR
VVVVVVVV 
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 (32) 
where 
1nR
V  is the relative vulnerability of profile i with the additional neighbour, 
nR
V is the relative vulnerability of profile i without the neighbour, 
iA
V  is the 
absolute vulnerability of  profile i as a result of the addition of the neighbour and 
iA
V is the absolute vulnerability of profile i without the addition of the neighbour.  
An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 18. 
With the addition of a new neighbour with an individual vulnerability value of 0.9, 
the relative vulnerability value of profile A increases from 0.632 to 0.711 with an 
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increase change of 0.079. Consequently, the absolute vulnerability value 
increases from 0.316 to 0.355 with an increase of 0.039. An important 
observation between these results, is that the difference between 
iA
V  and 
iA
V is 
half the difference between 
1nR
V and 
nR
V .  
b) Decrease in Relative Vulnerability through the deletion of a neighbour  
Equation 33 states a decrease in the absolute vulnerability value of profile i 
when the relative vulnerability of profile i decreases, due to the deletion of a 
neighbour in the profile’s neighbourhood. 
ininiinn ARIRIARR
VVVVVVVV 
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 (33) 
where 
1nR
V  is the relative vulnerability of  profile i with a neighbour deleted, 
nR
V
is the relative vulnerability of  profile i before the neighbour was deleted, 
iA
V  is 
the absolute vulnerability of  profile i as a result of the deletion of the neighbour 
and 
iA
V is the absolute vulnerability of profile i before the neighbour was 
deleted.  
Equation 33 highlights that deleting a neighbour in the neighbourhood with an 
individual vulnerability value that is higher than the maximum individual 
vulnerability value of the neighbourhood, decreases the relative vulnerability 
value of the profile and this results in a decrease in the absolute vulnerability 
value of the profile.  
An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 18. If 
profile B which has the highest individual vulnerability value is removed from 
profile A’s neighbourhood, then the relative vulnerability value of profile A 
decreases from 0.632 to 0.500 with a difference of 0.132. Consequently the 
absolute vulnerability value decreases from 0.316 to 0.250, with a difference of 
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0.066. The difference between 
iA
V  and 
iA
V is half the difference between 
1nR
V
and 
nR
V . 
Proposition 6: On the change in absolute vulnerability due to addition or 
deletion of a neighbour when relative vulnerability is calculated using 
arithmetical mean operator and absolute vulnerability is calculated using the 
product operator, .  
Given that 
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where n is the number of neighbours 
and 
jI
V is the individual vulnerability of neighbour j. If   is product, then a 
change in the relative vulnerability (
iR
V ) will be reflected by a change in the 
absolute vulnerability (
iA
V ) if and only if the RR VV n 1  where 1nRV  is the relative 
vulnerability of profile i with the addition of a new neighbour and RV is the 
relative vulnerability of profile i without the addition of a new neighbour.  
Proof  
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The proof shows that when the relative vulnerability is calculated using the 
arithmetical mean operator, the addition of a new neighbour in to the existing 
neighbourhood can increase the profile i relative vulnerability value if and only if 
the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour is higher than the 
maximum individual vulnerability value of the existing neighbourhood.  
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This implies that the deletion of a neighbour will decrease the relative 
vulnerability value of the profile. In order for the relative vulnerability value to 
increase, the individual vulnerability value of the new neighbour has to be higher 
than the maximum individual vulnerability value of the existing neighbours in the 
neighbourhood.  
There are two cases of change for relative vulnerability:  
a) Increase in Relative Vulnerability through addition of a neighbour 
Equation 34 highlights the increase in absolute vulnerability when the relative 
vulnerability value of a profile increases due to the addition of a neighbour into 
the profile’s neighbourhood.  
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 (34) 
where 
1nR
V  is the relative vulnerability of the profile with the additional 
neighbour, 
nR
V is the relative vulnerability of the profile without the neighbour, 
iA
V  is the absolute vulnerability of the profile as a result of the addition of the 
neighbour and 
iA
V is the absolute vulnerability of the profile without the addition 
of the neighbour. Equation 34, illustrates that adding a neighbour with a higher 
individual vulnerability value to a neighbourhood, increases the relative 
vulnerability value of the profile and this results in an increase in the absolute 
vulnerability value of the profile.  
An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 18. 
With the addition of a new neighbour with an individual vulnerability value of 0.9, 
the relative vulnerability value increases from 0.650 to 0.733 which is a 
difference of 0.083. Consequently the absolute vulnerability value of profile A 
increases from 0.320 to 0.366 with a difference of 0.046.  
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b) Decrease in Relative Vulnerability through deletion of a neighbour 
Equation 35 highlights the decrease in absolute vulnerability when the relative 
vulnerability value of a profile decreases due to the deletion of a neighbour with 
the highest individual vulnerability value, in a profile’s neighbourhood.  
ininiinn ARIRIARR
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 (35) 
where 
1nR
V  is the relative vulnerability of the profile with a neighbour deleted, 
nR
V is the relative vulnerability of the profile before the neighbour was deleted, 
iA
V  is the absolute vulnerability of the profile as a result of the deletion of the 
neighbour and 
iA
V is the absolute vulnerability of the profile before the 
neighbour was deleted. Equation 35 illustrates that deleting a neighbour with 
the highest individual vulnerability value in the neighbourhood, decreases the 
relative vulnerability value of the profile and this results in a decrease in the 
absolute vulnerability of the profile.  
An example of this case involves the neighbourhood of profile A in Figure 18. If 
profile B is removed from profile A’s neighbourhood, then the relative 
vulnerability value of profile A, decreases from 0.650 to 0.500 which is a 
difference of 0.150. Consequently the absolute vulnerability value of profile A 
decreases from 0.325 to 0.250 which is a difference of 0.075.  
Overall this section has detailed several propositions, which focus on changes 
in the vulnerability model. What the propositions have demonstrated is that the 
changes in what a user present on their profile and the adding and deletion of 
friends into a neighbourhood, impacts on the overall profile vulnerability.  
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7.4- Experimental Work and Findings Regarding Application of 
Propositions 
In order to explore how the operators from the propositions affect the 
vulnerability of real life cases, different operators for the relative and absolute 
vulnerabilities calculations were used. These calculations were tested on 
76,263 profiles from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset. For the 76,263, the 
average age of the profile owners is 25.6. 50.1% of the profile owners are male, 
48.6% of the profile owners are female and 1.3% profile owners do not state 
their gender. 16.3% of the profiles are private profiles. Private profiles may 
present basic information (e.g. name, gender, profile picture and age) on their 
profiles but not the list of friends or interactions.  
The different operators were used in the following ways:  the relative 
vulnerability value of the cases in the dataset was calculated using the 
geometric and arithmetical mean. These operators are used in propositions 3-6. 
The absolute vulnerability value for the cases was calculated using the product 
and MAX operators used in propositions 1, 2, 5 and 6. The operators were 
applied to 76,263 cases with varying individual vulnerability values.  
In terms of the relative vulnerability calculation, unlike some operators (e.g. 
MAX and MIN) which select just the maximum or minimum individual 
vulnerability value of the neighbourhood, the geometric and arithmetical mean 
takes into account all the individual vulnerability values of the neighbours in the 
calculation. With the arithmetical mean operator, 78.0% of the profiles had a 
relative vulnerability of 0.9 or above and with the geometric mean, 75.9% of the 
profiles had a relative vulnerability of 0.9 and above.  The results highlight that 
most neighbours in profiles’ neighbourhoods self disclose the attributes and 
display structural features, that contribute towards vulnerability readily.  
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The effect of the calculation of the relative vulnerability on the absolute 
vulnerability of profiles is covered in propositions 5 and 6. Table 6 presents 
statistics for the whole dataset, regarding different combinations of operators for 
the relative and absolute vulnerability calculations. The MAX operator is mainly 
used in proposition 2. In Table 6, the absolute vulnerability of profiles is denoted 
as VA.   
Table 6-Statistics regarding Application of Different Operators 
 
What Table 6 demonstrates, is the big difference between the effect of the 
product and MAX operator in regards to the absolute vulnerability of profiles. 
The product operator can act as a reducing effect. An example is that if a profile 
has friends which self disclose personal details readily (VR value of 0.8), but the 
profile itself is very private (VI value of 0.2), the overall vulnerability of the profile 
would be 0.16. This emphasises that there is a low likelihood of the profile’s 
personal details spreading through the OSN.  
On the other hand the MAX operator selects the higher value between the VI 
and VR. The high percentage of profiles that have an absolute vulnerability of 
0.9 or above highlights that there are cases in which the profile’s neighbours 
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many not collectively disclose many attributes that contribute towards 
vulnerability but the profile itself will and this causes the overall vulnerability of 
the profile to increase.   
The average absolute vulnerability values of the dataset for the product and 
MAX operators demonstrate that the MAX operator may not be an effective 
operator for the calculation of absolute vulnerability. This is because it does not 
take into effect the meaning of both the individual and relative vulnerability 
values together and it would be hard to select the profiles which are truly 
vulnerable.  
With the product operator, 15.5% of the profiles in which the relative 
vulnerability is calculated using arithmetical mean have an absolute vulnerability 
value which is less or equal to 0.8. Therefore the product operator is more 
realistic than the MAX operator in selecting vulnerable nodes. This is validated 
by the standard deviation for the VA values calculated using the product 
operator. It illustrates that in this dataset there are a variety of cases with 
varying VI and VR values.  
The negative skew for the product and MAX operators indicates that there is a 
long distribution tail to the left and consequently more profiles have a higher 
absolute vulnerability value. Overall what the statistics have shown is that the 
choice of operator especially for the calculation of absolute vulnerability can 
influence the number of profiles which are classed as having a high overall 
vulnerability (VA of 0.9 or above).  
7.5-Discussion 
Based on the vulnerability model, the axioms and propositions presented have 
helped to investigate the impact of attribute and probability value change on the 
individual vulnerability of a profile. Axiom 1 highlights the issue of attributes and 
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the probability that the attribute change can contribute towards the profile’s 
vulnerability. In our vulnerability model we make the assumption that an 
attribute’s contribution towards the vulnerability of a profile is independent of the 
type of user, as illustrated in equations (22) and (23). This assumption helps 
when modelling an OSN because different users have different attitudes 
towards privacy.  
On the other hand, Axiom 2 illustrates the effect that a probability change can 
have on the individual vulnerability value of the profile. An increase in an 
attribute weight will increase the individual vulnerability of the profile. Since the 
weights of the attributes that contribute towards vulnerability have to add up to 
one, an increase in one attribute weight will lower the weights of the other 
attributes. The generation of the weights is an issue which will require further 
investigation. Even though the relative frequency approach is stated in section 
3.2.2, there are other approaches to generate weights. One approach is based 
on human perception and involves distributing a questionnaire which asks 
subjects about their willingness to share certain profile attributes. Another way 
is to use is an information theory based approach to investigate how distinctive 
a profile attribute is.  
The propositions focus on how changes in the individual and relative 
vulnerabilities of a profile, can impact on the overall (absolute) vulnerability of 
the profiles. The mathematical operators (geometric mean and arithmetical 
mean) used for the calculation of the relative vulnerability, highlighted the issue 
of a profile adding friends that have a high individual vulnerability. Propositions 
3 and 4 show that if a new friend added to the neighbourhood has an individual 
vulnerability that is higher than or equal to the maximum individual vulnerability 
of the existing neighbourhood, then the relative vulnerability of the profile will 
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increase. This may increases the likelihood of the personal details of the profile 
spreading through the OSN.  
In order for OSN users to lower their relative vulnerability, the user has to 
unfriend the friends who self disclose readily and have a high individual 
vulnerability. This finding is validated by Gundecha et al (2011) who carried out 
research into defining vulnerable friends and  states that an “individual is 
vulnerable if any friends in the network of friends has insufficient security and 
privacy settings to protect the entire network of friends”.  
Propositions 5 and 6 demonstrated that with the operators presented in the 
proposition, if the addition of a new neighbour causes the relative vulnerability 
to rise, then this will lead to an increase in the absolute vulnerability of the 
profile. The experimental work regarding the propositions highlight how 
important it is to use the right operators for the calculation of absolute 
vulnerability, in order to model the vulnerability of profiles in a realistic way.  The 
choice of using simple weighted average functions (geometric and arithmetical 
means) for calculating relative vulnerability was used by Gundecha et al (2011) 
in their calculations which expanded their definition of vulnerable friend.   
In terms of the MAX and product operators, even though product operator has a 
reduction effect, it is suitable in this case because the concept of vulnerability 
centers on the spreading of personal details of the profile through comments 
written by friends or friends of friends of the profile.  
Concentrating on just an online relationship between a profile and its friends, if 
a profile is very private in terms of self disclosure and the friends are very public 
in terms of their disclosure, then the overall vulnerability will be quite low 
because there would not be many personal details to spread through the OSN 
Chapter 7- Axioms, Propositions and Vulnerability Measure Properties 
167 
network. The MAX operator would just focus on the actions of one or more 
users regardless of what the other users are doing.  
7.6-Conclusions  
With the increase in the amount of personal details displayed on an OSN profile 
comes the privacy issue and the threat of social engineering attack which can 
make users vulnerable. Our proposed vulnerability model considers that the 
vulnerability of a profile can be quantified in such a way to also take into 
account how the behaviour of the profile’s friends can impact on the 
vulnerability of a profile. The axioms presented have highlighted various areas 
that can be developed and implemented into the model in the future, to 
accurately reflect the vulnerability of a profile. One of the issues is incorporating 
the profile interaction into the model. Analysis of interactions has helped to 
validate that the personal details of a profile can be spread through the OSN 
network. This is shown by the profile’s personal details being displayed in the 
neighbours’ profile comments. Another open issue is the attribute weight and 
the reality of using OSNs.  
The propositions which are based on the axioms, highlighted the changes in 
what a user present on their profile and the adding and deletion of friends into a 
neighbourhood which impacts on the overall profile vulnerability. The 
experimental work which involved investigating the effect of different operators 
on the overall vulnerability of a profile, demonstrated that the product operator 
in comparison to the MAX operator was the most effective in the absolute 
vulnerability calculation. This was because the product operator realistically 
modelled the concept of vulnerability.   
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CHAPTER 8: ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTAL WORK 
VALIDATION 
The aim of this chapter is to detail experiments used to validate the vulnerability 
measure, as well as investigate whether personal details of a profile, are spread 
through an OSN network because of the friends actions on the OSN and the 
implications of privacy options on the vulnerability of a profile. Facebook is an 
OSN which gives the profile owners the ability to set privacy options, to define 
which type of users (friends, friend of friend, external users) have access to 
different items of their personal details.    
Also various mathematical operators used to calculate the relative vulnerability 
and absolute vulnerability will be applied to case studies, in order to explore the 
effects of the different operators on the relative and absolute vulnerability 
values.  
8.1-Vulnerability Measure Validation 
The concept of vulnerability in this thesis centers on the theory that an OSN 
profile with a high relative vulnerability will lead to an increased likelihood of the 
profile’s friends leaking the profile’s personal details. This can occur with 
comments that the profiles’ friends write on the walls of the profile’s friends of 
friends. The three experiments presented in sections 8.1.1-8.1.3, explore 
whether there is a correlation between profiles that have a high relative 
vulnerability and the number of comments written by the profiles’ friends and the 
profiles’ friends of friends, which disclose some of the profiles’ personal details. 
Personal details are referred to as attributes.   
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
169 
8.1.1-Experiment 1: Vulnerability due to the Disclosure of the 
attribute values by the Neighbours. 
The aim of experiment 1 is to investigate using profiles from Caverlee and 
Webb (2008) dataset, whether the neighbours (top friends and other friends that 
are not classed as top friends) of profiles do leak the profiles’ personal details in 
comments written to the profiles’ top friends of top friends. This experiment 
involved analysing the comments written by top friends and other friends (of 
43,259 profiles which will act as start profiles) from the Caverlee and Webb 
(2008) dataset, to see if any of the start profile’s personal details were 
disclosed. Figure 19 demonstrates some of the terminology for OSN levels that 
will be used to explain experiments 1,2 and 3.  
 
Figure 19-Terminology for Experiments 1 to 3 
The start profile will refer to the profile whose sub network is being analysed 
for the leakage of its personal details by its top friends, other friends or wider 
neighbourhood.  The neighbourhood is the friends that the start profile classes 
as top friends. The wider neighbourhood contains the top friends of the 
neighbourhood.  
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
170 
For experiment 1, the focus is on the unidirectional relationship between a start 
profile and its top friends (the friends classed as top friends by the start profile). 
This is because the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset is a top friends network. 
When analysing the comments on the walls of the wider neighbourhood of the 
start profiles, comments made by other friends as well as top friends are 
examined as well. This is because it is not just top friends of a profile that can 
make the start profile vulnerable. Other friends of the start profile can write 
comments to the walls of the wider neighbourhood that can leak personal 
details of the start profile.  
Only 43,259 profiles were used for this experiment because this was the 
number of start profiles that had their wider neighbourhoods extracted and 
present for analysis. Due to technical issues, the wider neighbourhoods of the 
rest of the profiles could not be extracted.   
Also the correlation between high and heading towards high relative 
vulnerability profiles (0.8-1.0) and the number of comments that leak the start 
profiles’ personal details is investigated to help to validate the vulnerability 
concept.   
Unlike experiments which are explained in previous chapters, the relative 
vulnerability for experiment 1 is calculated using just the top friends of the 
start profile, not the friends who class the start profile as a top friend. This 
is because the network is a network of top friends and this experiment focuses 
on the top friends that have a strong friendship with the start profile.         
To calculate the individual vulnerability, the MySpace start profiles were 
analysed for the presence of personal information: name, gender, profile 
picture, age, current location and zodiac as well as neighbourhood features i.e. 
clustering coefficient and number of friends. The attribute weights which are 
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used in the individual vulnerability calculation were calculated based on the 
relative frequency of the attributes in the dataset. The relative vulnerability was 
calculated using the arithmetical mean operator which is illustrated in equation 
17 in section 6.2 and the absolute vulnerability which was calculated using the 
product operator in equation 13 in section 3.2.4.  
Also for the 43,259 MySpace start profiles, the comments from the walls of the 
wider neighbourhood of the start profiles were examined to see if any of the 
comments written by the start profiles’ neighbourhood, leaked personal details 
of the start profile itself. This was done in an automated way by developing a 
program which analysed the comments that were written by the start profiles’ 
neighbourhood and other friends on the walls in the wider neighbourhood. 
These comments were analysed for the presence of some of the start profiles’ 
personal details.  
Personal details that appear in comments on the walls in the wider 
neighbourhood can be seen by other users (friends of friends of the 
neighbourhood and external users if the OSN profiles in the wider 
neighbourhood are very public in terms of privacy.  
If the start profile’s personal details appear in the wider neighbourhood walls 
which are posted by the start profiles’ neighbouhood , then this shows that the 
personal details of the start profile are propagating through the OSN network 
and can be seen by other users. Also it shows that vulnerability does exist 
regarding OSN profiles.  
The results from experiment 1 indicated that some start profiles that had high 
relative vulnerabilities (0.9 or above), had leakage of personal details about the 
start profiles, in the comments written by the neighbourhoods . The comments 
appeared in walls of the wider neighbourhood of the start profiles. This showed 
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that as well as the top friends self disclosing their own details readily, some of 
them were talking about the start profile. Out of the 43,259 selected start 
profiles, 32.1% of the profiles had a high relative vulnerability (0.9-1.0). In terms 
of personal detail disclosure:  
 0% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
mentioned the birthday of the start profile owner, in the comments made 
to the wider neighbourhood. Out of these start profiles, the average 
number of comments disclosing the birthday was 0.  
 51.2% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
disclosed the name of the start profile owner, in the comments made to 
the wider neighbourhood. Out of these start profiles, the average number 
of comments disclosing the name was 10.2.  
 0% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
disclosed the age of the start profile owner, in the comments made to the 
wider neighbourhood. Out of these start profiles, the average number of 
comments disclosing the age was 0.  
 21.6% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
disclosed the current location of the start profile owner, in the comments 
made to the wider neighbourhood. Out of these start profiles, the 
average number of comments disclosing the current location was 23.5.  
 0.7% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
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disclosed the education of the start profile owner, in the comments made 
to the wider neighbourhood. Out of these start profiles, the average 
number of comments disclosing the education was 35.8.  
 8.8% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends) that had 
disclosed the hometown of the start profile owner, in the comments made 
to the wider neighbourhood. Out of these profiles, the average number of 
comments disclosing the hometown was 4.46.  
 40.2% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained profile neighbours (top friends including other friends)  that 
disclosed no attributes (personal details) of the start profile owner in the 
comments made to the wider neighbourhood.  
The results above illustrated that top friends including other friends of start 
profiles which have a high relative vulnerability (collective individual vulnerability 
of the top friends of the start profile), do leak the start profiles’ personal details 
in the interactions with the wider neighbourhood. In this case the interactions 
comments are written on the walls based in the wider neighbourhoods.  
These findings are validated by Ho et al. (2009) and Gundecha et al (2011) 
observations that profile users cannot prevent personal information about 
themselves from being uploaded and spread by their friends.  
To investigate if there was a relationship between the number of comments 
written by the start profiles’ neighbourhood, who leaked the start profiles’ 
personal details and the relative vulnerability of the start profiles being 
analysed, statistical analysis was used to derive the correlation between the two 
variables. This was in order to test the following hypothesis:  
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
174 
H1- The number of comments which appear on the walls of the wider 
neighbourhoods and disclose some of the personal details of the start profiles 
increases as the relative vulnerability of the start profiles increases.  
whereas the null hypothesis is that:  
H0- There is no significant relationship between the number of comments which 
appear on the walls of the wider neighbourhoods and discloses some personal 
details of the start profile and the relative vulnerability of the start profiles.  
To approve or disprove the hypothesis H1, Spearman Rank which is illustrated 
in equation 36 was used to correlate start profiles that have a relative 
vulnerability greater than 0.8 against the number of comments present in the 
wider neighbourhood walls which disclose some personal details of the start 
profiles.  
The value of 0.8 and above is used for correlation because there needs to be a 
suitable scale of increase in values of relative vulnerability. In this case, the 
scale covers start profiles which are heading towards having a high relative 
vulnerability (0.8) and having a high relative vulnerability (0.9 and above).  
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where r is the Spearman Rank coefficient, n is the set of observations for 
variables x and y, and di is the difference between the i-th rank of x and the i-th 
rank of y.  
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
175 
 
Figure 20-Correlation between High Relative Vulnerability Profiles and Attribute Disclosure by 
Profiles’ Neighbourhood 
The results in Figure 20, show that the attributes name, current location and 
education have a weak positive relationship. A positive relationship signifies that 
as the relative vulnerability of the start profiles increases from 0.8 to 1.0 (full 
vulnerability), the amount of comments which disclose the personal details of 
the start profile increases. Even though the correlation is weak, the attribute 
name has a significant and meaningful correlation.  The attribute hometown has 
a weak negative correlation which implies that as the relative vulnerability 
increases from 0.8 to 1.0, the amount of comments which disclose the 
hometown of the start profile decreases.   
Overall in this experiment, the results have shown that there are instances 
where personal details of a start profile can be spread by the profiles’ 
neighbours in their interactions. Therefore vulnerability does exist in OSN 
profiles.  
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
176 
Correlation has been shown even with initial data available because Caverlee 
and Webb (2008) only extracted the first page of comments. The Caverlee and 
Webb dataset is a well used and established dataset and has been used for 
studying of the characteristics of MySpace in terms of who uses the network 
and how the networks is being used. Also language models were constructed 
from the wall comments of MySpace users. Researchers who have referred to 
work carried out by Caverlee and Webb (2008) with their dataset have included 
Gauvin et al (2010) who extended Caverlee and Webb (2008) work on analysis 
of word frequencies from MySpace wall comments which were grouped by 
gender and age, by analysing patterns in other posted content i.e. images and 
hyperlinks.   
The investigation into the relationship between the high relative vulnerability of 
some of the start profiles and number of comments disclosing certain personal 
details of the start profiles, showed that even though a weak positive 
relationship existed between the two variables, a relationship did exist. Top 
friends who self disclose readily can contribute towards an increase in 
information disclosure of some of the start profiles attributes.  
Out of all the attributes, the start profile owners’ name was the most popular 
attribute to be leaked. This attribute also had a significant weak positive 
correlation between the relative vulnerability of the start profiles and the number 
of comments that leaked the name of the start profile owner. The surprising 
finding was that the attributes birthday and age were not leaked at all.  
The reason being that adolescents and young people like to talk about their 
social lives and this can include going to birthday parties. Another reason being 
that when the software was built to analyse the number of comments that 
disclosed certain personal details of the start profile, the name of the start 
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profile owner had to be present in the comment as well as the age or birthday. 
This was in order to add meaning.  If just the words happy birthday were 
extracted, it may not correspond to the start profile’s birthday.    
8.1.2-Experiment 2: Vulnerability due to the Disclosure of the 
attribute values by the Friends of Friends 
The aim of experiment 2 is to investigate if there is any correlation between high 
relative vulnerability start profiles and the amount of personal details of the start 
profile that are spread and appear on the walls in the neighbourhood rather than 
the wider neighbourhood. In this experiment, the neighbourhood of a start 
profile, consist of top friends that the start profile classes as top friends and the 
top friends that class the start profile as one of their top friends. For this 
experiment (Alim et al. 2011a) the individual, relative and absolute vulnerability 
were calculated for 100 random MySpace start profiles from the Caverlee and 
Webb (2008) dataset.  
As in experiment 1, the MySpace start profiles were analysed for the presence 
of personal information: name, gender, profile picture, age, current location and 
zodiac as well as the neighbourhood features i.e. clustering coefficient and the 
number of friends. The weights in the individual vulnerability were calculated 
based on the relative frequency of the attributes in the dataset. The relative 
vulnerability was calculated using the arithmetical mean operator which is 
illustrated in equation 17 in section 6.2 and the absolute vulnerability was 
calculated using the product operator in equation 13 in section 3.2.4. Also for 
the 100 MySpace start profiles, the comments on the neighbourhood walls were 
examined manually, to see if any of the comments written by the start profiles’ 
friends of friends leaked information about the start profile itself. Personal 
details of the start profiles which are leaked in the walls based in the 
neighbourhoods , can be seen by other users (friends of friends of the 
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neighbourhood and external users if the  profiles in the neighbourhood are very 
public in terms of privacy). If the start profile’s personal details appear in the 
neighbours’ wall comments, then this indicates that the personal details of the 
start profile are spreading through the OSN because the friends of friends, who 
may not have a friendship link with the start profile, have written the comments. 
Other reasons maybe that the wider neighbourhood and the start profile may 
have a stronger offline relationship.  
The results from this experiment indicated that some neighbours from 
neighbourhoods, of start profiles that had high relative vulnerabilities (0.9 or 
above), had personal details about the start profile in their walls. Out of the 100 
start profiles which were analysed manually, 47% of them had a high relative 
vulnerability (0.9-1.0) and there was interaction between the neighbours and the 
start profile considered. In terms of personal detail disclosure:  
 14.8% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that had mentioned, the birthday of the start profile 
owner in their comments. Out of these start profiles, the average number 
of comments disclosing the birthday was 1.14.  
 68% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that that had the name of the start profile owner 
displayed in their comments. Out of these start profiles, the average 
number of comments disclosing the name was 1.53.  
 4.25% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that had the age of the start profile owner in their 
comments. Out of these start profiles, the average number of comments 
disclosing the age was 1.  
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 25.3% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that had the current location of the start profile 
owner in their comments. Out of these start profiles, the average number 
of comments disclosing the current location was 1.08.  
 17.0% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that that had the education of the start profile 
owner displayed in their comments. Out of these start profiles, the 
average number of comments disclosing the education was 1.25.  
 8.51% of the MySpace start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities 
contained neighbours that had the hometown of the start profile owner 
displayed in their comments. Out of these start profiles, the average 
number of comments disclosing the hometown was 1.  
To investigate if there is a relationship between the amount of information 
disclosure of the start profiles’ personal details in the neighbours walls and the 
relative vulnerability of the start profiles being analysed, statistical analysis was 
used to derive the correlation between the two variables. To evaluate whether 
the start profiles’ personal details spread through the network, for this 
experiment, the vulnerability theory is based around the following hypothesis:  
H1- The number of comments which appear on the neighbours’ walls that leak 
the personal details of the start profile increases as the relative vulnerability of 
the start profiles increases.        
whereas the null hypothesis is that:  
H0- There is no significant relationship between the number of comments which 
appear on the neighbours’ walls that leak the start profiles’ personal details and 
the relative vulnerability of the start profiles.        
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To approve or disprove the hypothesis H1, Spearman Rank which is illustrated 
in equation 36 was used to correlate start profiles that have a relative 
vulnerability greater than 0.8 to allow for a suitable increase of VR against the 
amount of information disclosure for certain attributes in the comments present 
on the neighbours’ wall.   
 
Figure 21-Correlation between High Relative Vulnerability Profiles and Attribute Disclosure by 
Profiles’ Friends of Friends for a Small Profile Sample 
The results displayed in Figure 21 highlighted that the attributes: name ,age, 
education and hometown have weak positive relationships. A positive 
relationship signifies that as the relative vulnerability of the start profiles 
increase, so does the amount of disclosure of the start profiles' personal details 
contained in the neighbourhood wall comments.  
The relationships involving the attributes mentioned are not significant because 
the significance value is greater than .05. The attribute current location on the 
other hand has a significant medium positive relationship. This shows that as 
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the relative vulnerability of the start profiles increase, the number of neighbours’ 
comments that the current location of the profile is disclosed in, increases as 
well. A higher relative vulnerability value for a start profile demonstrates that the 
profiles’ neighbours display their personal details publically and this can 
increase the likelihood of the personal details of the profile spreading through 
the OSN and contributing towards privacy and social engineering attacks.  
The attribute birthday has a weak negative relationship that shows that as the 
relative vulnerability of the start profiles increases, the number of times the 
birthday of the profile is mentioned in the neighbours’ comments decreases.  
The presence of a weak positive relationship for some of the attributes is a good 
outcome for this experiment to validate the spreading of profiles’ personal 
details because it demonstrates that personal details can spread though an 
OSN and can be seen by other users.    
8.1.3-Experiment 3: Vulnerability of Larger Dataset due to the 
Disclosure of the attribute values by the Friends of Friends 
The aim of experiment 3 is to repeat experiment 2 but with a larger sample of 
start profiles and concentrating on the unidirectional relationship between a start 
profile and its top friends. The experiment was repeated with 76,662 random 
MySpace start profiles from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset. Out of 
these profiles, 35,123 (45.8%) had a high relative vulnerability (0.9 and above) 
and the comments from the neighbours’ walls were extracted and analysed in 
an automated way, in comparison to experiment 2 which was done manually. 
Also like experiment 1, only the top friends classed by the start profile, were 
analysed for their comments. From the high relative vulnerability profiles:  
 23.6% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had mentioned, the birthday of the start profile owner in 
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their wall comments. Out of these start profiles, the average number of 
comments mentioning the birthday was 4.94.  
 8.9% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had the name of the start profile owner in their wall 
comments. Out of these start profiles, the average number of comments 
disclosing the name was 3.04.  
 0% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had the age of the start profile owner in their walls 
comments. 
 2.0% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had the current location of the start profile owner in their 
wall comments. Out of these profiles, the average number of comments 
disclosing the current location was 11.5 
 1.1% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had the education of the start profile owner in their wall 
comments. Out of these profiles, the average number of comments 
disclosing the education was 3.73.  
 0.13% of the start profiles with high relative vulnerabilities contained 
neighbours that had the hometown of the start profile owner in their wall 
comments. Out of these profiles that average number of comments 
disclosing hometown was 3.76.  
The results contribute towards justifying that personal details about the start 
profile can spread via the comments that a friend of a friend writes on the start 
profiles’neighbours’ wall.  
An interesting aspect of this area is that in some OSNs (e.g. Facebook), each 
profile has an activity stream which records the interaction of the profile owner 
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(e.g. the contents of the comments that the profile owner writes in response to 
status changes, photo comments or profile comments on their neighbours’ 
profiles). If these profiles were Facebook profiles then the personal details of 
the profiles could spread even further through the OSN network. This is 
because unlike MySpace, the interaction in Facebook appears on the activity 
stream. With Facebook, when a profile owner posts a status on their profile, 
they may react to any comments about the status made by their friends, on their 
own profile rather than posting a comment on their friends’ profile. This means 
that a lot of interaction about the profile owner can take place on the profile 
owner’s own profile.  
For experiment 3, to correlate start profiles approaching high relative 
vulnerability and high relative vulnerability (VR of 0.8 and above) against the 
amount of information disclosure of certain personal details of the start profile 
by the profile’s ‘friend of a friend’, Spearman Rank was again used. The results 
for this dataset which are illustrated in Figure 22, show that the attributes 
birthday and name have significant weak positive relationships.  
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Figure 22-Correlation between High Relative Vulnerability Profiles and Attribute Disclosure by 
Profiles’ Friends of Friends for Bigger Profile Sample 
The correlation between relative vulnerability and number of comments that 
disclose a start profiles’ personal details may be weak because Caverlee and 
Web (2008) only extracted the first page of profile comments from each 
MySpace  start profile, so there could have been comments that the profiles’ 
personal details were leaked in. Also the fact that this experiment looks at the 
friend of friend relationship. The profile and the friend of a friend are not directly 
linked through friendship.  
Some neighbours of start profiles can be privacy aware and know not to display 
personal details in comments written to other friends and so refer to their friends 
by using nick names. What the results do show is that as the top friends self 
disclose some of their personal details, the profiles’ ‘friends of friends’ can leak  
the start profiles personal details in interactions made with the start profiles’ 
neighbourhood and if MySpace had activity streams then this would increase 
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the vulnerability of the start profile . Consequently the personal details of the 
start profile would spread through the network.  
The start profile owners’ age was not disclosed in any of the comments on the 
neighbours’ walls but the age can be derived from the birthday of the start 
profile owner. Apart from age, the attribute current location was the only 
attribute to not have a significant positive or negative relationship with other 
attributes.  
Overall the validation experiments have shown that the concept of the 
vulnerability theory has been born out of practice. There are signs that as the 
VR of the start profile increases, the neighbours of the start profiles profile 
become more public with their disclosure of personal details and there can be 
an increase in the number of comments written by the neighbours of the start 
profile, which leak the personal details of the start profile.  
Experiment 1 demonstrated the concept of vulnerability does exist and personal 
details can spread through the OSN due to the actions of the start profiles’ 
neighbours.  In the experiment, the attributes age and birthday were not leaked 
but the attributes name, current location, education and hometown were. In 
terms of the correlation between start profiles heading towards high relative 
vulnerability or high relative vulnerability (0.9+), and the number of comments 
that disclose certain attributes of the start profile, most of the attributes have a 
weak positive correlation. The attribute name displays a significant and 
meaningful weak correlation.  
The reason behind a weak correlation may be that the vulnerability measure in 
its current state does not factor in the strength of psychology between the 
neighbours. Some neighbours who may display their personal details readily on 
a MySpace profile may not interact online regularly with the start profile and this 
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can be seen by a low number of profile comments written between them. They 
may have a stronger offline relationship with their friends. Also only the first 
page of comments for each profile was extracted by Caverlee and Webb (2008) 
and the network was a top friends network so only the individual vulnerabilities 
of these profiles were calculated for the relative vulnerability, rather than all the 
friends of the start profile.  
Experiments 2 and 3 highlighted that a ‘friend of friend’ of a start profile can 
make that profile vulnerable. Popular attributes leaked according to the 
statistical work included name and current location.  
8.2-Privacy Levels  
The levels of privacy play an important part in some OSNs and the control of 
personal details. In May 2010, Facebook introduced a set of simpler privacy 
controls which allowed profile owners to control who sees their personal details 
and give profile owners the ability to turn off applications, so their personal 
details can’t be viewed without consent (BBC News 2010a). The three main 
categories for privacy controls are everyone, friends only and friends of friends. 
Also privacy controls can be customised according to the profile owner.  
This section extends the work done in section 5.4 by incorporating the 
disclosure of the personal details into the concept of OSN levels. The aim of this 
first experiment is to investigate a small Facebook network to analyse the 
amount of a ‘friend of a friend’ personal details, the start profile can view. An 
example to illustrate this concept is that profile X and profile Y are friends and 
so are profile Y and profile Z. The aim is to investigate how much of profile Z’s 
personal details, profile X can view. Profile X and Z are not friends directly and 
this will give a better idea about the levels of privacy that profile owners have 
set their profiles to.  
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Any data that is extracted from Facebook (or any other OSN) whether manually 
or automated and used for analysis will be destroyed after the PhD has been 
finished. This is because, if the data was kept beyond the PhD then it can be 
perceived that we may be facilitating the spread of personal details of the 
profiles. Also it would contravene one of the Data Protection Act principles 
which states that data can be only kept for as long as needed.   
For this experiment the following methodology was carried out to build up a 
Facebook network to experiment on:  
1. A profile in a small Facebook network was selected. This acts as the 
start profile 
2. The start profile’s 70 neighbours (friends of the start profile) were 
selected.  
3. For each of the neighbours, 10 of the neighbours’ friends were randomly 
selected and were analysed for the personal details that were presented 
and viewable to the start profile. This means that 700 profiles were 
analysed altogether.  
Also if the neighbours’ friends’ walls could be viewed by the start profile, then 
the comments in the wall made since January 2011 were analysed for presence 
of some of the neighbours’ personal details. The wall for each profile in 
Facebook consists of an activity stream which contains the interaction regarding 
a profile (list of profiles’ statues, what the profile owner wrote on their friends 
profile walls, who the profile owner added as a friend and what the friends wrote 
on the profile owner’s wall).  
The results based on what the start profile (who was not directly linked but who 
is friends with the neighbour) can view, regarding the attributes present in walls 
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in the wider neighbourhood (which in this case contains  neighbours’ friends), 
are presented below in Table 7. 
Table 7-Percentage of Disclosure of Attributes Viewable to the Start Profile 
 
Out of the 11.4 % of the neighbours’ friends who had their walls public for the 
start profile to see:  
 191 comments disclosed the name of the neighbour .  
 2 comments disclosed a photo of the neighbour  
 2 comments disclosed the birthday of the neighbour.  
 10 comments disclosed the current location of the neighbour.  
 6 comments disclosed the hometown of the neighbour .  
 5 comments disclose family information of the neighbour .  
The presence of the neighbours’ details in the walls of the other friends 
demonstrates that the neighbours’ personal details can spread through OSN 
levels due to the actions of some of the neighbous’ friends, in making their 
profiles public. If the profiles are very public then external users or friends of 
friends of the neighbours can view the wall contents.  
Schrammel et al. (2009) results from a study into information disclosure 
involving friends and unknown persons can be used to compare to the results 
presented in Table 7. Schrammel et al. (2009) study involved developing and 
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
189 
distributing an online questionnaire about information disclosure behaviour. 856 
people answered the questionnaire and the results highlighted the following in 
terms of disclosure to an unknown person.  
 55.0% of the users reveal their full name to an unknown person when 
using OSNs 
 65.7% of the users reveal their profile picture to an unknown person 
when using OSNs 
 42.6% of the users reveal their birthday to an unknown person when 
using OSNs.  
 39.8% of the users reveal their friends list to an unknown person when 
using OSNs.  
 12.5 % of the users reveal their email address to an unknown person 
when using OSNs.  
 2.8% of the users reveal their current address to an unknown person 
when using OSNs.  
In terms of the experiment involving the small Facebook network, the start 
profile can count as an unknown person because the start profile’s wider 
neighbourhood does not know the start profile directly and no friendship link 
exists.  
Even though the results from Schrammel et al. (2009) are from questionnaire 
responses in 2008 which focus OSNs in general, not just a specific OSN, there 
are some interesting comparisons. The disclosure of full name is higher in the 
results in Table 7 because the results just focus on Facebook in which most 
users readily disclose their real personal details.  On the other hand Schrammel 
et al. (2009) results takes into account a variety of OSNs and is based on 
human responses rather than analysing the profile manually. With some OSNs 
Chapter 8-Additional Experimental Work Validation 
190 
i.e. MySpace, some users commonly use nicknames as their main identity with 
their real names being mentioned in profile contents.  
Facebook is different to MySpace when it comes to interaction and privacy. If a 
MySpace profile is private then the profile’s interaction can’t be viewed, where 
as a Facebook profile has more control over what can be shown on a profile. An 
example being that the profile owner may display only their name and their 
profile wall (which contains the interactions between them and their friends), but 
not any of their other personal details.         
Schrammel et al. (2009) results for the users claimed to have disclosed birthday 
were higher because in 2008 some OSNs did not offer the users adequate 
privacy controls in terms of who could see what. Some OSNs (e.g. MySpace) 
displayed the age and zodiac sign rather than the birthday.    
For the attribute current location, the results in Table 7 are higher and one of 
the reasons maybe due to the introduction of applications (e.g. Foursquare) 
which can transmit the current location of the user.  
In terms of displaying the list of friends, the results in Table 7 are significantly 
higher because in Facebook even with the privacy controls, some users still 
want to be found and don’t think that displaying the list of friends causes any 
privacy issues. Also with some OSNs (e.g. MySpace) where the user has 
defined their profile as private, the friends list cannot be seen. Some users may 
not like to admit in Schrammel et al. (2009) questionnaire that their networks of 
friends is available to unknown users and therefore lie to protect their privacy.  
Schrammel et al. (2009) results have demonstrated that even back in 2008, 
profile owners claimed their profiles were open for unknown users to view their 
personal details. What the results in Table 7 have shown is despite the 
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introduction of privacy controls, there are still profiles that are publically open 
and available to view. This indicates that more responsibility needs to be taken 
by the OSNs to remind users about the privacy controls and the consequences 
of making your profiles too public.      
Overall the results in this section have shown that in the case of this Facebook 
network, some of the profiles in the start profile’s wider neighbourhood have not 
used the privacy controls effectively. A start profile who does not have a 
friendship link to the wider neighbourhood can view some of the personal 
details of the wider neighbourhood including interactions made because of how 
public their OSN profiles including the walls are.   
In this experiment the user who is able to view some of the public walls of the 
wider neighbourhood, is known to the neighbour but what if the user is not 
known to the neighbour or the wider neighbourhood i.e. an external user who is 
a Facebook user and has no friendship connections to the Facebook network 
used in this experiment.   
8.2.1-Privacy levels and Vulnerability  
The aim of this next experiment is to extend the experimental work using the 
small Facebook network detailed in section 8.2, by incorporating the 
vulnerability concept detailed in this thesis into the experiment and investigating 
if there is a relationship between the relative vulnerability value of the 
neighbours of the start profile and the amount of disclosure of the neighbours’ 
personal details by the neighbours’ friends, whose profiles are viewable to an 
external user.  
An external user in the case of this experiment is a Facebook user (Start profile) 
who does not have any connections to the network used in this experiment. 
This is in contrast to the previous experiment in section 8.2 where there was a 
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link between the user and the neighbour but not between the user and the wider 
neighbourhood (friends of the neighbours). A fake Facebook profile which 
represents the external user was set up and the neighbours’ friends’ were 
visited using the fake profile.  
In regards to this experiment, the vulnerability of the start profile’s neighbours 
was calculated. The individual vulnerability calculated the vulnerability of each 
of the neighbours’ profiles on their own whilst the relative vulnerability of the 
neighbours calculated the collective vulnerability of the neighbours’ friends. The 
Facebook profiles representing the neighbours and the neighbours’ friends were 
analysed for the presence of the attributes name, gender, profile picture, date of 
birth, location, hometown, email address, education and the number of friends.  
The attribute weights for this experiment were calculated using the statistical 
approach derived from the results of the online questionnaire that is detailed in 
section 3.41. Using this approach for the calculation, the attributes name, 
gender, profile picture, date of birth, current location, email address and number 
of friends were classed as very important. Hometown and education were 
classed as important.     
With the results of the vulnerability calculation, the highest relative vulnerability 
value of the neighbours’ profiles was only 0.6125. This is because the individual 
vulnerability of the neighbours’ friends varies in value as well as the weights of 
the attributes. Some of the friends are more private about their personal details 
then other friends. 11.4% of the neighbours have a relative vulnerability of 0.5 
and above.  
Out of all of the 70 neighbours regardless of the VR value, 72.8% of the 
neighbours, contain 1 or more friends that have a wall which can be seen by an 
external user with no direct friendship connection with the neighbour or the 
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neighbours’ friends.  This result demonstrates how vulnerable the actions of a 
friend can make you.  
It is these neighbours which were taken into account when correlating the 
relative vulnerability of the neighbours’ against the amount of disclosure 
(number of comments) of the neighbours’ personal details leaked on the walls in 
the wider neighbourhood, which are viewable and public to an external user. 
The walls contain the activity stream. Spearman Rank was used for the 
correlation.  
 
Figure 23-Correlation between Neighbours with Various Relative Vulnerabilities and Neighbours’ 
Personal Details Disclosure 
Figure 23 shows correlation results for the start profile’s neighbours that have 
various relative vulnerability values, which range from high to low. The results of 
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the correlation show that even though there are no significant relationships 
between the relative vulnerability of the start profiles neighbours and the 
number of comments present on public walls which leak some of the 
neighbours’ attributes, some attributes (e.g. name, date of birth and current 
location) have a weak positive relationship as the relative vulnerability values 
increases.  
The positive relationship indicates that as the neighbours’ friends self disclose 
more attributes that contribute towards vulnerability (increase in relative 
vulnerability of the neighbours), there is an increase in the number of comments 
present on the walls of the neighbours’ friends, which leak the neighbours’ 
personal details and these walls can be viewed by an external user.  
Reasons for the positive relationship being weak include the fact that only 10 of 
the neighbours’ friends profiles were analysed for each neighbour but not all of 
the neighbours friends profile walls were publically available for the external 
user to view. Also only reciprocated friends for each neighbour were analysed. 
This means that both the neighbour and the friend consented to the friendship.  
Figure 24 shows the correlation results but just for the neighbours with high 
relative vulnerabilities (0.5 and above) in this dataset. The analysis of 
neighbours with high relative vulnerabilities links in with the vulnerability concept 
detailed in this thesis. In terms of this experiment and vulnerability theory, 
higher relative vulnerability relates to an increased likelihood that one or more 
profiles in the wider neighbourhood of the start profile, will disclose personal 
details of the neighbours to its friends.  
Regarding this experiment, the addition to the vulnerability theory involves the 
use of OSN levels, by analysing the amount of personal details of the neighbour 
which is leaked by the neighbour’s friends and is viewable by an external user.   
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Figure 24-Correlation between Neighbours with High Relative Vulnerability and Neighbours' 
Personal Detail Disclosure 
The results in Figure 24 highlight there is a weak positive relationship for the 
attributes name and location. The relationship does exist between the amount 
of personal disclosure that the external user can view and the high relative 
vulnerability of the neighbours. This demonstrates that as the neighbours’ 
friends become more public, there is a potential for them to leak the name and 
location of the neighbours in their interactions with other friends.  
Overall what the findings in this section have illustrated is that you do not have 
to be the friend of someone directly in order to learn more about them in terms 
of their identity. The results in section 8.2 contributed towards validating this by 
highlighting the amount of personal detail, an external user who has no direct 
friendship link with its neighbour’s friends but has direct links with the 
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neighbours, can view, despite privacy controls being available. Also some of the 
neighbours’ friends made their walls public and these walls can leak personal 
details about a neighbour via the activity stream and therefore demonstrates 
that vulnerability exists. This finding forms the basis for the spreading of 
personal details and rallies up the issue of what if the user did not know the 
neighbours or the neighbours’ friends in the network.  
In terms of vulnerability and the different OSN levels, the correlations in the 
statistical work demonstrated the presence of a weak positive relationship (for 
the attributes name and current location) between the high relative vulnerability 
of the neighbours and the amount of personal details that were leaked in 
interactions made by the neighbours’ friend and viewable by the external user.  
The findings in this section have shown that the vulnerability theory can be 
applied to external users because of the actions of the neighbours’ friends and 
therefore the issue of OSN levels can be incorporated into the vulnerability 
measure.  
Schrammel et al. (2009) measures for information disclosure to friends and 
unknown people can be incorporated into the relative vulnerability measure as 
highlighted in equation 37, in order to incorporate the issue of OSN levels. This 
is to emphasise the potential for the personal details of the profile to spread 
through the OSN and increase the profile owners’ risk of being vulnerable to 
privacy attacks.  
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where n is the number of the profile neighbours and 
iI
V is the individual 
vulnerability of the neighbour j. For simplicity
iR
V  denotes the relative 
vulnerability of profile i where i =1,.., n and n is the number of profiles in the 
network. The notation PFj ]1,0[ is the information disclosure to friends of 
neighbour j and is calculated using equation 38  
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where PFj is the information disclosure to friends of neighbour j, #pdfj is the 
number of personal details disclosed to friends and unknown people by 
neighbour j and #pdj is the number of available items of personal details on 
neighbour j. The notation PUj ]1,0[  is the information disclosure to unknown 
people of neighbour j and is calculated in equation 39: 
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where PUj is the information disclosure to unknown people  of neighbour j, #pduj 
is the number of personal details disclosed  by neighbour j and #pdj is the 
number of available items of personal details on neighbour j.  
8.3-Case Studies for Attribute Disclosure 
The case studies in Table 8 highlight several OSN start profiles from the 
Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset with varying individual and relative 
vulnerability values and how much the neighbours and other friends of the start 
profile, leak certain personal details (attributes) of the start profile in interactions 
with their top friends. The relative vulnerability is calculated using equation 12 
and the absolute vulnerability is calculated using equation 13.  
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With the vulnerability theory in this thesis, the higher the relative vulnerability 
(VR) of the start profile, the increased likelihood there is of the personal details 
of the start profile spreading due to the actions of its neighbours.  
Table 8-Vulnerability and Disclosure Details for Case Studies 
 
Table 8 highlights the common attribute values that can be leaked by the start 
profiles’ neighbours and other friends. The number of top friends of a profile is 
the number of neighbours which the profile classes as top friends.  In this 
experiment the comments were analysed just for the attribute values of the start 
profiles.  
The number of comments that leak certain attributes is high in some of the case 
studies because quantifying the amount of attribute disclosure of a start profile 
by a start profiles’ neighbours means analysing the walls of each one of the top 
friends of the neighbours.  
Case number 2 in Table 8 highlights that an increased number of top friends for 
the start profile does not always result in a higher amount of leakage of the start 
profile’s attributes. In case 2, a large proportion of the top friends of the start 
profile had private profiles so their interactions were not accessible. The 
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concept of a private profile for this experiment is illustrated in case number 5 
because the start profile is private, the top friends list can’t be viewed so the 
interactions can’t be analysed. Consequently the VR is 0 because this 
experiment focuses on unidirectional friendship.     
In comparison case 7 demonstrates that there will be cases where start profiles 
which display their personal details publically and have top friends that do the 
same but, the top friends or other friends do not disclose any of the start 
profile’s personal details in their interactions. In this particular case, the  wider 
neighbourhood  of the start profile’s were mainly private profiles where the list of 
friends are not accessible and consequently the interactions between the 
profile’s top friends and their top friends could not be analysed. This shows that 
most of the top friends of the start profiles’ neighbours that have private profiles 
have privacy concerns. Although the top friends of the start profiles’ neighbours 
still display personal details about themselves.   
A few of the top friends of the start profiles’ neighbours had public profiles so 
personal details of the profile can still be leaked even though there was no 
leakage in this case.  
The issue of leakage is demonstrated in case 4, where the start profile has a 
low VI value but the collective vulnerability of the top friends is very high and the 
top friends and other friends of the start profile leaked the name of the owner of 
the start profile in its interactions.  
Case 6 highlights the various attributes that can be leaked by the start profile’s 
top friends and other friends. The leakage of a profiles’ education alongside 
name and current location can increase the chances of an adolescent being 
located and stalked (Patchin and Hinduja 2010).  
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Overall what Table 8 has shown is that the top friends as well as other friends of 
a start profile can leak the profiles’ personal details through interactions with the 
wider neighbourhood. A start profile having a high number of top friends does 
not necessarily mean a greater amount of disclosure. This is because of the 
issue surrounding private profiles.  
Private profiles will not allow access to a profile’s list of top friends or any profile 
comments.  One factor which is not incorporated into the vulnerability theory but 
does play a part in information disclosure is the psychology between the start 
profiles’ top friends and the start profiles wider neighbourhood. Even though top 
friends indicates a strong relationship between one profile and another, the top 
friends of a profile may be privacy aware and choose not to disclose the 
profiles’ personal details  in interactions in order to respect the profile’s privacy. 
This issue is touched upon by Gundecha et al. (2011) who states that when a 
new friend is accepted by the user, it is the user’s responsibility to ensure that 
the new friend does not increase the security risk of the user’s friend network.   
8.4-Alternative Ways of Calculating Relative and Absolute 
Vulnerability 
The calculation of the relative and absolute vulnerability values is affected by 
the operators used in both the calculations. In previous experiments the 
arithmetical mean and product operators have been used for the calculation of 
the relative and absolute vulnerability. The aim of this experiment is to 
investigate different combinations of operators and how they affect the 
vulnerability values. For this experiment, the multigraph aspect will be used to 
ascertain the neighbours of the start profile (top friends of the start profile and 
friends that class the start profile as a top friend). Three profiles were selected 
randomly from the Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset and the vulnerability 
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values which were calculated using different operator combinations are stated 
in Table 9.  
Table 9-Vulnerability Results for Operator Combinations 
 
In terms of the operators used to calculate the relative vulnerability (VR) of the 
profile, case B is an example where when the profile has only one neighbour, so 
the MAX and arithmetical mean operators will generate the same value for the 
relative vulnerability.  
The MAX operator in general will highlight the neighbour of the profile with the 
highest individual vulnerability (VI) regardless of what the other neighbours 
individual vulnerabilities are, so an accurate picture of the neighbourhood 
vulnerability may not be given.  On the other hand, the arithmetical mean 
operator takes the individual vulnerabilities of all the neighbours into account 
and gives a more accurate picture of the neighbourhoods’ collective 
vulnerability.  
For calculating the VA, using the arithmetical mean operator takes into account 
both the VI and the VR value and this is reflected by the VA values for cases A, B 
and C where case C has six neighbours and case A has 3 neighbours . Case C 
has the higher VA value because even though the profile self disclosure is more 
private, the likelyhood of the personal details spreading is very high compared 
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to case B where the VI  of the profile is fairly high but the likelyhood of the 
profile’s personal details spreading is quite low.  
This is in comparison to the actions of the operators 
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 for calculating the VA value where case C has a lower VA 
value even though the profile has more chance of its personal details spreading. 
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 operator has a reduction effect and the VA values are too small and 
harder to distinguish which profiles have very high overall vulnerabilities. The 
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operator but unlike the arithmetical mean operator, the 
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operator does not emphasise the importance of the VR value. This is 
demonstrated by how close the VA values of the cases are.  
Ideally the best combination of functions would allow the VA  values not to be 
close together, so it is easier to identify the profiles that are very vulnerable 
overall.  
Also the VR values should be empahsied by the functions because the 
neighbours’ behavior can contribute towards how far the personal details will 
spread. With these criteria, combination 1 is more suited towards an accurate 
calculation of the vulnerability of a profile with the exception of the calculation of 
the VR. The VR value needs to take all the neighbours’ behaviours in to account 
and not just the maximum individual vulnerability value in the neighbourhood. 
There are other ways to calculate the VR and an example is shown in equation 
40  
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where n is the number of the profile neighbour and 
iI
V is the individual 
vulnerability of the neighbour  j. For simplicity
iR
V  denotes the relative 
vulnerability of profile i where i =1,.., n and n is the number of profiles in the 
network. The reason that j is not equal to i is because a profile cannot be 
neighbours with itself. The notation MIN is the minimum individual vulnerability 
values of all j neighbours of profile i where as the notation MAX is the maximum 
individual vulnerability values of all j neighbours of profile i.  
The problem with this operator is that if the MIN and MAX values are the same 
then the VR value will be 1 regardless of whether the values are big or small.  
This experiment has highlighted how the combination of different mathematical 
operators can affect the overall vulnerability and that it is important for the 
operator for the VR calculation to emphasise the true value of the VR.  
8.5-Challenges with Data Extraction 
At present, validating the vulnerability measure with a larger amount of OSN 
profiles, poses a variety of challenges. One example is with Facebook. With 
Facebook, data extraction from OSN profiles has bought about new challenges 
recently due to the tightening of privacy controls by Facebook. In the past it was 
acceptable to build a web crawler to extract a vast amount of data from a 
Facebook network.  Now, in order to extract data, an application has to be built 
using an API (Application Programme Interface). An API as described by IBM 
(2005) is “a functional interface supplied by the operating system or a 
separately orderable licensed program that allows an application program 
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written in a high-level language.” In comparison to using a web crawler to 
extract data from Facebook profiles, with an API application, the profile owner 
has to grant permission to the application in order to extract from their profile 
and profiles of the immediate network of friends.  The profile owner grants 
access to the application in order to know exactly what type of data the profile 
owner has authorised the application to access. For an application that wants to 
extract data, types of permissions that an application may require include:  
 Access to the basic information of the profile owner 
 The ability to post statues, messages, photos and videos on the profile 
owner’s behalf.  
 Access messages in the profile owner’s inbox 
 Access posts in the news feed (known as a wall) of the profile owner.  
 Access the profile owner’s list of friends 
 Access information  that people share with the profile owner 
Granting the list of permission mentioned above to the applications enables the 
extraction if useful and meaningful data but poses serious privacy concerns. 
One issue highlighted by the permissions is that the profile user is responsible 
for the privacy of their friends’ profiles as well. This can cause some ethical 
debate because Facebook’s stance on data extraction profiles is that you have 
to ask permission of the profile owner that you wish to extract from (BBC 2011). 
Applying this statement in a strict way would mean that permission has to be 
gathered by each of the friends of the profile owner for their data to be extracted 
as well. At present, the only way to extract data from Facebook is to use their 
API to build applications to extract and the API does not specify that you need 
the permission from the profile owners friends in order to extract data from their 
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pages. Several OSNs (e.g. Google+ and MySpace) have their own API’s which 
use the same approach.  
Using an API will increase the time needed to extract from Facebook profiles, 
due to the need to ask permission from the profile owner, but a lot of effort will 
be required to gather a large dataset.  In the current climate where privacy and 
data leakage is a main concern for society, asking a vast amount of Facebook 
users ( even if it is users you know) to  grant an application access to extract 
their and their networks data for research purposes may lead with some 
resistance. Alternatives to automated extraction may have to be used (e.g. 
questionnaires and interviews).  
8.5-Conclusions 
The experiments detailed in this chapter have illustrated that the vulnerability 
concept in the thesis does exist in terms of the spread of a start profile’s 
personal through the OSN.  
Experiment 1 showed that there are neighbours  of a start profile that will leak 
the start profiles’ personal details in comments made to the start profile’s wider 
neighbourhood. What the experiment did highlight was that, as there was an 
increase in relative vulnerability from 0.8 to 1, for most attributes, there was a 
weak correlation between the increase in relative vulnerability of the start 
profiles and the number of comments that were written by the start profiles’ 
neighbourhood that leaked some of the start profiles’ personal details.  Out of 
the attributes, only name had a significant and meaningful correlation which 
highlights that name is a popular attribute to be leaked.  There are other factors 
which affect whether profile friends with high individual vulnerabilities can leak 
information (e.g. psychology and relationship strength between the profile’s 
friends and profile’s friends of friends).   
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What the experiment did show is that there is a correlation even when only the 
front page of comments for each profile were extracted as the case was with the 
Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset.  
Experiments  2 and 3 highlighted that some profile attributes (personal details) 
had a weak positive correlation between the high VR of the start profile and the 
number of comments made by the start profile’s friends of friends, on the start 
profile’  neighbourhood walls, that leaked the start profile’s personal details. 
Attributes that had significant weak positive correlations included current 
location, birthday and name.   
This demonstrated that the vulnerability concept can be applied not just to the 
comments made by the start profile’s neighbours but also by the profile’s ‘friend 
of friends’. Consequently, this can facilitate the spread of its personal details 
because depending on how public the start profile’s neighbours or profile’s 
friends of friends are, other users including external users, other friends of the 
start profiles’ neighbours or neighbours of the start profiles who are not top 
friends, can view the comments.     
In terms of privacy levels in OSNs, when investigating a small Facebook 
network, the available privacy controls do not deter users from making their 
profiles public to a friend of a friend or even an external user. This can facilitate 
the spread of personal details. Incorporating the vulnerability theory and privacy 
levels together showed that there is a weak positive correlation for two 
attributes (name and current location). The correlation involved high VR profiles 
and the amount of the profile neighbours’s personal details that are leaked and 
are viewable by the external user. This shows that vulnerability exists in a 
modern day OSN due to the actions of the profiles’ neighbours’ friends, the 
neighbours were made vulnerable because the external user could view some 
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of the neighbours’ personal details and build up the identity of the neighbours’ 
without having a friendship link with them.  
The experimental work presented so far highlighted that two of the most popular 
attributes that were leaked were name and current location and this was 
illustrated in the case studies that were analysed. The case studies showed that 
not all profiles with high VR values have neighbours that disclose their personal 
details via interactions with their friends. This shows that more research needs 
to be done into the psychology between profiles and this will inform the 
relationship strength. Consequently this can be incorporated into the 
vulnerability measure.  
The experiment involving mathematical operators showed that finding the right 
operators to reflect the relative and absolute vulnerability of profiles is 
challenging. The best combination of operators for VR and VA, allows for 
emphasis to be placed of the neighbours of the nodes and the VI value of all the 
because of their role in spreading information. In terms of the VA value, the 
nodes that are vulnerable should be easily identified.  
Ideally the best combination of functions would allow the VA  values not to be 
close together so it is easier to  identify the nodes that are very vulnerable 
overall. Also the VR values should be empahsied by the functions because the 
neighbours’ behavior can contribute towards how far the personal details will 
spread. With these criteria, combination 1 is more suited towards an accurate 
calculation of the vulnerability of a profile with the exception of the calculation of 
the VR. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
9.1-Research Summary and Conclusions 
The increase in the use of OSNs has resulted in a vast amount of personal 
details being displayed on OSN profiles. This can lead to social engineering and 
privacy attacks due to the spread of personal details.  
OSNs can be modeled using graphs where a node represents an OSN profile 
and an edge defines a friendship link between two profiles. In the field of graph 
theory including social network analysis, the various definitions and concepts of 
vulnerability focused on the structure surrounding the node (friends of the 
profile) but not as much on the content of the node (what personal details are 
displayed on the profile itself).  
This formed the motivation for the concept of vulnerability and a vulnerability 
measure. The definition of vulnerability was considered as the likelihood that the 
personal details displayed on an OSN profile will spread due to the actions of 
the friends of the profile in regards to information disclosure of the profile’s 
personal details by the profile’s friends via the interactions with their other 
friends.  
The research in this thesis mainly focused on the design, implementation and 
development of the vulnerability measure as well as the data extraction 
approach for OSN profiles. This was in order to provide real life cases for the 
vulnerability measure to be applied to.  
The first phase of the research involved designing a vulnerability measure 
algorithm (which is detailed in chapter 3) to quantify the vulnerability of an ONS 
profile. The measure consisted of three components: individual vulnerability, 
relative vulnerability and absolute vulnerability.  At this stage, the measure was 
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unnormalised but the measure was normalised later on after significant 
experimental work.  It was concluded after the initial design of the algorithm that 
there were several issues regarding the algorithm. The issues included:  
 Attribute weights-allocating weights which emphasise the importance of 
the attribute’s disclosure in contributing towards the vulnerability of a 
profile.  
 Attributes that are classed as contributing towards vulnerability.  
 Relationship strength between two profiles.  
 Other features of the profile that can contribute towards vulnerability (e.g. 
the number of friends). 
Some of these issues would be explored later on in the thesis.  
The second phase of the research involved developing and implementing a 
data extraction approach for OSN profiles. This was in order to produce real 
data for the vulnerability measure to be applied to, as well as produce an OSN 
graph to aid investigations into structural features that can affect the 
vulnerability of a profile. After further investigation, the OSN graph which 
resulted from the data extraction approach was used in the calculations of the 
individual vulnerability of a profile.   
The data extraction approach for top friends and all friends highlighted various 
issues (e.g. various profile structures and ethical debate) regarding the 
extraction. The profile structure presented significant problems because the 
profile structure can change instantly depending on what the user wants to 
present or what the OSN wants to improve in terms of site functionality. The 
program for data extraction depended a lot on the tokens and tags present in 
the profile structure so a change in profile structure caused extraction issues. It 
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was concluded that the data extraction approach would need to be improved to 
deal with the extraction issues.  
Also in late 2011 MySpace, which was the OSN used in our data extraction 
approach, blocked parsers extracting from MySpace profiles. Therefore our 
parser could not be updated to reflect the new structure of  MySpace profiles.    
The research involving the analysis of the OSN graph produced from the all 
friends data extraction approach highlighted that the number of friends and the 
clustering coefficient were the main structural factors which can affect the 
vulnerability of a profile. These two factors were later taken and added to the list 
of attributes which could contribute towards the vulnerability of a profile.       
The third phase of the research involved the development and implementation 
of the vulnerability measure to real life data. The real life data is based on 
profiles extracted as a result of our data extraction approach and profiles from 
Caverlee and Webb (2008) dataset. Further experimental work took place to 
explore the application of the vulnerability measure. To develop the measure, it 
had to be normalized in order to allow profiles to be compared on the same 
scale.  
The experimental work in chapter 5 concluded that in order for the vulnerability 
measure to be normalized, the relative vulnerability could not be normalized 
using the Min Max method of normalization due to the dynamic nature of the 
OSN. This raised the issue regarding the calculation of the relative vulnerability 
to produce values between 0 and 1 and how to accurately reflect the OSN.  
One issue when choosing the appropriate operator for normalization of the 
relative vulnerability value, is reflecting the vulnerability of the profiles’ 
neighbours in an accurate way. Many different operators were considered to 
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normalize the relative vulnerability. Most of the operators (e.g. MAX) 
emphasized the actions of the profile with the highest individual vulnerability, 
regardless of what the other profiles in the neighbourhood do, or with (e.g. 
MIN/MAX) where if two profiles have an individual vulnerability of 0.2 then the 
relative vulnerability value will be 1 which is incorrect.  On the other hand, the 
arithmetical mean operator was chosen for experiments from chapter 6 onwards 
because of its ability to take the individual vulnerabilities of all the neighbours 
into account when calculating the relative vulnerability.  
Another aspect of the vulnerability measure implementation which was explored 
in chapter 6 was the attitudes of various users towards privacy. The modeling of 
the individual vulnerability of profiles via different mathematical functions 
highlighted how the type of mathematical function used to model the user, can 
also link to the vulnerability approach adopted because of the user’s attitudes 
towards privacy. The experimental work in this chapter concluded that with a 
convex function a small amount of personal detail disclosure can lead to an 
individual vulnerability value straight away resulting in an alarmist approach to 
vulnerability. This function would suit children and adolescent users who are not 
so privacy aware and are more vulnerable to their personal details being 
leaked.  
A concave function on the other hand requires a bigger disclosure to be made 
before the vulnerability value became significant. This would lead to a 
conservative approach on vulnerability. This function would suit aspects of adult 
or older adult users who understand the issues considering privacy. A younger 
adult user might need a function which displays both aspects of concave and 
convex behavior because even though they may be more privacy aware then a 
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child or an adolescent, they still receive peer pressure and this can lead to an 
increased chance of information disclosure.     
The fourth phase of research involved establishing axioms and propositions 
based around the vulnerability measure to form a formal approach for the 
measure. The axioms and propositions were established after substantial 
experimental work into the vulnerability measure. The axioms and propositions 
took into account the dynamic nature of the OSNs and showed how the 
vulnerability of a profile can change because of this.  
In conclusion, the axioms which focused on the individual vulnerability 
demonstrated, that changes in the list of profile attributes that are presented 
and the attributes’ probabilities in making the profile vulnerable, affects the 
individual vulnerability of a profile. Also one main issue is that the disclosure of 
attributes can have different effects on the type of user. The propositions 
emphasized the dynamic nature of the OSN and how this affects the relative 
and absolute vulnerability of a profile. In the experimental work regarding the 
application of the propositions, the product operator was identified as the most 
effective operator in calculating the absolute vulnerability due to its accurate 
reflection of the meaning of vulnerability.  
The fifth phase of the research focused on the validation of the measure. The 
first three experiments using profiles from the MySpace Caverlee and Webb 
(2008) dataset highlighted that vulnerability can occur in OSN profiles because 
of the comments written made by the profiles’ neighbourhood and wider 
neighbourhood. This is despite the experiments only taking place on MySpace 
profiles where only the first page of comments was extracted.  Popular 
attributes of the profile that were leaked by the profiles’ neighbourhood or wider 
neighbourhood included current location and name.  
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In the analysis of the correlation between high relative vulnerability profiles and 
the number of comments written by the profiles’ neighbourhood, that leaked 
certain personal details known as attributes of the profile, most of the attributes 
had a weak positive correlation with the attribute name having a weak positive 
correlation, in which the correlation is significant. What this finding concludes in 
the case of this experiment, is that as the neighbourhoods (top friends) of 
profiles self disclose their personal details more readily and display factors that 
contribute towards vulnerability, the amount of information disclosure of the 
profile’s personal details in comments written by its neighbours does not 
necessarily increase.  More work has to be done into the psychology between a 
profile and its friends in order to ascertain the true strength of relationship 
between the two in terms of interactions on the OSN and incorporate this into 
the vulnerability measure.   
Also private profiles are a factor when validating whether a profiles’ personal 
details are leaked by its friends. A private profile in MySpace or Facebook will 
not show the interaction elements (e.g. comments written on the profile’s wall or 
in the case of Facebook, the activity stream of the profile). If a profile has 
friends that have private profiles, then the interactions between the profile’s 
friends and the profile’s wider neighbouhood can’t be viewed. However if the 
wider neighbourhood of the profile is open to even external users, then the 
comments on the walls of the profile’s wider neighbouhood can be seen .  
To test if the vulnerability can occur in current Facebook OSN profiles, a small 
Facebook network was built up. Incorporating the vulnerability theory into the 
small Facebook network provided extra challenges due to use of privacy levels. 
In comparison to MySpace, Facebook contained an activity stream which 
displayed the details of the interactions that the OSN profile would carry out 
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(e.g. profile comments written to friends and the tagging of photos).Investigating 
the amount of personal details of OSN profiles that were leaked by the profiles 
friends (whose OSN profile and interactions could be viewed by an external 
user) highlighted how the consequences of vulnerability could extend far 
beyond the small Facebook network.  
An external user was defined in this case as a user which had no connections 
to the small Facebook network used for the experiment. There were a variety of 
personal details that were leaked which included name, profile picture, date of 
birth, hometown and location. In conclusion what this experiment showed was 
that vulnerability does occur in an OSN even with a higher level of privacy 
control set by profile owner. All it takes is friends of the profile owner who set 
their profiles to be very public and therefore be available for anyone to view.  
At present, one challenge which will affect the process of validation in the future 
is the automated extraction of data from OSNs (e.g. Facebook). This is due to 
the tighting of privacy. With the move towards the use of an API application to 
extract data due to privacy, permission has to be granted by the profile owner 
before data extraction can take place. This can increase the time it takes to 
automatically extract a big sample of data.       
Overall what this thesis has presented is a vulnerability measure which 
illustrates that the actions of your friends can have an impact on your own 
privacy in terms of your personal details. In the age of systems which require 
personal details for authentication, any leakage of personal details can have 
major effects on our identity and consequently our everyday lives.  
9.2-Contributions to the Field of Online Social Networks 
This thesis proposes contributions into the fluid domain of OSNs, which has 
developed in the last 10 years and is a dynamically moving field.  
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To address the issue of privacy and personal detail disclosure that has arisen 
due to the use of OSNs, this thesis has introduced a framework for a 
quantifiable measure for the vulnerability of a user profile.  
The contributions of this are as follows:   
 A concept of vulnerability which takes into account the information 
disclosure of a OSN profile owner as well as the information disclosure of 
the profile owners friends. An OSN graph is used to aid the concept of 
vulnerability. Vulnerability concepts in the graph theory field (e.g. 
cutpoint, vulnerable bridges and clustering coefficient) only take into 
account the connections between a profile owner and its friends whereas 
our concept of vulnerability acknowledges the profile content as well as 
the connections.  The vulnerability concept is explained in chapter 3 and 
in the papers AbdulRahman et al. (2010); Alim et al. (2011b) and Alim et 
al. (2011a).        
 A normalised measure that will quantify the vulnerability of an OSN 
user’s profile. The measure will quantify vulnerability by using a weights 
system to allocate weights to the profile if the profile displays attributes or 
features which contribute towards information disclosure. The 
normalization of the measure is explained in chapter 6 and in the papers 
AbdulRahman et al. (2011); Alim et al. (2011a) and Alim et al. (2011c). 
The weights based system is detailed in AbdulRahman et al. (2010); Alim 
et al. (2011b) ; Alim et al. (2011a) and Alim et al. (2011c).       
 An extraction approach to retrieve personal data from OSN profiles was 
applied and the extracted friendship connections were used to produce a 
simple OSN graph. Features of the graph are used to aid the vulnerability 
calculation of a user’s profile. The extraction approach and OSN graph 
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analysis are described in chapters 4 and 5 and detailed in the papers 
Alim et al. (2009); AbdulRahman et al. (2010) and Alim et al. (2011b). 
 Different mathematical functions can be used to model the individual 
vulnerability of a profile user based on the type of user (e.g. children, 
adolescent, young adult and older adult). A variety of different users of 
different age groups use OSNs. Different types of users display different 
behaviours when disclosing personal details. Some choose to display a 
lot of their personal details whilst other users are more reserved about 
what they present on their profiles. The mathematical modeling is 
detailed in chapter 6. 
 A set of notations, axioms and propositions which form a formal 
approach for the vulnerability measure. This is all detailed in chapter 7 
and described in the papers Alim et al. (2011a) and Alim et al. (2011c).   
As the vulnerability measure develops, more notations, axioms and 
propositions can be added.  
 Ways to validate the vulnerability measure to prove the concept that as 
the friends of a profile owner can spread the profile’s personal details 
through interactions made with other users. The ways are detailed in 
chapter 8. 
9.3-Future work 
The development and implementation of an approach to measure the 
vulnerability of OSN profiles has opened up opportunities for future work to be 
carried out. The future work includes:  
 Comparing the vulnerability of profile from various OSNs in order to 
investigate how the vulnerability measure works in terms of the personal 
details that are displayed by user and the user’s friends.  
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 Further test the vulnerability measure by using another dataset which 
has all the comments from the profiles extracted rather than just the first 
page (e.g. Caverlee and Webb).  
 Test the vulnerability of profiles across multiple OSNs to compare and 
contrast the vulnerability values of these profiles. To add complexity to 
the analysis, the OSN graphs of each of the profiles can be compared 
across the networks to explore the activity of the neighbourhood of a 
profile. Also one user’s profile in multiple networks can be analysed to 
calculate if the user is more vocal on one network compared to the 
others or if the user discloses more personal details on a specific 
network than the others.  
 Incorporate the strength of relationship between two OSN profiles that 
are friends into the relative vulnerability calculation. The strength of 
relationship between two friends can influence the amount of personal 
information disclosure of each of the friends and whether their attitude 
towards privacy, affects the profile’s personal details being spread 
through the network.  
 Expand the vulnerability measure to take into account that a profile’s 
friends of friends can make the profile vulnerable. This can be 
incorporated into the relative vulnerability calculation of a profile.  
 Link the attribute weights and the attributes classed as contributing 
towards vulnerability with different users. An example that an OSN 
consisting of childrens’ profiles will have different vulnerable attributes 
and weights in comparison to an OSN consisting of profiles belonging to 
adults.  
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 Extract the data from OSN profiles over time in order to investigate how 
the vulnerability of profiles changes over time. We have made a start on 
this work and the results have been submitted to a journal in the paper 
entitled ‘Multi Agents System Approach for Vulnerability Analysis of 
Online Social Network Profiles over Time’. The paper is currently under 
review.   
 Extract the data from OSN profiles using an API application. This is in 
order to produce a larger dataset for validation purposes. Work has 
already started on this and an application has been sent for ethical 
approval.  
 Investigate and apply different mathematical operators to model the 
various behaviors in regards to information disclosure of the profile 
owners and their friends.  
 Propose and apply axioms for the relative and absolute vulnerability. This 
will lead to more propositions being designed to incorporate different 
aspects of the vulnerability model (e.g. strength between friends) 
alongside different operators to reflect the behavior of the friends.    
 Investigating other approaches to calculate the attribute weights in the 
individual vulnerability calculations.  
 The vulnerability values of profiles based in a top friends network and in 
an all friends network, can be compared along with the full walls of the 
profiles, to explore the true extent to which vulnerability occurs in profiles.  
 Identify and analyse outliers in a variety of networks. Outliers can pose a 
danger to OSN users especially children and teenagers.  
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